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“In the matter of slavish imitation, man is the monkey's superior all the time. The average 
man is destitute of independence of opinion. He is not interested in contriving an opinion of 
his own, by study and reflection, but is only anxious to find out what his neighbor's opinion is 
and slavishly adopt it.” – Mark Twain 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
The overall objective of this PhD dissertation is to investigate the role of imitation in 
explaining management control in interfirm relationships. In this introduction, we first 
present the general research motivation, after which we discuss the research methods used. 
Next, we provide an overview of the three manuscripts that compose this dissertation, and 
highlight the linkages between them.  
1. Research motivation 
Over the past several decades, companies have become increasingly engaged in interfirm 
relationships. Various forms of interfirm relationships provide ways of gaining access to the 
specialised skills and competencies that are needed to compete effectively in a globalized 
market place (Groot & Merchant, 2000; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003). In this dissertation, 
the focus is on outsourcing or supply chain relationships, as these in particular have gained 
much popularity among companies in their attempts to improve competitive advantage 
(Anderson & Dekker, 2009; Lumineau & Henderson, 2012). Indeed, strong supply chain 
relationships have considerably increased in importance, and downstream buyers are more 
and more working towards intensified collaboration with upstream suppliers. This 
collaboration enables firms to realize benefits such as reducing costs, increasing productivity, 
accessing valuable resources, and strengthening their market position. Yet, despite this 
enthusiasm to develop cooperative relationships in buyer-supplier exchanges, many supply 
chain relationships do not reach this goal (Chua & Mahama, 2007; Lumineau & Henderson, 
2012). Although statistics differ and definitions of failure vary, research indicates that over 
two-thirds of interfirm relationships fail and that a significant contributory factor is the 
manner in which the risks posed by these relationships are managed and controlled. Thus 
essentially, interfirm relationships expose firms to significant risks; risks that need to be 
mitigated in order to effectively reap collaborative benefits and, hence, to decrease failure 
(Dekker et al., 2013; Langfield-Smith, 2008).  
An important way to do so is through the establishment of good management controls. 
That is, control reduces the perceived probability and impact of undesirable outcomes – 
which, by definition, is risk (Das & Teng, 2001; Langfield-Smith, 2008). In this regard, the 
control literature has pointed to the design of proper management control systems (MCS), 
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which are typically intended to motivate other parties to carry out collaborative plans to 
ensure that desired goals are met (e.g., Li et al., 2010; Kang et al., 2012). Designing MCS, 
however, is not the only manner in which firms attempt to achieve control over their 
cooperative activities. Recent studies find that by reducing concerns about a partner’s 
trustworthiness, the choice of a particular partner to collaborate with can also contribute 
significantly to mitigating perceived risks (e.g., Dekker et al., 2013; Li et al., 2008). The 
critical importance of effective control system design and appropriate partner selection for the 
success of interfirm relationships explains the focus of this dissertation on these two 
management control aspects.  
In particular, while research has devoted considerable attention to the management and 
control of interfirm relationships, we believe that there is still much scope to better 
understand specific control system choices and partner selection decisions. For example, 
there has been only limited attention to how managers inform the design of MCS to manage 
their interfirm relationships, even though this is a key challenge that they face when engaging 
in such relationships (Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 2010). While MCS are the practices and 
processes put in place for the ongoing management of the relationship, important decisions 
also need to be made at the outset of the relationship; that is, when partners are being 
evaluated and eventually selected. Despite the increasing rapidity with which interfirm 
relationships are being initiated, however, we also have limited knowledge of how managers 
select their collaboration partners (Bierly & Gallagher, 2007). In fact, the role of trust in 
partner selection has been identified as an effective control mechanism when relationships are 
initiated under conditions of uncertainty. The natural inclination to handle conditions of 
uncertainty by using perceptions of others’ trustworthiness may facilitate the decision-making 
process, but more research is required to explain how trust in potential partners is actually 
formed, and how this subsequently influences selection decisions. Thus, a better 
understanding of the design of MCS and the partner selection process is warranted, and 
brings out the motivation for this dissertation. 
The goal of this dissertation is, more specifically, to introduce the role of imitation in 
explaining management control in interfirm relationships. Substantial literature documents 
that imitation is a common form of behavior. Indeed, imitation is, amongst many others, a 
fundamental element of human nature. As pointed out by Hedström (1998), when doubt in 
what to do, people frequently look around at the actions of others for possible clues. This 
decision heuristic is practiced in the most varied sets of circumstances, from mundane 
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everyday activities, to intricate organizational decisions. In an interfirm context, imitation 
generally refers to the situation in which organizations, or rather key human actors within 
organizations, are positively influenced by what others organizations do. The importance of 
such imitation in explaining organizational decisions has been pointed out in various 
management fields. Studies have examined imitative behavior, for example, relating to issues 
such as acquisition choices (Haunschild, 1993), application of total quality management 
principles (Westphal et al., 1997), plant location decisions (Henisz & Delios, 2001), 
organizational hiring patterns (Williamson & Cable, 2003), export decisions (Brouthers et al., 
2005), influence strategies (McFarland et al., 2008), firm exit decisions (Gaba & Terlaak, 
2013), and several other organizational processes and management practices. Given the 
pervasiveness of imitation in organizations, it would be interesting, then, to find out whether 
this would also affect management control decisions. No research to date, however, has 
explicitly studied imitation in the context of management control in interfirm relationships. 
The lack of attention in previous literature to this role of imitation might be due to the 
unit of analysis that is often taken. Much research that studies management control in supply 
chain relationships models these as dyadic relationships between a buyer and supplier only 
(Chua & Mahama, 2007; Häkansson & Lind, 2007). Such an assumption enables useful 
theoretical models to be constructed, but it necessarily simplifies the complex reality of 
practice in which supply chain relationships are often part of larger networks. As a result, 
scholars have argued that a promising avenue for advancing our understanding of interfirm 
management control is to explicitly recognize that dyadic relationships sit within a wider 
network (Caglio & Ditillo, 2008; Anderson & Dekker, 2014). That is to say, for supply chain 
managers, although a relationship issue might start with a single supplier, this relationship 
can be more fully addressed only in a broader relationship context that includes relationships 
with other firms – other suppliers or other buying companies (Choi & Wu, 2009a,b). 
Specifically, it are these networks of relationships that allow managers to see how others 
cope with similar situations to their own and thus get some idea as to how to behave 
themselves, giving rise to the phenomenon of imitation. Hence, by studying firms in their 
broader relationship context, one can gain insights into how these relationships influence the 
firms involved and how transfers from firm to firm may take place (Brass et al., 2004; 
Borgatti & Li, 2009). Following this logic, we expand our view in this dissertation beyond 
dyadic relationships, in order to study the influence of imitation on management control in 
interfirm relationships. We argue that imitation is an important factor influencing whether 
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and how interfirm cooperation will be formed and how it will be managed (Lyles et al., 
1996). This line of argument builds on theories and models of imitation that address relevant 
aspects influencing  important choices in cooperative strategies (Smith et al., 1995). 
In the first two manuscripts, we consider vertical buyer-supplier-supplier triads as a 
specific type of network and investigate upstream MCS imitation in the supply chain. More 
specifically, MCS imitation is present when the use of MCS by the buyer with the first-tier 
supplier increases the likelihood of similar MCS being used by the first-tier supplier with the 
second-tier supplier (cf. Haunschild & Miner, 1997; McFarland et al., 2008). That is, 
suppliers are exposed to the MCS used by the buyer when dealing with them, and these may 
then serve as models for the MCS used with their own suppliers. In the first manuscript, we 
examine the occurrence of such MCS imitation, while the second manuscript is designed in 
order to understand its implications for performance. 
In the third manuscript, we incorporate horizontal relationships between multiple buyer 
firms, and study the role of imitation in trust formation and partner selection. In this setting, 
imitation is defined to take place when knowing other buyer firms that trusted a potential 
supplier, i.e., have done business with them, increases a focal buyer manager’s level of trust 
in the supplier, and subsequently its intention to do business with the same supplier (cf. 
Wittek, 2001; Barrera & Buskens, 2007). Our general contention here is that buyer managers 
trust potential partners who are trusted by others in their own network position. In other 
words, in the third manuscript, we investigate how perceptions of a potential partner’s 
trustworthiness are shaped by the actions of others, and how these perceptions, in turn, affect 
decisions regarding own partner selection. 
Taken together, while imitation may take many forms, we view imitation in essence as a 
mechanism where managers observe actions by other firms and change their own beliefs 
and/or behavior as a result (Bingham & Davis, 2012). Throughout this dissertation, we 
assume that imitation occurs intentionally, in that imitators have good reasons for imitating 
others, or at least have good reasons for believing this to be the case. For instance, to the 
extent that the other firms act reasonably and avoid alternatives that have proven to be 
inferior, imitation can be perceived to be a useful strategy for arriving at better decisions. By 
extending previous work on such imitation, which has long been contended to be prevalent in 
daily managerial behavior (Manz & Sims, 1981), in the context of management control, we 
aim to develop a better understanding of how MCS are designed and how collaboration 
partners are selected in interfirm relationships, and supply chains in particular. 
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2. Research methods 
In order to realize the research objectives postulated above, multiple research methods were 
used in this dissertation, keeping in mind that “the impact of management studies depends 
upon the appropriateness and rigor of the research method chosen” (Scandura & Williams, 
2000, p. 1248). In all three manuscripts presented in this dissertation, we use quantitative 
research methods, as the main intent is theory testing. More specifically, we employ both 
survey and experimental methods, which have been widely used in management accounting 
research. The suitability of each method should be judged in light of the specific objectives of 
the study. 
In the first two manuscripts, we employ a survey research method. The reason for this is 
that surveys are generally used to explain and understand phenomena in a natural setting. 
Given that imitation frequently occurs in reality, empirical studies to test models on the 
antecedents and consequences of imitation are indispensable in order to provide a better 
understanding of this phenomenon (Ordanini et al., 2008). Accordingly, the primary purpose 
of the first manuscript is to identify and confirm the existence of MCS imitation in a supply 
chain setting, whereas the second manuscript aims to investigate the performance 
implications of such imitation. Conducting a survey allows us to test this with real company 
data, and thus to gain insights on the occurrence and consequences of imitative behavior in 
practice. While the survey method clearly has its benefits in this regard, it is important to note 
that it also has been the subject of heavy criticism, with the central concern being the 
reliability of the data obtained. Nonetheless, if surveys are constructed and administered 
appropriately, then they can be a source of large-scale, high-quality data (Van der Stede et al., 
2007). Therefore, we paid careful attention to applying sound methodological procedures, as 
to provide valid and interpretable data to address our research questions in the first and 
second manuscript. 
In the third manuscript, we opt for an experimental research method. Experimentation 
involves the active and purposeful manipulation and measurement of variables, thereby 
enabling the researcher to create a research setting and generate data. By manipulating the 
independent variables and using the principle of randomization, experiments also enable the 
investigator to control the research setting and isolate the effects of variables that are 
confounded in the natural environment (Sprinkle & Williamson, 2007). This method is 
considered to be particularly useful for the third manuscript, as the impact of various factors 
influencing partner attractiveness cannot be gauged for relationships that are already in 
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existence. For instance, surveying managers regarding the choices already made is likely to 
result in retrospective biases (Shah & Swaminathan, 2008). An experimental approach can 
help to overcome these issues and also allows us to isolate the causal effect of information 
from other firms’ experiences from other factors influencing perceptions about a potential 
partner’s trustworthiness and subsequent selection decisions, and hence is most suitable to 
answer the research questions in the third manuscript. 
3. Overview of the three manuscripts 
This dissertation consists of three manuscripts in which we study the role of imitation in 
explaining management control in interfirm relationships. Although the three manuscripts 
that compose this dissertation serve a singular overarching purpose, each manuscript 
investigates a different research question and is written to read independently of the others. 
As all manuscripts are interlinked, however, there might be some overlap in the discussed 
literature. In this section, we provide a brief overview of the three manuscripts, and highlight 
the connection between them. Figure 0.1 schematically represents the three manuscripts. 
Manuscript I 
The first manuscript is motivated by the scarce attention that has been paid to where 
managers get the inspiration for the use of specific MCS in supply chain relationships. As 
indicated earlier, despite a growing understanding of the ways in which such relationships 
may be managed using MCS in particular, little is known about how managers inform the 
design of MCS (Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 2010). In particular, we propose that managers 
can get some inspiration about how to control their interfirm transactions, by looking at how 
other firms controlled them. 
The major question underlying this study is whether the use of MCS by buyers with their 
suppliers results in imitative MCS usage by these suppliers with their own suppliers. Previous 
research demonstrates that imitation is present in the supply chain, and that network partners 
often replicate the ways in which relationships are managed (e.g., Fu, 2012; McFarland et al., 
2008). In this study, we particularly consider MCS used for the day-to-day management of 
the relationship and, in accordance with the interfirm control literature, include the 
specification and monitoring of outcomes and behaviors, as well as socialization activities 
such as frequent meetings and communications (e.g., Dekker, 2004; Langfield-Smith, 2008). 
In this context, imitation takes place when the MCS used by the supplier can be, partially, 
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explained as mirroring the MCS used by the buyer towards them. The purpose of this study, 
then, is to examine the conditions under which such MCS imitation is likely to occur. 
Our theoretical framework, which predicts the antecedents of MCS imitation, has an 
institutional theoretical foundation (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006; Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008). We 
specifically propose that under conditions of environmental uncertainty and affective 
commitment, MCS imitation is more likely to happen. In order to test these conditions of 
MCS imitation, a survey was conducted using a unique sample of vertically linked supply 
chain triads. 
The results are consistent with MCS choices being shaped by imitation and also provide 
solid support for our theoretical framework predicting the conditions that make MCS 
imitation more likely. More specifically, we demonstrate that a large variance in the use of 
upstream MCS in the supply chain can be explained in terms of imitation. In addition, we 
provide empirical evidence for the drivers of such MCS imitation. Specific factors that 
impact the level of imitation are, as expected, environmental uncertainty and affective 
commitment. Altogether, this study contributes to our understanding of how MCS are 
developed in interfirm relationships, and particularly sheds light on the occurrence of MCS 
imitation in supply chains. 
Manuscript II 
The second manuscript is strongly related to the previous one and comprises a further 
investigation of the MCS imitation phenomenon. In particular, with the results of the first 
study indicating that MCS imitation exists in practice, the question arises whether such 
imitative behavior is a reasonable strategy. Previous research suggests that imitation can have 
diverse possible consequences. There is, however, little evidence on the actual link between 
imitation and performance (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006; Ordanini et al., 2008). The purpose of 
this study is to clarify the performance implications of MCS imitation in the supply chain. 
While in the organizational learning literature it is commonly assumed that imitating 
successful ideas or practices from other firms is beneficial, we argue that the extent to which 
firms benefit from imitation is contingent upon the conditions in which they operate (Csaszar 
& Siggelkow, 2010; Kim & Miner, 2007). More specifically, we investigate the effectiveness 
of MCS imitation, by considering context similarity of the relationships in which the MCS 
are being spread from one to another. 
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The role of context similarity is particularly relevant for the study of management control 
issues, since the use and effectiveness of MCS is affected by critical characteristics of the 
transaction context. Earlier studies on MCS design in interfirm settings have argued that 
performance results from alignment between transaction context and control structure (e.g., 
Anderson & Dekker, 2005). Taking this a step further, we posit that the performance 
consequences of MCS imitation are dependent on the alignment between the imitated MCS 
and the specific transaction context in which they are to be installed. Similar as in the first 
study, we focus on the MCS used for the day-to-day management of the relationship, and 
follow previous interfirm control literature in conceptualizing this as a combination of 
outcome, behavior, and social controls (e.g., Dekker, 2004; Langfield-Smith, 2008). 
Regarding the transaction context, several contextual factors are taken into account, such as 
the level of uncertainty surrounding the transaction, the degree of interdependence between 
the transaction partners, and the duration of the exchange relationship. We test our model 
using survey data collected from firms involved in a supply chain triad. 
As predicted, we find that MCS imitation can positively impact performance, but that this 
impact hinges upon the level of similarity in the transaction context. The results show a 
positive relationship between MCS imitation and performance in situations of high 
transaction context similarity, whereas the performance benefits substantially weaken when 
MCS are imitated across relationships with dissimilar transaction contexts. Overall, this study 
further contributes to our understanding of how MCS are developed in interfirm 
relationships, and provides interesting insights on the processes involved in successful MCS 
imitation in supply chains. 
Manuscript III 
The third manuscript takes a different perspective and is concentrated on investigating the 
role of imitation in trust formation and partner selection. After all, understanding why certain 
partners are considered to be more attractive and likely to be selected, remains an important 
research issue (Shah & Swaminathan, 2008). Therefore, instead of examining the use of 
specific systems to manage and control interfirm relationships, we now turn to the partner 
selection process, and introduce the role of imitation in forming trust judgments and making 
selection decisions when entering into new collaborative relationships. 
In this study, the focus is on a buyer manager’s trust in a potential supplier firm during 
the initial stages of the relationship, when partners are being evaluated and eventually 
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selected. The starting point is that managers initially need cues to assure them that the 
potential partner is trustworthy, upon which then the decision regarding partner selection will 
be based. The purpose of this study is to explain where these cues may come from. In 
particular, the decision-making process associated with selecting a collaboration partner is 
complex and challenging, especially when there is incomplete information and time pressures 
intensify (Bierly & Gallagher, 2007; Huang et al., 2008). Other firms’ dealings with potential 
partners may then serve as a valuable piece of information in a manager’s attempt to come to 
an assessment of the partners’ trustworthiness, and consequently, to help them decide which 
partner to select. 
Although scholars have speculated about how third-parties may serve as trust 
intermediaries, surprisingly little research has directly assessed how trust might be transferred 
in an interfirm setting (Barrera & Buskens, 2007). The central tenet in this study is that 
interfirm partnering may be affected by a process of imitation, by which managers adapt their 
trusting beliefs and subsequent decisions based on what others have done or are doing. 
Our hypotheses are tested by conducting a between-subjects experiment, in which 
participants assume the role of a buyer manager in charge of handling collaborative 
relationships with supplier firms. Specifically, by varying the information that can be 
obtained from others, we are able to provide insights into how imitation works in the context 
of trust problems. Prior research has established that trust has two components, being 
competence trust on the hand, and goodwill trust on the other hand (e.g., Dekker, 2004; 
Langfield-Smith, 2008). Since competence trust and goodwill trust present a clear distinction, 
we adopt these dimensions of trust in this study. 
The findings support the argument that buyer managers inform their trust judgments by 
looking at other firms that have engaged in similar collaborations. The results reveal different 
effects on the two trust dimensions, as simply knowing other firms that trusted the supplier, 
without any information about the outcomes, is sufficient for the buyer manager’s level of 
competence trust, but not of goodwill trust, in the supplier to increase. The results also 
indicate that higher levels of both competence and goodwill trust, in turn, increase the 
likelihood of the supplier being selected. Taken together, our findings provide evidence on 
imitation effects, and suggest that managers may sometimes come to trust and select a certain 
partner, just because they see others do. In this way, our study highlights unique aspects of 
how trust forms at the earliest stage of an interfirm relationship, and additionally how this 
influences managers deciding with whom to collaborate. 
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MANUSCRIPT I                                                                                                         
MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM IMITATION:                                                   
DRIVING FACTORS                                                  
 
Abstract 
This study investigates the use of MCS in supply chains. We examine whether the use of 
MCS by buyers with first-tier suppliers results in imitative MCS usage by these first-tier 
suppliers with second-tier suppliers. We propose that under conditions of environmental 
uncertainty and affective commitment, MCS imitation is more likely to occur. In order to test 
this, a survey was conducted using a unique sample of vertically linked supply chain triads. 
We show that suppliers often imitate MCS used by the buyer. We also find that 
environmental uncertainty and affective commitment impact the level of imitation. The 
effects, however, are not similar for all types of control. Distinguishing between imitation of 
outcome, behavior, and social controls, results reveal different effects for each type of 
control. Altogether, by expanding our view beyond dyadic interactions, this study contributes 
to the understanding of how MCS become imitated in supply chains. 
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1. Introduction 
This study seeks to improve our understanding of how MCS are developed in supply chains. 
Several studies have investigated the use of MCS in an interfirm setting (Caglio & Ditillo, 
2008; Anderson & Dekker, 2014). Despite a growing understanding of the ways in which 
such interfirm relationships may be managed using MCS in particular, there has been 
relatively little analysis on where managers get the inspiration for the use of specific MCS in 
these relationships. In this study, we specifically investigate the role of imitation involved in 
the establishment of MCS in supply chains. The key question motivating this study is 
whether the use of MCS by buyers with their suppliers results in imitative MCS usage by 
these suppliers with their own suppliers. 
To date, much research that studies the use of MCS in supply chain relationships models 
these as dyadic relationships between a buyer and supplier only. The importance of studying 
not only dyads but also interactions between vertically connected dyads, however, has long 
been acknowledged (Wuyts et al., 2004). Following this reasoning, we consider a vertical 
supply chain involving dyadic relationships at two levels. The first-level dyad involves the 
relationship between the buyer and the first-tier suppliers (S1s), and the second-level dyad 
involves the relationship between these S1s and the second-tier suppliers (S2s). When the 
first-level dyad and second-level dyad are considered in isolation, they paint one picture of 
two companies dealing with each other. However, when we bring them together into a triad, 
this enables us to see different relational dynamics. As is typically the case in outsourcing 
relationships, the S1s then act as a bridge between the buyer and the S2. In this way, firms are 
widely connected with each other, potentially serving as conduits for spreading MCS from 
firm to firm. That is, S1s are exposed to the MCS used by the buyer when dealing with them, 
and these may then serve as models for the MCS used with the S2s. From this point of view, 
it is interesting to investigate to what extent the MCS that the buyer uses to organize the 
relationships with its S1s  are in effect imitated by these S1s to use with the S2s. 
The purpose of this study is to examine the conditions under which MCS imitation in 
supply chains is likely to occur. Our test design emphasizes the role of imitation as an 
intended decision on behalf of the S1 in response to observing the MCS used by the buyer. 
As such, this study essentially looks at the factors influencing the S1’s decision to imitate the 
buyer firm’s MCS in the supply chain. The imitation of management practices in supply 
chains has, in particular, been shown to operate through activation of network ties when a 
focal firm is facing a highly complex environment and is uncertain about the best response 
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(McFarland et al., 2008). In addition, firms’ positive affect toward and identification with 
another may increase their willingness to emulate, resulting in greater imitative behavior. 
Drawing on this stream of work, we expect that next to environmental uncertainty, also 
affective commitment is positively related to the occurrence of MCS imitation in supply 
chains. 
In order to test the model, a survey was conducted. Based on a unique data set consisting 
of vertically linked buyer-supplier-supplier triads, we demonstrate that MCS imitation is 
common in the supply chain, and that it is important to consider several factors in explaining 
this phenomenon. 
For corroboration purposes, we used multiple measures to test for MCS imitation. The 
first measure directly asked S1s to indicate the extent to which they considered the MCS they 
are using towards the S2s as being imitated from the buyer firm. The second measure had S1s 
report on the MCS that the buyer used towards them and, in turn, S2s report on the MCS that 
the S1 used towards them, so that we also indirectly, with non-self-reported measures, 
investigate similarities in MCS. For the two test specifications, the conclusions are the same. 
Overall, we find that the use of upstream MCS can be partly explained in terms of imitation. 
As expected, specific factors that impact the level of imitation are environmental uncertainty 
and affective commitment. Our findings indicate, however, that the imitation effects are not 
similar for all types of control. Besides examining MCS imitation as a whole, we 
distinguished between imitation of outcome, behavior and social controls. It appears that all 
three types of control are being imitated, but the conditions under which they operate seem to 
determine which type of control the supplier will choose to imitate from the buyer. 
In testing for imitation, it is also crucial to control carefully for alternative explanations 
for commonalities in MCS usage. One could argue, for example, that a powerful buyer may 
coercively push specific practices to be adopted in the supply chain. However, our data 
provides evidence that S1s have a considerable degree of freedom when selecting their MCS, 
augmenting the potential of true imitative behavior. Furthermore, we control for situations 
where compliance would be more plausible, such as when the S1 is highly dependent on the 
buyer. In addition, it is important to control for the emergence of similar MCS due to a 
common source. For instance, firms sharing a cultural background or facing similar 
conditions may have preferences for similar MCS. Notably, we find imitation effects above 
and beyond the influence of such common factors, increasing our confidence in the 
inferences drawn. 
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We contribute to the accounting literature by providing evidence on the role of imitation 
in the use of MCS in supply chains. As such, we expand our view beyond dyadic 
relationships, which is important for a more complete understanding of MCS usage. We 
further contend that organizations that are aware of MCS imitation in different parts of the 
supply chain should be better able to control their upstream interactions. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, relevant literature 
is reviewed. Then, our theoretical framework is outlined, and hypotheses are developed. This 
is followed by the empirical part of the study, including a description of the sample and data 
collection, measurement validation, and analysis and results. To conclude, we discuss the 
academic as well as the managerial relevance of the study, and point to some limitations and 
directions for further research. 
2. Literature review 
Traditionally, much research that studies the use of accounting and control systems in supply 
chains is guided by a transaction cost economics framework, and is particularly concentrated 
on how these systems are matched with the transaction context (Williamson, 1985). In this 
regard, several studies have indicated the importance for firms to adapt their MCS to 
transaction, transaction environment and transaction party characteristics (e.g., Anderson & 
Dekker, 2005; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; Phua et al., 2011; Van der Meer-Kooistra & 
Vosselman, 2000). The general reasoning is that these factors are related to potential control 
problems that may arise when engaging in a transaction (Dekker, 2004). MCS should then be 
accordingly installed to mitigate and manage these problems. 
Although these studies certainly contribute to our understanding of how transactions may 
be optimally managed, they have paid little attention to where the inspiration for the use of 
specific MCS is coming from. Specifically, these studies rather offer an explanation of the 
extent to which exchange partners will use MCS as a function of the specific transaction 
context. However, they provide limited insights into the diffusion of MCS across the supply 
chain. 
In fact, the focus in prior studies has predominantly been on individual transactions, and 
supply chain relationships are frequently modeled as dyadic relationships between a single 
buyer and supplier. Such an assumption enables useful theoretical models to be constructed, 
but it necessarily simplifies the complex reality of practice in which supply chain 
relationships are often part of larger networks. Related to this, scholars have highlighted the 
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importance of considering the network of relationships within which firms are embedded 
(Granovetter, 1985; Gulati et al., 2000). The buyer-supplier relationship, for instance, could 
be complicated by relationships that the buyer and/or supplier may have with significant 
others (Choi & Wu, 2009a). Interestingly, firms in such a network of relationships provide 
examples of behavior that is often imitated by other network members (Haunschild, 1994; 
Brass et al., 2004). Through these networks, firms are able to observe and experience possible 
options and strategies that they then might adopt themselves. This provides mechanisms that 
facilitate firms doing the same thing as their network partners are doing. Hence, by studying 
firms in their broader network of relationships, one can gain insights into how these 
relationships influence the firms involved and how transfers from firm to firm may take place 
(Borgatti & Li, 2009).
1
 
The importance of imitation in explaining firm behavior has been pointed out in various 
management fields. This has led many to investigate the mimetic adoption of practices in 
several network contexts, such as supply chains (e.g., Huo et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2010; 
McFarland et al., 2008), and the work has expanded from investigating the diffusion of 
technologies and innovations to examining the diffusion of competitive strategies, 
organizational structures, and management practices (e.g., Chiu et al., 2013; Li et al., 2015; 
Shipilov et al., 2010). The current study adds to this by investigating imitative behavior 
related to MCS issues in a supply chain setting. 
More specifically, we consider buyer-supplier-supplier triads, with each member being 
interconnected by a vertical relationship, as a specific type of network.
2
 In this setting, the 
buyer outsources to the S1 and, in turn, the S1 outsources to the S2. This network design is of 
particular interest as it enables us to study how the dyadic relationship between the buyer and 
S1 influences the dyadic relationship between the S1 and S2. In particular, taking this 
perspective, the S1 sits between the buyer and the S2, and may be inclined to control its 
supplier relationships in a similar way as the buyer firm controlled them. 
                                                 
1
 There are some previous studies that have taken a network perspective to examine the ways in which supply 
chain relationships are constructed and controlled (e.g., Chua & Mahama, 2007; Häkansson & Lind, 2004; 
Mouritsen & Thrane, 2006; Thrane & Hald, 2006), but these studies have mainly relied on actor-network theory 
and did not consider the role of imitation in the development of MCS within such relationships. 
2
 Such a triad can be seen as the smallest unit of a network. That is to say, a network generally consists of nodes 
and the links that connects these nodes. In order to capture the essence of a network, one must at minimum be 
able to address how a link affects another link (Choi & Wu, 2009). The smallest unit of network arrangement 
where this occurs is a triad. In a supply chain context, the buyer and suppliers form the nodes, with the 
relationships between them constituting the links. The question of interest, in our triadic configuration, is then 
how the buyer-supplier relationship affects  the supplier-supplier relationship.  
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We refer to control as any attempt to motivate and enable transaction partners to work in 
such a way that desired objectives are achieved (Speklé, 2001; Kirsch et al., 2002). Control is 
seen here in the sense that there is a “controller” (the company exercising control; e.g., the 
buyer) and a “controllee” (the target of control; e.g., the supplier). In other words, the buyer’s 
control is defined as the process through which the buyer influences the supplier’s actions 
(Donada & Nogatchewsky, 2006; Stouthuysen et al., 2012). Hence, consistent with prior 
supply chain and outsourcing research, we view the buyer as the one who typically initiates 
the transaction and decides on the mechanisms used to manage the transaction (Dekker et al., 
2013). Taking this a step further, as the MCS used by the buyer are readily identifiable by the 
supplier, imitation effects are likely to take place (Greve, 1998). In particular, suppliers are 
exposed to MCS of the buyer when dealing with them. For these suppliers, MCS used by the 
buyer may then serve as models, examples to imitate or emulate, in their interactions with 
their own suppliers (Haunschild, 1993). Specifically in our context, the buyer may use 
various types of control towards the S1 as part of their day-to-day management. When the S1 
engages in outsourcing itself, it is reasonable to expect that they will replicate these controls 
towards the S2s. Therefore, we examine the impact of the buyer’s use of MCS towards the S1 
on the S1’s use of MCS towards the S2, in this direction. 
Building on this line of thought, imitation represents an intended decision. A firm or its 
decision-maker receives a stimulus from other firms’ behavior, and then decides whether to 
imitate or not (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006; Ordanini et al., 2008). It is through such imitation 
that the MCS used by network partners in their respective relationships may come to 
resemble each other. It must be noted, however, that the decision to adopt certain practices is 
often also made in relation to the pressures exerted by dominant other organizations.
3
 In a 
supply chain context, coercive pressures come into play when a powerful buyer requires its 
suppliers to adopt favorable structures or practices. For example, buyers may insist on the use 
of certain supply chain principles (e.g., Ke et al., 2009; Zsidisin et al., 2005; Wu et al., 2012) 
or quality management applications (e.g., Braunscheidel et al., 2011; Ketokivi & Schroeder, 
2004; Nair & Prajogo, 2009) as a condition for doing business. Under these circumstances, 
suppliers have the option of either conceding to buyer demands or foregoing that business 
relationship. In this way, firms are induced to select those practices adopted by others upon 
                                                 
3
 This is helpful in distinguishing imitation from other mechanisms that may be at work that encourage the 
convergence of business practices. The one we focus on is mimetic adoption, where firms choose to engage in 
mimicry of other firms. It is important, however, to contrast this with compliant adoption, by which firms are 
required to comply with demands from outside the firm (Mizruchi & Fein, 1999). The latter may be a form of 
isomorphism, but not of imitation, because firms do not intentionally try to copy the behaviors of others. 
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which they are dependent, leading them to become more similar. Yet, while this coercion 
argument may be applicable to practices to be directly implemented by the supplier, the focus 
in this study is on MCS used for the ongoing management of transactional relationships. This 
involves a broad range of mechanisms that can be used for planning, coordinating, and 
evaluating supply chain partners, for which we believe it is less likely that these will be 
strictly imposed by the buyer. In general, this implies that firms will have the latitude in 
picking and choosing which controls to rely upon. Thus, consistent with earlier work, we 
acknowledge the existence of managerial choice in the use of MCS (Brignall & Modell, 
2000). That is, the buyer’s MCS may be consulted to inform, but not dictate, the use of MCS 
further in the supply chain. In their transactional relationships, firms may decide to follow or 
to model themselves after other players, so that similarity among firms may be observed 
(Kostova et al., 2008). However, this is the result of choices firms make, rather than 
compliance with downstream actors in the supply chain. Given this perspective, the adoption 
of MCS is conceived to represent an organization’s choice and, in our context, to reflect 
voluntary mimicking behavior (Guerreiro et al., 2012).
4
 
The purpose of this study, then, is to investigate the existence of such MCS imitation in 
supply chains, and develop and test a theoretical framework that predicts the conditions under 
which MCS imitation is likely to occur. 
3. Theory and hypotheses 
Our theoretical framework, which predicts the antecedents of MCS imitation, has an 
institutional theoretical foundation. Institutional theory has been widely used in studying 
imitative behavior. It traditionally emphasizes social influences on organizational behavior, 
and suggests that organizations copy practices adopted by others in an effort to acquire 
legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). More recent developments in institutional theory, 
however, posit that mimickers may be economically motivated and that imitation occurs in an 
attempt to improve efficiency. According to this perspective, organizations respond to 
indications that specific actions are worthwhile to pursue (Haunschild & Miner, 1997). 
                                                 
4
 Our data provides some evidence for this reasoning, given the variety in S1s’ MCS usage. That is to say, not 
all S1s are equally adopting the buyer’s MCS towards the S2s. There are cases where the buyer is using similar 
MCS towards several S1s, but where only some of these S1s adopt the MCS in the relationships with their S2s. 
This signifies that imitation effects are at work, where the S1s are making a choice whether or not to imitate the 
buyer’s MCS to use with their S2s. As such our results are unlikely to be strongly driven by compliance, as in 
these situations the S1s would have no other choice but to adopt the MCS imposed by the buyer in their 
relationships with the S2s.  
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Although these variants may differ concerning the underlying motives that trigger 
imitation, they generally propose that organizations will be more likely to take a particular 
action if other organizations have taken a similar action.
5
 
Besides this general notion of imitation, the literature also emphasizes conditions under 
which such imitative behavior occurs. In particular, drawing on institutional theory and 
previous work, we identify two important drivers influencing the occurrence of imitation. The 
first driver relates to information-based imitation, whereby organizations model themselves 
on other organizations when the environment is uncertain. Researchers have long noted the 
tendency of organizations to avoid and reduce uncertainty. One prominent mechanism for 
addressing uncertainty is imitative behavior (Henisz & Delios, 2001). With regard to supply 
chains, uncertainty is a key element of the environmental context. In particular, 
environmental uncertainty refers to the degree to which firms’ external environment in terms 
of its competitors’ actions, technology, and consumer tastes and preferences, is characterized 
by an absence of pattern, unpredictability, and unexpected change (Fynes et al., 2004). These 
unpredictabilities and sudden changes in the external environment result in high information 
processing demand for firms. In such situations, firms are particularly likely to be receptive to 
information implicit in the actions of others (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). Specifically in 
complex and uncertain environments, where a firm’s best course of action is unclear and they 
are not sure what to do, firms frequently look at others and replicate what they did in the 
same situation. The second driver refers to identification-based imitation, where 
organizations copy other organizations that they relate to and with whom they identify. While 
many scholars associate the mechanisms of imitation to uncertainty, others propose 
identification to be the main explanatory concept (Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008). The identity of an 
organization is derived from its reference to and relationship with others. Therefore, the 
relational context that connects two firms, is also important to consider in order to understand 
and explain imitative behavior (Kostova & Roth, 2002). In supply chain relationships, this 
relational context can be described by the level of affective commitment. Affective 
commitment typically has been defined as a party’s intention to continue an exchange 
relationship based on a generalized sense of positive regard for and attachment to the other 
                                                 
5
 In this respect, we recognize that imitation can be driven by both social and economic considerations. That is, 
mimickers may have legitimacy motivations as well as efficiency ones. Moreover, we also believe that all forms 
of imitation have some rational basis, since mimickers always seek benefits, be it social or economic. The 
difference mainly lies in the means through which these benefits are sought (Ketokivi & Schroeder, 2004). The 
social view relates to building normative rationality, referring to choices induced by historical precedent and 
social justification. The economic view focuses on economic rationality, which is mainly motivated by 
efficiency and profitability.  
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party (Geyskens et al., 1996). If a relationship is characterized by high affective commitment, 
and firms experience states of attachment and identification towards another, they are 
increasingly likely to display matching behaviors. Taken together, both environmental and 
relational factors suggest testable hypotheses relevant to predicting the occurrence of 
imitation. In particular, by looking at the effects of environmental uncertainty and affective 
commitment, we investigate the conditions that would lead to greater imitative behavior.
6
 
The focus in this study is specifically on the imitation of MCS used in interfirm 
transactional relationships. The control literature suggests that MCS typically consist of two 
types of control, namely formal and informal control (Das & Teng, 2001; Kang et al., 2012). 
Formal control can be subdivided into outcome and behavior controls. Outcome controls 
focus on the measuring and monitoring of results to be achieved, regardless of the processes 
followed to obtain these results. Behavior controls, in contrast, are to ensure that the 
processes are appropriate, rather than focusing on the results itself. In the case of informal or 
social control, organizations do not specify outcome targets or desirable behaviors, but rely 
on the development of shared values and beliefs and on the internalization of goals. Social 
controls mainly involve socialization activities such as frequent meetings and 
communications. However, while this typology has been widely accepted in the literature, it 
must be noted that the types of control are not completely distinct, and there is some 
agreement that all control systems consist of formal as well as informal controls (Langfield-
Smith & Smith, 2003). The fact is that these controls, jointly, motivate transaction partners to 
work in such a way that desired objectives are achieved (Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 2010). 
This corresponds to the idea of MCS comprising a combination or set of controls (Chen et al., 
2009; Harmancioglu, 2009) In this study we investigate the imitative use of such a 
combination of controls. In other words, we refer to imitation as more extensive overlap in 
the buyer’s and S1’s reliance on MCS and, in line with prior literature, we conceptualize 
MCS as combinations of outcome, behavior and social control mechanisms. 
Based on the prior discussion, we expect that both environmental and relational factors 
will be important determinants of the occurrence of MCS imitation. We make no predictions 
about whether the types of control are impacted differently by various imitation conditions 
                                                 
6
 In this way, we take a multilevel perspective in explaining imitative behavior within the supply chain, in 
accordance with previous research. McFarland et al. (2008), in particular, pointed to the importance of 
considering both macro and micro perspectives, and suggested that the source of imitation in supply chains can 
be a firm’s external environmental context, but also a firm’s specific relational context with another. Therefore, 
we take into account both macro-level factors (i.e., environmental uncertainty) and micro-level factors (i.e., 
affective commitment), and investigate their joint impact on imitation. 
 - 20 -  
 
and leave the matter for empirical investigation. Although we think it is possible that 
different sources of imitation in supply chains are associated with different types of control, 
the literature provides little guidance for hypothesizing how specific sources of imitation 
(e.g., environmental uncertainty or affective commitment) relate to imitation of specific types 
of control (e.g., outcome, behavior, social). What we test is the more general proposition that 
controls are more extensively imitated in supply chains when imitation conditions are 
present. Below, we develop specific hypotheses that predict the conditions under which MCS 
imitation is likely to occur. 
3.1 Environmental uncertainty and management control system imitation 
When firms establish interfirm relationships under conditions of uncertainty, accounting 
literature suggests that they will make use of MCS to monitor transaction partners and align 
their joint processes (Dekker, 2004). At the same time, however, these conditions of 
uncertainty make it difficult for managers to establish effective MCS. Managers often do not 
have information on changes in the environment, how these changes will affect their 
organization, or if their response to these changes will have the intended consequence 
(Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989). In such situations of environmental uncertainty, 
managers may not always have the capacities to make appropriate decisions regarding MCS 
design. Specifically, environmental uncertainty makes it difficult for managers to select 
appropriate actions, because they are unsure about the likelihood of possible outcomes 
(Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). Managers who perceive a higher level of environmental 
uncertainty therefore may be motivated to look at other firms to get some assurance about 
how to act themselves (Henisz & Delios, 2001). In particular, imitating the practices of other 
supply chain members may provide a viable solution to the perceived uncertainty (McFarland 
et al., 2008). In our setting, this means that the supplier would follow the buyer’s use of MCS 
in the interactions with its own suppliers. Therefore, when environmental uncertainty is 
present, we expect that S1s will be more likely to imitate the buyer’s use of MCS to use with 
the S2s. 
H1: When the environment of a first-tier supplier is characterized by high uncertainty, 
we expect higher levels of imitation of the buyer’s use of MCS by the first-tier 
supplier to use with the second-tier supplier. 
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3.2 Affective commitment and management control system imitation 
Affective commitment has been frequently used in previous studies to characterize exchange 
relationships (Stanko et al., 2007). It is also considered to be relevant from an imitation 
perspective as, consistent with earlier propositions that firms imitate those in their network 
whom they know and trust, we believe that affective factors are important in explaining 
imitative behavior (Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989). In particular, affective commitment 
may promote imitation, since organizations tend to imitate those they relate to and those with 
whom they identify (Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008). Specifically, the feelings of attachment and 
identification that affective commitment entails are often linked with a desire to be closely 
associated with the partner, and may lead to a greater willingness to resemble. Moreover, 
firms are also more attentive to the actions of closely related others, as these are generally 
considered as more reliable. Confirming these arguments, the degree to which firms 
experience a state of attachment and identify with another has been found to be positively 
related with practice adoption (Kostova & Roth, 2002). Also in a supply chain context, the 
importance of such relational elements has been acknowledged, and has been suggested to 
play a significant role in the mimetic adoption of management practices (McFarland et al., 
2008). Following this reasoning, when the supplier feels committed to the buyer, they would 
be more inclined to adopt its MCS. That is, given the increased salience and perceived value 
of the MCS used by the buyer, the supplier would be more likely to rely on these MCS to 
manage the relationships with its own suppliers. Thus, in situations of high affective 
commitment, we expect greater imitative use of the buyer’s MCS by S1s to use with the S2s. 
H2: When the relationship between a buyer and a first-tier supplier is characterized 
by high affective commitment, we expect higher levels of imitation of the buyer’s use 
of MCS by the first-tier supplier to use with the second-tier supplier. 
4. Sample design and data collection 
We collected survey data from partner firms working together in close buyer-supplier 
relationships. In particular, the unit of analysis in this study is the vertical supply chain 
consisting of three members – that is, buyer-supplier-supplier triads. 
We gained the cooperation of a large Fortune 500 consumer goods manufacturer that has 
outsourced different production and service functions. In this setting, it is also common for 
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S1s, in turn, to outsource to one or more S2s. This provides a good context for investigating 
the occurrence of imitative behavior.
7
 
Data were collected from both the S1s and S2s. First, contact information for the S1s was 
obtained from the buyer. In particular, 1000 S1s were randomly selected from the buyer’s 
supplier database. Second, contact information for the S2s was obtained from the S1. Each S1 
principal surveyed was asked to select at least three S2s with whom they had recently done 
business. These S2s were explicitly asked to respond to all questions with the S1 who had 
identified them in mind. This procedure ensured that we obtained matched triads. 
The S1s and S2s were both sent emails with a survey questionnaire. Two separate 
questionnaires were developed. For those who did not respond, the survey questionnaire was 
sent again approximately one month after the initial mailing. After two such waves of 
mailing, we received 61 S1 responses and 96 S2 responses. We evaluated informant quality 
using a series of questions that assessed the informant’s ability to respond to the 
questionnaire items, the level of involvement with the partner firm, and the knowledge of 
their firm’s dealings with the partner firm. We excluded 2 S2 respondents with a low score on 
all three informant quality questions. Further, 1 S2 response was eliminated because of 
missing data. This left us with 61 usable S1 responses and 93 usable S2 responses. These S2 
responses named 60 of the contacted S1s. Multiple responses were received for 13 single S1s. 
In this case, where two or more S2s identified the same S1, we treated these as one-to-one 
unique relationships. Matching of the buyer, S1 responses, and S2 responses then resulted in 
91 unique triads.
8,9
 An overview of the key sample characteristics (i.e., firm age, firm size, 
location, industry) is provided in Appendix 1.A. 
To test for non-response bias, we compared early and late respondents for each sample 
(i.e., S1 and S2) on the study variables and some company demographics (Armstrong & 
                                                 
7
 Especially since the buyer is regarded as an organization of high prestige, it is likely to serve as a role model 
for other companies upstream in the supply chain. There is some evidence that the actions of organizations with 
high prestige particularly influence the actions of others (e.g., Burns & Wholey, 1993; Haunschild & Miner, 
1997). That is, organizations attend mostly to the actions of large and profitable organizations, and are often 
seen as role models to be imitated.  
8
 Out of the 61 usable S1 responses, 1 S1 could not be matched to a S2.  Out of the 93 usable S2 responses, 2 
S2s could not be matched to a S1. As such, we obtained complete triadic data for 91 triads in total. 
9
 This research design creates a potential problem of non-independence among the observations because some 
S1s enter the analysis multiple times. To account for this, we also ran the regressions for the subsample in which 
each S1 was linked to only one S2 (n = 60). That is, when two or more S2s named the same S1, we randomly 
selected one of these S2 responses. The analysis (untabulated) shows that the results are somewhat weaker, but 
similar to those of the final analysis. This indicates that our approach of treating multiple responses does not 
greatly affect our findings.  
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Overton, 1977). Because we did not find any significant differences between the responses of 
early and late waves of returned surveys, non-response bias does not appear to be a concern.  
Common method biases were reduced by following recommendations such as obtaining 
measures of the predictor and criterion variables from different sources, protecting 
respondent anonymity, and reducing evaluation apprehension (Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
Although we tried to mitigate common method bias, we still assessed its presence by 
performing the Harman’s single factor test. For each sample (i.e., S1 and S2), the principal 
component factor analysis did not result in a single factor and the first factor did not account 
for most of the variance.
10
 These results suggest that the potential for common method bias is 
low. 
5. Measures and validation 
Scales used to measure the constructs were drawn from the available literature. For each 
multi-item construct we calculated individual scores as mean scores for the combined scale 
items. An overview of the measures is can be found in Appendix 1.B. 
5.1 Dependent variables  
We examine MCS imitation in two ways. Using alternative measures mitigates the possibility 
that results using one measure would capture some factor other than imitation, and that this 
factor would be driving our results. 
As a first measure, we asked the S1s at the end of the survey questionnaire to indicate the 
extent to which they consider the control mechanisms their firm is using towards its suppliers 
as being imitated from the buyer firm, on a five-point scale ranging from “to a very low 
extent” to “to a very large extent”. This measure reflects in a direct way whether controls that 
the buyer uses with the S1s result in imitative usage of controls by these same S1s with S2s. 
In what follows we refer to this measure as the direct measure of MCS imitation. 
The second measure examines MCS imitation in the form of upstream MCS similarity 
between the buyer and the S1 and between the S1 and the S2. To this end, we constructed a 
list of different mechanisms to exercise transaction partner control, which are applicable to 
                                                 
10
 For the dependent variables reported by S1 and S2, the analysis yields three factors with eigenvalues > 1. The 
first factor captured 42 percent and 43 percent of the variance for S1 and S2 respectively. For the independent 
and control variables,  three factors with eigenvalues > 1 resulted from the analysis. The first factor explained 50 
percent of the total variance. 
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various types of interfirm relationships, based on an extensive literature review (e.g., Chen et 
al., 2009; Choudhury & Sabherwal, 2003; Das & Teng, 2001; Dekker, 2004; Groot & 
Merchant, 2000; Mahama, 2006; Mouritsen et al., 2001; Stouthuysen et al., 2012). Both 
formal and informal controls were included. More specifically, a distinction between the 
three different types of control outlined above was made. The outcome control construct 
attempts to capture the extent to which the buyer/supplier relied on outcome controls, 
whereas the behavior control construct reflects the extent to which the buyer/supplier 
employed behavior controls. The social control construct was used to assess the extent to 
which the buyer/supplier applied social controls. All these MCS items were scored on a five-
point scale ranging from “used not at all” to “used extensively”. We asked the S1s to rate the 
extent to which the buyer used specific control mechanisms towards them, and asked the S2s 
to rate the extent to which the S1 used specific control mechanisms towards them. 
The similarity of use for each of the three types of control was then determined as 
illustrated in Equation 1, derived from Westphal et al. (2001) and McFarland et al. (2008) and 
adapted to our study context. We first took the absolute difference between the control 
mechanisms used by the buyer towards the S1 (labeled CB in Equation 1) and the control 
mechanisms used by the S1 towards the S2 (labeled CS in Equation 1). We then converted 
this into a similarity score by subtracting it from the highest value possible. Higher scores 
thus indicate greater imitative use of control. 
       |         |                                                      (1) 
where 
i = control mechanism identifier, 1-3; 
j = triad identifier, 1-91. 
Finally, we model total MCS imitation as a second-order composite latent variable 
composed of the first-order similarity measures. This corresponds to what Jarvis et al. (2003) 
described as a Type II reflective first-order, formative second-order model. The MCS 
imitation construct is treated as a formative construct because the various dimensions are not 
assumed to have a common underlying meaning. Rather, MCS imitation is seen as a linear 
combination of each similarity factor. In what follows we refer to this measure as the indirect 
measure of MCS imitation. 
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5.2 Independent variables 
Environmental uncertainty refers to the degree to which the S1’s external environment in 
terms of its competitors’ actions, technology, and consumer tastes and preferences is 
characterized by an absence of pattern, unpredictability, and unexpected change. It is 
measured using a multi-item scale adapted from Srinivasan et al. (2011). 
Affective commitment reflects the S1’s desire to continue the relationship because of the 
positive affect toward and identification with the buyer firm. The measure is based on the 
multi-item scale developed by Kumar et al. (1995). 
The independent variables were measured from the S1’s perspective, as the S1’s 
perceptions are considered to be the most important predictors of their imitative behavior. For 
both measures, a five-point Likert-type scale was used anchored by “strongly disagree” and 
“strongly agree.” 
5.3 Control variables 
It is important to distinguish the variables that we hypothesize to impact MCS imitation from 
other factors that may affect a firm’s propensity to imitate. Therefore, we control for sample 
characteristics such as S1’s firm age and size. It has been argued that a lower level of 
experience might lead to greater imitative behavior (e.g., Henisz & Delios, 2001). Firm age 
was measured in number of years since the foundation of the firm. Previous studies also 
indicate that organizations are most likely to imitate the strategies of their size peers (e.g., 
Haveman, 1993). Given that the buyer in our study is a large firm, suppliers that are large in 
size as well would be most inclined to imitate. Firm size was measured using a categorical 
scale, and included in the model as a dummy variable with number of employees larger than 
1000 or number of employees less than or equal to 1000. Furthermore, we control for 
relationship duration and contact frequency between the buyer and S1 as these might be 
indicative for strong ties and exert an important impact on the occurrence of imitation (e.g., 
Strang & Still, 2006). This stems from the idea that long-term relationships and frequent 
contacts between firms may lead to an improved exchange of information and thereby may 
amplify imitation. Relationship duration was operationalized as a single-item measure that 
asked the S1s to indicate the number of years and months they have been working together 
with the buyer firm. Contact frequency measures the perceived level of interaction between 
the S1 and the buyer. This multi-item measure was based on Doney and Cannon (1997), 
using a five-point Likert-type scale with anchors at “strongly disagree” and “strongly agree.” 
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In addition, we recognize that dependence of the S1 on the buyer could increase the adoption 
of similar practices (e.g., Kostova & Roth, 2002). The general reasoning is that organizations 
conform to other organizations on which they are dependent to increase their perceived 
validity by those organizations. Dependence was operationalized as a single-item measure 
that asked the S1s to report the percentage of total sales accounted for by the buyer firm, of 
which the natural logarithm is used in our model.
11
 
Given our focus on imitation effects it is also important to ensure that our findings are 
indeed the result of firms’ responses to the actions of other firms. More specifically, our 
central arguments relate to imitation on behalf of the S1 in response to observing the MCS 
used by the buyer, resulting in similar MCS being used in interactions with S2s. The 
complication is, however, that what looks like imitation may simply be firms’ independent 
responses to a common external stimulus (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006; Ordanini et al., 2008). 
While our direct measure of MCS imitation helps alleviate these concerns, one might argue 
that our indirect measure captures similarity and not necessarily imitation. We therefore 
include a number of variables to control for the emergence of similar behaviors due to a 
common source. Similar MCS may, for instance, also be shaped by a common cultural 
context. Scholars have noted that different preferences for certain types of control exist in 
various countries (e.g., Li et al., 2010). The national culture may constitute an important 
determinant of the value that managers share regarding appropriate business practices in the 
supply chain. According to this logic, buyers and S1s located in the same country might be 
using similar MCS because of their cultural background, and not because the S1 decides to 
imitate the buyer. While the buyer’s headquarters in our study are located in the US, data 
were collected from S1s located in different geographical regions. As such, we constructed a 
dummy variable equaling 1 if the S1 is also located in the US, and 0 if the S1 is located 
elsewhere. Besides location, we considered industry similarity between the buyer, the S1 and 
the S2, because similar conditions within the specific supply chain might also have a positive 
influence on the similarity of use of MCS. In fact, the relationship between MCS used by the 
buyer and the supplier may be due to the buyer and supplier being subject to similar 
                                                 
11
 The inclusion of dependence as a control variable addresses the possibility of compliance driving our results. 
While we reason that observed similarities in MCS in the supply chain are due to mimetic rather than compliant 
adoption, we must nevertheless control for this factor. If the buyer would be forcing the S1s to adopt specific 
MCS in the supply chain, the S1s’ responses to this pressure will be determined by the degree to which they are 
dependent on the buyer. The more dependent the S1 is on the buyer, the more it will comply. That is, S1s who 
are highly dependent on the buyer would comply with the requirements coming from the buyer in order to 
secure their position; S1s who are less dependent on the buyer would have greater freedom to make autonomous 
decisions and may deviate from the buyer’s demands.  
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conditions that cause the observed levels of MCS usage by both firms. In this sense, the buyer 
and S1 would be using similar MCS in response to these conditions, and not because the S1 is 
imitating the buyer. One way to measure similarity of conditions is the industry in which 
firms operate (e.g., Haunschild, 1993). A dummy variable was used for similar (i.e., all 
manufacturing) or non-similar (i.e., not all manufacturing) industries between the buyer, the 
S1 and the S2.
 12,13 
5.4 Measurement validation
 
Multi-item measures were subjected to a systematic assessment of unidimensionality, 
reliability and validity. Given that the indirect measure of MCS imitation was operationalized 
as a formative construct, for which conventional techniques are not appropriate for assessing 
their reliability and validity (Jarvis et al., 2003), we did not include this construct in the 
validation process. For the other, reflective, constructs we first evaluated the item sets on the 
basis of item-to-total correlations and exploratory factor analysis. Items with low item-to-
total correlations (< 0.30; Flynn et al., 1994) or low factor loadings (< 0.30; Hair et al., 1998) 
were dropped. For each construct, we compared the remaining items with our conceptual 
definition and concluded that none of the initial conceptualizations changed significantly. 
We further validated our measures via confirmatory factor analysis using LISREL 8.8 
(Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996). Because of the large number of indicators and constructs, and 
the limitation on sample size, different confirmatory factor models were estimated according 
to Bentler and Chou (1987).
14
 That is, we divided the multi-item constructs into theoretically 
plausible groups and ran separate models for these groups.
15
 Model 1 included one part of the 
explanatory variables (environmental uncertainty), and Model 2 included the other part of 
explanatory variables (affective commitment and contact frequency). Model 3 included one 
                                                 
12
 Another way of testing for similar conditions is to see whether the effects still hold when conditions are very 
dissimilar. Therefore, we also ran the regressions  for the subsample in which industries are non-similar (n=44). 
The analysis (untabulated) yields results that are almost identical to those of the main analysis, providing 
confidence that similarity in industry is not responsible for our results. This observation thus supports the 
imitation perspective, stating that firms often show remarkable similarities that cannot be explained by industry 
type alone.  
13
 We also investigated industry similarity in more detail. That is, we looked at whether or not the buyer, the S1 
and the S2 shared the same SIC code at the one-digit and two-digit levels. When including this as dummy 
variables into the regression models, we did not find any significant effect and the results for the other variables 
remained unchanged.  
14
 We followed the recommendation to maintain a parameter-to-sample ratio of at least 1:5. It should be kept in 
mind, however, that the covariance-based method as we used here might still be sensitive to the relatively small 
sample size.  
15
 We also estimated a series of alternative models with different combinations of constructs grouped together. 
This leads to highly comparable results as those of the models reported here.  
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part of the dependent variables (outcome and behavior control) reported by S1, while Model 
4 included the other part of dependent variables (social control) reported by S1. Similarly, 
Model 5 included one part of the dependent variables (outcome and behavior control) 
reported by S2, while Model 6 included the other part of dependent variables (social control) 
reported by S2. To evaluate model fit, we used multiple fit criteria as recommended by Hu 
and Bentler (1999). The results show that the measurement models demonstrated a 
reasonably good fit: (1) Model 1: χ²(9) = 18.57, SRMR = 0.03, CFI = 0.98, and IFI = 0.98; 
(2) Model 2: χ²(8) = 20.48, SRMR = 0.12, CFI = 0.93, and IFI = 0.93; (3) Model 3: χ²(13) = 
41.24, SRMR = 0.07, CFI = 0.92, and IFI = 0.92; (4) Model 4: χ²(2) = 6.08, SRMR = 0.03, 
CFI = 0.98, and IFI = 0.98; (5) Model 5: χ²(13) = 26.15, SRMR = 0.08, CFI = 0.90, and IFI = 
0.91; and (6) Model 6: χ²(2) = 3.64, SRMR = 0.02, CFI = 0.98, and IFI = 0.99. This provides 
evidence for unidimensionality. 
We then assessed the scale reliabilities on the basis of Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 
1951) and composite construct reliability (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). With one exception, the 
results met the recommended criteria. The one exception, outcome control, had an alpha 
value and composite reliability of around 0.60. While we recognize that these values are 
relatively low, the measure was deemed acceptable for further analysis.
16
 
To test convergent validity, we inspected the parameter estimates and their corresponding 
t-values (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). The results show that all the indicators are 
significantly related to their underlying theoretical constructs and, hence, exhibit convergent 
validity. 
We used several methods to test discriminant validity. First, for each construct, we 
compared the average variance extracted with the shared variance with any other constructs 
(Fornell & Larcker, 1981). The average variance extracted should be greater than the highest 
variance that the construct shares with any other construct. This was true for all constructs, 
except for outcome control reported by S1, for which the highest shared variance was with 
behavior control, and slightly higher than the average variance extracted of the outcome 
control construct. Second, to address these issues, we also performed paired construct tests 
for the control constructs in our study (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). Models in which the 
                                                 
16
 Some scholars recommend against automatically applying the cutoff criterion of 0.70 (Cho & Kim, 2015). 
Measures that are newly developed, in particular, can be accepted with reliabilities around 0.60. Other studies 
have indicated that, for two or three item scales, relatively low values are not uncommon. In this case, it has 
been suggested to alternatively look at the average inter-item correlation to evaluate item interrelatedness (Cho 
& Kim, 2015). For the outcome control construct, this equals 0.30, which lies within the proposed optimal range 
of 0.20 to 0.40.  
 - 29 -  
 
correlations between each pair of constructs were constrained to unity were estimated and 
compared to the original unconstrained model. For all pairs of constructs, we found a 
significant difference in chi-square values for the constrained and unconstrained model as 
reported in Table 1.1, demonstrating evidence of discriminant validity. Thus, in the light of 
these favorable results, we consider the constructs to be adequate for further testing.
17
 
Table 1.1: Tests for discriminant validity 
Model Comparison Unconstrained 
model χ² 
Constrained 
model χ² 
∆df ∆ χ² 
S1 
Outcome control vs. Behavior control 
 
41.24 
 
44.15 
 
1 
 
2.91 
Behavior control vs. Social control 79.75 262.92 1 183.17 
Outcome control vs. Social control 39.24 68.12 1 28.88 
S2 
Outcome control vs. Behavior control 
 
26.15 
 
39.28 
 
1 
 
13.13 
Behavior control vs. Social control 54.77 106.91 1 52.14 
Outcome control vs. Social control 33.57 45.92 1 12.35 
∆ χ² >10.83 is significant at p < 0.001; ∆ χ² >6.64 is significant at p < 0.01; ∆ χ² >2.71 is significant at p < 0.10. 
Moreover, it is important to emphasize that we use similarity scores of the control 
constructs as final measures in the analysis. We inspected the correlations between the 
similarity measures of the three types of control, and found that these were all significantly 
below unity. We also examined the variance inflation factors to determine whether the 
similarity measures were not too highly correlated (Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2006). The 
results show that each variance inflation factor is less than 3.3, providing further support for 
the distinctiveness of the final constructs. 
Finally, when similarity scores are calculated between groups, the results are meaningful 
only if the measures are invariant across groups (Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). 
Therefore, before calculating these scores, we tested for measurement invariances of the 
MCS measures across S1s and S2s. It is recommended to test for both configural and metric 
invariance. Configural invariance exists when the measures have the same factor structure 
across groups. This can be tested by examining the degree to which the observed variables fit 
the latent constructs in each group, allowing factor loadings to vary freely within each group. 
Metric invariance exists when both the factor structure and the scale of each observed 
variable are equivalent. This can be tested by constraining the factor loadings to be the same 
                                                 
17
 The difficulty in assigning particular controls to distinct categories has also been acknowledged in the 
literature (Fryxell et al., 2002). Therefore, some overlap between the types of control, is not completely 
surprising. Further note that the items of the control constructs were presented in a randomized format which 
generally poses a more stringent test on discriminant validity (Weijters et al., 2014).  
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in each group and comparing the fit statistics to those of the unconstrained model. We again 
estimated multiple confirmatory factor models, including outcome, behavior and social 
control constructs respectively. Model fit indices for the unconstrained, as well as for the 
constrained models are depicted in Table 1.2. The results indicate that the three unconstrained 
models have an acceptable fit and meet the requirement for configural invariance. Moreover, 
the fit of the constrained models is comparable to that of the unconstrained models, indicating 
that also the requirement for metric invariance is fulfilled. 
Table 1.2: Tests for measurement invariance 
Model Model Fit Indices 
Model 1 (Outcome control)  
- Unconstrained 
- Constrained 
 
χ²(8) = 13.02; CFI = 0.91; IFI = 0.92 
χ²(11) = 16.18; CFI = 0.88; IFI = 0.89 
Model 2 (Behavior control)            
- Unconstrained  
- Constrained 
 
χ²(19) = 70.03; CFI = 0.92; IFI = 0.92 
χ²(23) = 78.60; CFI = 0.91; IFI = 0.91 
Model 3 (Social control)                
- Unconstrained  
- Constrained 
 
χ²(19) = 31.67; CFI = 0.97; IFI = 0.97 
χ²(23) = 48.66; CFI = 0.94; IFI = 0.94 
CFI = comparative fit index; IFI = incremental fit index. 
6. Results and discussion 
Summary statistics and correlations for all variables are reported in Table 1.3. It is 
noteworthy that our two dependent variables, the direct and indirect measure of MCS 
imitation, are highly correlated. Moreover, both are significantly positively correlated with 
environmental uncertainty and affective commitment, as expected. This result should be 
interpreted with care, though, since it is only a univariate analysis. Significant correlations are 
also reported between MCS imitation and the other variables, pointing to the importance of 
including these as controls in our regressions. We elaborate on the multivariate analyses 
below.  
To test the hypotheses, we used ordinary least square (OLS) regression modeling with 
MCS imitation as function of environmental uncertainty and affective commitment, and 
added the variables firm age and size, relationship duration, contact frequency, dependence, 
location, and industry similarity as controls. The results are reported in Table 1.4. 
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Table 1.3: Correlation matrix and summary statistics 
Construct 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. MCS imitation – direct  
2. MCS imitation – indirect  
3. Outcome control imitation 
4. Behavior control imitation 
5. Social control imitation 
6. Environmental uncertainty  
7. Affective commitment 
8. Age S1 
9. Size S1  
10. Relationship duration 
11. Contact frequency 
12. Dependence  
13. Location  
14. Industry similarity 
 
0.470
**
 
0.062 
0.257
*
 
0.499
**
 
0.455
**
 
0.333
**
 
0.375
**
 
0.401
**
 
0.479
**
 
0.613
**
 
0.133 
-0.219
*
 
0.156 
 
 
0.441
**
 
0.644
**
 
0.781
**
 
0.262
*
 
0.405
**
 
0.217 
0.283
**
 
0.458
**
 
0.441
**
 
0.073 
0.071 
0.049 
 
 
 
-0.008 
0.007 
-0.167 
0.178 
-0.094 
-0.039 
-0.052 
0.035 
-0.001 
0.266
*
 
-0.134 
 
 
 
 
0.280
** 
0.400
** 
0.195 
0.125 
0.294
** 
0.213
* 
0.287
** 
0.021 
0.046 
0.226
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.231
* 
0.364
** 
0.310
** 
0.258
* 
0.589
** 
0.451
** 
0.099 
-0.104 
0.004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.219
* 
0.407
** 
0.210 
0.256
* 
0.588
** 
0.208
* 
-0.127 
0.068 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.395
** 
0.274
* 
0.290
** 
0.234
* 
0.046 
0.056 
-0.076 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.475
** 
0.589
** 
0.487
** 
0.076 
-0.206 
0.327
**
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.273
* 
0.283
** 
-0.173 
-0.316
** 
0.390
**
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.556
**
 
0.030 
-0.085 
0.207
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.501
**
 
-0.206 
0.184 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.038 
0.047 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.198 
 
M 3.40 4.15 4.12 4.31 4.01 3.58 3.54 55.20 0.67 8.33 3.32 0.21 0.60 0.52 
SD 0.91 0.52 0.69 0.73 1.02 0.97 0.60 48.02 0.47 8.36 0.78 1.06 0.49 0.50 
*
 p < 0.05;  
**
 p < 0.01 (two-tailed) 
M = mean; SD = standard deviation. 
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Table 1.4: Regression analysis results 
 Dependent variable: 
MCS imitation – direct 
Dependent variable: 
MCS imitation – indirect 
Dependent variable:  
Outcome control imitation 
Dependent variable:  
Behavior control imitation 
Dependent variable:  
Social control imitation 
 Std. Coeff. t-value  Std. Coeff. t-value  Std. Coeff. t-value  Std. Coeff. t-value  Std. Coeff. t-value  
Independent variables  
Environmental uncertainty 
Affective commitment 
 
0.150 
0.167
† 
 
1.466 
1.842
 
 
0.040 
0.282
** 
 
0.356 
2.855
 
 
-0.352
**
 
0.211
†
 
 
-2.732 
1.845 
 
0.407
**
 
0.126 
 
3.381 
1.175 
 
0.007 
0.201
*
 
 
0.065 
2.100 
Control variables 
Age S1 
Size S1 
Relationship duration 
Contact frequency 
Dependence 
Location 
Industry Similarity 
 
-0.167 
0.173
†
 
0.192
†
 
0.438
**
 
-0.094 
-0.083 
0.013 
 
-1.483 
1.669 
1.672 
3.003 
-0.888 
-0.971 
0.140 
 
-0.303
*
 
0.187 
0.326
*
 
0.327
*
 
-0.062 
0.151 
-0.004 
 
-2.476 
1.661 
2.617 
2.062 
-0.537 
1.633 
-0.039 
 
-0.046 
0.001 
-0.226  
0.484
*
 
-0.157 
0.263
*
 
-0.063 
 
-0.322 
0.006 
-1.561 
2.637 
-1.180 
2.454 
-0.550 
 
-0.323
*
 
0.213
†
 
0.148 
0.042 
-0.040 
0.157 
0.221
*
 
 
-2.432 
1.746 
1.095 
0.246 
-0.319 
1.566 
2.075 
 
-0.205
†
 
0.135 
0.551
*** 
0.145 
0.040 
-0.059 
-0.123 
 
-1.724 
1.236 
4.559 
0.941 
0.363 
-0.659 
-1.288 
Model Fit 
R²  
F-value 
 
              0.50 
              8.99
***
 
 
0.41 
   6.29
***
 
 
0.21 
  2.36
**
 
 
0.31 
    4.01
***
 
 
0.45 
   7.27
***
 
†
 p < 0.10; 
*
 p < 0.05; 
**
 p < 0.01; 
***
 p < 0.001 (two-tailed) 
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The regression analysis results for the direct measure of MCS imitation indicate that a 
large part of the variance is explained (R² = 50%). Although H1 predicted a positive 
influence of environmental uncertainty on MCS imitation, this did not turn out be significant. 
The results do show that firms are more likely to imitate in case of high levels of affective 
commitment (β = 0.17; p < 0.10), in support for H2. Likewise, the regression analysis results 
for the indirect measure of MCS imitation, indicate that a large part of the variance is 
explained (R² = 41%). Again, H1 is not supported, as the results show no significant relation 
between environmental uncertainty and MCS imitation. Further, we find that affective 
commitment (β = 0.28; p < 0.01) is positively related to MCS imitation, as predicted in H2. 
We also comment briefly on the control variables. The age of S1 shows a negative 
coefficient, indicating that newer or less experienced firms are more likely to imitate 
compared to their older counterparts. The size of S1 has a positive effect, suggesting that 
firms are inclined to copy the practices of similar sized others. The results further show that 
relationship duration and contact frequency lead to more imitative use of MCS. For 
dependence, no significant association with MCS imitation is found. The variables location 
and industry similarity are not significant either. 
In general, the findings for the direct and indirect measure of MCS imitation are highly 
comparable and, together, they indicate that a large variance of MCS usage in the supply 
chain can be explained as imitation. Based on this, it appears that managers indeed look for 
directions outside their organizational boundaries, when designing their MCS. 
Nevertheless, because only limited support was found for our hypotheses when looking 
at overall MCS imitation, we decided to further examine how each of the control types are 
related to the imitation conditions. After all, it is possible that, under certain conditions, 
particular types of control are less or more likely to be imitated. In fact, given the specificity 
of each type of control, different conditions may favor imitation of different types of control. 
Thus, to further explore the antecedents of MCS imitation and to clarify the types of control 
that are being imitated, we estimated separate regression models for the different types of 
control (i.e., three first-order factors in our model). These dependent variables are called 
outcome, behavior, and social control imitation, and refer to imitation of the buyer’s use of 
outcome, behavior and social controls by the S1 respectively. As shown, distinct effects for 
each particular type of control are found. 
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With regard to environmental uncertainty, results indicate that there is a significant, but 
negative, relation with outcome control imitation (β = -0.35; p < 0.01). An argument for this 
could be that practices previously adopted by others are only influential if these practices are 
perceived as relevant (Greve, 1998; Li et al., 2015). When faced with high levels of 
uncertainty, suppliers may realize that it is particularly difficult to select specific outcome 
targets and to monitor the achievement of these targets (Harmancioglu, 2009; Langfield-
Smith, 2008), which might inhibit the supplier to imitate this type of control. The results for 
behavior control imitation, in contrast, show that the relation with environmental uncertainty 
is positive (β = 0.41; p < 0.01). Since behavior MCS are considered as being more effective 
in situations of uncertainty, because they focus on the required behaviors to generate certain 
outcomes and are therefore better suited to deal with uncertainties (Harmancioglu, 2009; 
Langfield-Smith, 2008), the supplier might be motivated to imitate especially this type of 
control. As such, although environmental uncertainty leads to a preference for imitation, by 
its own nature it also puts constraints on the use of particular controls and determines the 
relative preference. When environmental uncertainty is high, suppliers seem to recognize that 
imitating outcome controls is not the best option, and rather opt for imitating behavior 
controls. Further, the relation between environmental uncertainty and social control imitation 
was not found to be significant. The absence of such finding suggests that besides their 
relevance, practices should also be perceived as transferable in order to be helpful (Li et al., 
2015; Strang & Still, 2006). Social controls, in this regard, do not stipulate outcomes or 
behaviors in advance, but involve socialization activities that focus on creating common 
values and beliefs, and getting supply chain partners to accept goals as their own (Cousins et 
al., 2008; Langfield-Smith, 2008). Even though these socialization practices are observed, 
their results rely on the interaction of the specific parties involved, and may not be easily 
transferred from one relationship to another. This makes imitation difficult, and hence, might 
provide an explanation for the finding that it does not take place for social control.  
In sum, these findings suggest that uncertainty and imitation relate in ways that are more 
complicated than commonly assumed, and may help to explain the insignificant impact on 
MCS imitation in general as presented above. In fact, while environmental conditions may 
create the uncertainty that typically drives imitation, it is the perceived relevance and 
transferability that determines whether suppliers will mimetically adopt specific controls used 
by the buyer. More specifically, when we make the split-up between imitation of various 
control types, our findings suggest that suppliers are selective in what they imitate, in 
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particular by copying those controls that seem to be most appropriate. Thus, in line with 
previous findings on the impact of uncertainty, mimickers show evidence of some 
deliberateness in their imitative behavior (Gaba & Terlaak, 2013). 
Turning to the effect of affective commitment, we find support for a positive relation 
with imitation of practically all control types. This result is consistent with previous work 
explaining how relational aspects may impact the transfer of organizational practices 
(Kostova & Roth, 2002).  
Besides the general observation that suppliers are more likely to imitate when they feel 
more committed to the buyer firm, our findings show that this is the case for outcome control 
imitation (β = 0.21; p < 0.10) and social control imitation (β = 0.20; p < 0.05), but that the 
effect did not reach significance for behavior control imitation. These findings may follow 
from the fact that commitment and identification with an organization often results from a 
strong belief in and acceptance of the values and goals of that organization. Therefore, the 
supplier may be motivated to use similar outcome controls as set by the buyer towards its 
own suppliers in order to make sure that specific targets are met, particularly because they 
may believe this would be beneficial to the achievement of desired results and organizational 
goals. As behavior controls are not that much result oriented (Das & Teng, 2001; Langfield-
Smith, 2008), this process might be less pronounced for this type of control. Moreover, given 
that the supplier is inclined to internalize and identify with the values and goals of the buyer, 
this may enable a higher reliance on social controls to manage the relationship (Cousins et al., 
2008; Langfield-Smith, 2008). Since the controls used by the buyer serve as the supplier’s 
reference point for its own decision-making, the prevalence of social controls in the first-tier 
relationship may consequently stimulate the supplier to also use these in the second-tier 
relationship. In general, as commitment proves to be an important driver of MCS imitation, 
this suggests that imitation in supply chains is not devoid of relevant affective content. 
Regarding the control variables, the results again show an overall negative coefficient for 
firm age. Another factor influencing the propensity to imitate is firm size, specifically related 
to behavior controls. This is in accordance with the reasoning that, when environmental 
conditions are uncertain, firms are inclined to copy the practices of similar others. Our 
findings, in particular, complement previous studies suggesting that large firms copy the 
actions of other large organizations. The results further indicate that the effect of relationship 
duration is primarily related to the imitation of social controls. The long-term cooperation 
between the buyer and supplier could, for instance, resolve the ambiguity of issues such as 
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how social controls entail the development of shared understandings and alignment of goals, 
and in the end lead to organizationally desired objectives, enhancing the imitation of social 
controls. For contact frequency we find a positive impact on outcome control imitation. One 
reason for this could be that through frequent interactions, the supplier might gain a better 
understanding of the value of the outcome controls used by the buyer and, as a result, will 
engage more actively in outcome MCS imitation. Furthermore, although one could argue that 
dependence would influence diffusion in the supply chain, it was not significantly related to 
any of the control types. Finally, it is worthwhile to note that we also controlled for the 
country where the firms are located and for the industries in which the firms operate. The 
findings show that when the buyer and S1 are based in the same country, greater similarity in 
the use of outcome controls is observed. We further detect that industry similarity between 
the buyer, the S1 and the S2 has a positive influence on similarity of behavior controls. This 
confirms that it is important to include these variables in our model in order to rule out 
alternative explanations for similarity in the use of MCS. Crucially though, our results are 
robust when controlling for influences from a common location or similar industry, giving 
some assurance that the above reported effects can indeed be attributed to imitation. 
Taken together, although we find imitation effects to be present within the supply chain, 
these effects differ depending on the particular type of control. In fact, the conditions under 
which they operate seem to determine which type of control the supplier will imitate from the 
buyer. As such, our findings are more nuanced than initially predicted, and provide some 
interesting insights into the mechanisms behind MCS imitation. It has been noted that 
imitative behavior can occur for various reasons. From the traditional perspective of 
institutional theory, firms submit to institutional pressures in the field to maintain their social 
legitimacy. One could thus argue that, enhanced by institutional pressures, MCS would be 
blindly copied by the supplier from the buyer, without subjecting them to further rational 
evaluation. In this study, however, we rather see a deliberate way of imitating, as suppliers 
are not tempted to do so under any circumstances. Managers tend to decide in a careful 
manner whether or not to imitate their partner’s use of MCS. Consistent with previous 
research, these findings suggest that, although organizations may be influenced by 
institutional pressures aiming at social legitimacy, purposive efficiency seeking behavior will 
continue to be present in organizations when designing MCS (Vosselman, 2002). This is in 
line with the proposition that imitation is not always as “irrational” as sometimes presumed 
by institutional theory (Lounsbury, 2008). Rather than viewing imitation as a mindless 
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process by which organizations unconditionally imitate each other, imitation may be better 
understood as an effortful accomplishment. More specifically, our findings suggest that 
organizations imitating controls in the supply chain try do this in a thoughtful way, especially 
by making deliberate decisions regarding whether and what exactly to mimic under which 
conditions. 
7. Conclusion 
This study investigates the imitation of MCS in supply chains. The focus is on whether the 
use of  MCS by the buyer with the S1s results in imitative MCS usage by these S1s with the 
S2s. To this end, a survey was conducted using a unique sample of vertically linked buyer-
supplier-supplier triads. 
Our results support the existence of MCS imitation in the supply chain. More 
specifically, we find that how S1s control the S2s is explained, to a certain degree, as the S1s 
imitating how their buyers controlled them. Given extensive prior empirical support for 
indicators in individual transactions to explain MCS usage, our results are intriguing and 
suggest that the phenomenon of MCS imitation is important to consider. In addition, 
empirical evidence for the drivers of MCS imitation is provided. The effects, however, are 
not similar for all types of control. By making a distinction between imitation of outcome, 
behavior, and social controls, the study reveals that different factors have different effects on 
each particular type of control. Thus, in an attempt to examine the antecedents of MCS 
imitation, we did not only find evidence on when firms are more or less likely to imitate, but 
also on what is being imitated under those conditions. 
This study makes several contributions. We add to the accounting literature by examining 
the role of imitation in explaining the use of MCS in supply chains. By doing so, we 
acknowledge that the effects of firm behavior are not confined to dyadic relationships, and 
that interactions between vertically connected dyads are important to consider. Interfirm 
linkages within the supply chain are specifically found to be important mechanisms for the 
diffusion of organizational practices and structures. These aspects are critical for a more 
complete understanding of the use of MCS within supply chains. This study has important 
implications for management control practice as well. In particular, this study points out that 
control decisions can have consequences not only in the focal dyadic relationship, but also in 
adjacent relationships in the supply chain. Therefore, we believe that firms need to capture 
both the direct and indirect effects of their control decisions. While obtaining a complete 
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model for all network effects is probably impossible, it is our contention that firms that are 
aware of MCS imitation in different parts of the supply chain should be better able to control 
their upstream interactions. In fact, whether or not managers desire their MCS to be imitated 
and passed on, this may occur nonetheless. By recognizing the conditions under which MCS 
imitation is more or less likely to happen, managers should be able to organize themselves to 
provide the best chance for imitation when it is desired and the least chance for imitation 
when it is not. Moreover, managers should be aware that they themselves might be engaging 
in imitation, and should consider in advance whether it is in their best interest for the MCS to 
spread in this manner. As such, managers who are aware of these effects may be able to 
maximize the usefulness of their own imitation of other firms’ MCS practices within the 
supply chain. 
We recognize that this study is not without limitations, but at the same time this provides 
interesting opportunities for further research. For example, we focused on relationships 
between a consumer goods manufacturer and its first- and second-tier suppliers. Further 
research could examine a broader range of industries and other types of relationships. 
Furthermore, although our sample size is quite comparable to other studies that have relied on 
matched samples, and is regarded as adequate for the used statistical techniques, a larger 
sample size would have provided more confidence in our results. Another limitation relates to 
the measures. While the scales used to measure the MCS constructs were based on existing 
literature, they were not included before in a study in this exact form. We attempted to 
construct a list of very specific control systems in order to better capture the phenomenon of 
imitation. The validation of the measures, however, pointed to some weaknesses, especially 
for the outcome control construct, and we recognize that the scale items for this construct 
should be refined. The use of similarity scores for our dependent variables might also raise 
some concerns. We did include a more direct measure of imitation, ensuring that our results 
are indeed driven by upstream MCS imitation in the supply chain, but as this measure only 
pertains to MCS imitation in general, further research is important to see whether our results 
regarding imitation of the specific types of control also hold when other operationalizations 
are used. Moreover, we note that the explanatory variables mainly related to the first-level 
dyad, while limited information was collected on the conditions of the second-level dyad. 
Recall that we have chosen the factors investigated in this study as predictors of MCS 
imitation, and first-tier relationship characteristics in particular were argued to play an 
important role. Imitation theories generally point to predictive factors outside of the focal 
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relationship itself. Nevertheless, extending our framework by also considering second-tier 
relationship characteristics, could provide some further clarifications on the MCS choices. In 
addition, while this study examined MCS imitation going up the supply chain, it would be 
interesting for further research to find out whether a similar process may occur moving 
downstream. Another avenue for further research has to do with the precise motives for this 
imitative behavior. As pointed out above, imitation may be driven by both social and 
economic considerations, and it is hard to disentangle these two sets of effects. More research 
is necessary to further clarify the underlying reasons. 
In conclusion, we believe this study provides several new insights. The findings support 
the argument that the network perspective is important for a better understanding of the 
adoption of MCS, and particularly shed light on the occurrence of MCS imitation in supply 
chains. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1.A: Sample characteristics 
 
Average value 
Age S1 (number of years)  55.20 
 
Frequency in sample Percentage of sample 
Size S1 (number of employees) 
< 100 
100 – 500 
501 – 1000 
> 1000 
Unknown  
 
2 
9 
18 
58 
4 
 
2 
10 
20 
64 
4 
Location S1  
Africa 
Asia 
Australia 
Europe 
North America 
South America 
 
1 
2 
0 
32 
55 
1 
 
1 
2 
0 
35 
60 
1 
Industry Sector S1 
Manufacturing 
Transportation 
Finance & Real Estate 
Services 
Multiple 
 
62 
4 
1 
18 
6 
 
68 
4 
1 
20 
7 
Industry Sector  S2 
Manufacturing 
Transportation 
Finance & Real Estate 
Services  
Multiple 
 
53 
9 
0 
29 
0 
 
58 
10 
0 
32 
0 
N = 91 
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Appendix 1.B: Survey measures 
 Measurement Model Estimates 
Std. Coeff.  t-value 
MCS imitation – direct a 
(directly reported by S1)
 
Please indicate the extent to which you consider the 
control mechanisms your firm is using towards its 
suppliers as being imitated from the client firm.
 
 
 
 
 
N.A. 
MCS imitation – indirect  
(buyer’s use of control mechanisms towards S1 
reported by S1 and S1’s use of control mechanisms 
towards S2 reported by S2) 
Please indicate the extent to which the client firm  
is using the following control mechanisms towards 
you as a supplier. 
Outcome control 
b
 
(S1: α = 0.62; CR = 0.60; AVE = 0.34; HSV = 0.37) 
(S2: α = 0.55; CR = 0.58; AVE = 0.33; HSV = 0.14) 
Open book accounting to create transparency in 
supplier’s results.  
Financial incentive system in the form of benefit 
sharing.  
Information systems designed  to help monitoring 
the outputs delivered by the supplier.  
Establishment of target costs for the supplier.
* 
Behavior control 
b
 
(S1: α = 0.91; CR = 0.90; AVE = 0.70; HSV = 0.56) 
(S2: α = 0.80; CR = 0.83; AVE = 0.55; HSV = 0.30) 
Information systems designed to help monitoring 
behavior of the supplier.  
Joint alliance board serving as an authority 
structure in which both partners have control over 
the activities performed.  
Interorganizational chart to clarify the roles and 
responsibilities of the partners in the relationship.  
Task groups including employees of both partners 
to carry out the activities and to facilitate and 
monitor the processes.   
Open book accounting to create transparency in 
supplier’s processes.** 
Periodic meetings to facilitate direct observation of 
the behavior of the supplier.
**
 
Social control 
b
 
(S1: α = 0.90; CR = 0.90; AVE = 0.69; HSV = 0.42) 
(S2: α = 0.88; CR = 0.88; AVE = 0.65; HSV = 0.31 
Face-to-face communication to help establish 
shared norms and beliefs.  
Joint task groups or cross-functional teams 
including employees of both partners to enhance 
shared decision making and goal setting.  
Regular joint meetings to understand the 
relationship’s goals, values and norms.  
Workshops and training practices to stimulate 
shared understandings and common goals.  
S1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.414 
 
0.706 
 
0.602 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.728 
 
0.899 
 
 
0.970 
 
0.723 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.811 
 
0.701 
 
 
0.865 
 
0.921 
 
S2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.444 
 
0.456 
 
0.766 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.619 
 
0.899 
 
 
0.755 
 
0.535 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.745 
 
0.817 
 
 
0.897 
 
0.754 
 
S1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.723 
 
6.690 
 
5.642 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.923 
 
10.851 
 
 
12.378 
 
7.843 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9.090 
 
7.403 
 
 
10.030 
 
11.067 
S2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.452 
 
3.538 
 
5.076 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.078 
 
9.666 
 
 
7.743 
 
5.115 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.940 
 
9.047 
 
 
10.394 
 
8.075 
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Open book agreement to  enhance trust between the 
partners in the relationship.
**
 
Joint alliance board serving as an authority 
structure in which both partners are involved to 
enhance shared decision making and goal 
setting.
**
 
Environmental uncertainty 
a
 
(α = 0.93; CR = 0.94; AVE = 0.72; HSV = 0.56) 
The rate at which products/services are becoming 
obsolete in the industry is very fast. 
Actions by competitors are hard to predict. 
Demand and consumer tastes are hard to predict. 
The production technology in this industry changes 
fast. 
Technological advances in this industry are hard to 
predict. 
Consumer demand for our products/services is very 
unstable. 
 
 
0.921 
 
0.880 
0.778 
 
0.836 
 
0.834 
 
0.851 
 
 
 
11.365 
 
10.503 
8.679 
 
9.681 
 
9.645 
 
9.949 
Affective commitment 
a
 
(α = 0.72; CR = 0.75; AVE = 0.53; HSV = 0.25) 
 
Even if we could we would not drop the client firm 
because we like being associated with them. 
We want to continue as a supplier of the client firm 
because we genuinely enjoy our relationship with 
them. 
Our positive feelings towards the client firm are a 
major reason we continue to work with them. 
 
 
 
0.641 
 
0.446 
 
 
0.991 
 
 
 
 
5.371 
 
3.969 
 
 
7.267 
 
Relationship duration 
Length of relationship with client firm:… years.  
 
 
N.A. 
Contact frequency 
a
 
(α = 0.81; CR = 0.82; AVE = 0.60; HSV = 0.48) 
The client firm’s personnel often visit our place of 
business. 
The client firm’s personnel make more calls than 
those of other client firms.  
The client firm’s personnel spend considerable time 
getting to know our people. 
 
 
 
0.790 
 
0.763 
 
0.764 
 
 
 
 
7.924 
 
7.614 
 
7.634 
 
Dependence 
Percentage of total sales from client firm:… %. 
 
N.A. 
a 
Items measured on a five-point Likert-type scale anchored by 1 = “strongly disagree” and 5 = “strongly agree.” 
b 
Items measured on a five-point Likert-type scale anchored by 1 = “used not at all” and 5 = “used extensively.”  
Notes: N.A. is not applicable; * item dropped after inspection of item-to-total correlation; ** item dropped due 
to low factor loading; all p-values < 0.01; α = Cronbach’s alpha; CR = composite reliability; AVE = average 
variance extracted; HSV = highest shared variance.  
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MANUSCRIPT II                                                                                                        
MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM IMITATION:                                           
PERFORMANCE IMPLICATIONS                                                  
 
Abstract 
This study investigates MCS imitation and its performance implications in a supply chain 
setting. MCS imitation takes place when MCS that buyers use with first-tier suppliers result 
in similar MCS usage by these first-tier suppliers with second-tier suppliers. We predict that, 
while imitating successful MCS has the potential to improve performance, its effect weakens 
in the presence of transaction context dissimilarity between both relationships. Our 
hypotheses are tested using survey data collected from firms involved in the supply chain 
network. In line with our expectations, we find that the effectiveness of MCS imitation hinges 
upon the level of transaction context similarity. Specifically, dissimilarities in the level of 
uncertainty and duration of the first-tier and second-tier relationship weaken the association 
between MCS imitation and performance. Therefore, designers of MCS should not be 
seeking gains from blind imitation but should consider adapting the MCS to meet the specific 
relationship needs as prompted by factors such as uncertainty and duration. In sum, the 
results of this study illustrate that a good understanding of the suitability of MCS imitation is 
important for performance in the supply chain, and especially point to the critical role of 
transaction context similarity for MCS imitation to be successful. 
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1. Introduction 
The development of strong interfirm relationships has become more prevalent and important, 
as the business world has become more globalized and competitive. Various forms of 
interfirm relationships are being adopted by organizations as competitive tools (Meira et al., 
2010).  Although interfirm relationships are considered as a source of competitive advantage, 
it appears that the failure rate of such relationships is quite high (Ireland et al., 2002; Lunnan 
& Haugland, 2008). This high failure rate suggests that, even when potential benefits are 
present, firms face substantial difficulties in attaining them. One reason for this is the high 
level of risk associated with these relationships (Das & Teng, 2001; Langfield-Smith, 2008). 
In particular, there is the risk of transaction partners not cooperating in good faith, as well as 
the risk of unsatisfactory performance even when partners cooperate fully. Essentially these 
risks imply that firms might not achieve the intended or desired objectives of interfirm 
transactions they engage in (Dekker et al., 2013). One way to deal with these risks is the 
establishment of appropriate governance structures. The design of proper management 
control systems (MCS), in particular, seems to be crucial for the management and 
performance of interfirm relationships (Kang et al., 2012; Li et al., 2010). 
In this regard, researchers have devoted considerable effort to explaining firms’ 
governance choices, including the design of MCS, in interfirm relationships. This prior 
research has mainly relied on economic explanations, but has paid relatively little attention to 
behavioral and network aspects (Caglio & Ditillo, 2008). In fact, the focus has predominantly 
been on individual relationships and how organizations match MCS with the specific 
transaction context. The design of MCS in this way is seen as an organization’s independent 
choice as determined by various transaction cost factors. While this perspective is useful to 
explain how transactions may be optimally managed and controlled, control decisions clearly 
do not occur in isolation from a broader social context (Chua & Mahama, 2007). One specific 
consequence of this social context is that MCS choices are likely to be influenced by the 
opinions and actions of others in their network. According to this, it would be useful to take 
into account the implications of the larger network of relationships in which individual 
transactions and also interfirm relationships are situated (Gulati et al., 2000). Such networks, 
in particular, are considered as having a strong influence on imitative behavior, and may lead 
organizations to imitate the MCS of other organizations to which they are connected (Brass et 
al., 2004). 
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Management scholars are paying increasing attention to the phenomenon of imitation.  
There is ample evidence that individuals and, by extension organizations, rely on 
observational learning or imitation in the decision-making process (Gaba & Terlaak, 2013; 
Nikolaeva, 2014). Several studies have examined the processes through which organizations 
may be influenced by other organizations, as well as the conditions under which imitative 
behavior occurs. Another point of attention in imitation research concerns the performance 
outcomes arising from imitative behaviors. It has been suggested that imitation can have 
diverse possible consequences (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006; Ordanini et al., 2008). There are 
few studies, however, that have empirically investigated whether there is a link between 
imitation and performance. 
We specifically look at the imitation of MCS in supply chains. The study of imitative 
behavior is considered to be particularly relevant in this setting, as supply chains typically 
involve multiple relationships that are connected in various ways (Kumar et al., 2011). It are 
these networks of relationships that allow organizations to see how others cope with similar 
situations to their own and thus get some idea as to how to behave themselves. Previous work 
in this area, for instance, has indicated that interfirm linkages within the supply chain provide 
an effective channel for the diffusion of management practices (Fu, 2012). This may also be 
the case for MCS and, hence, lead to the spread of MCS throughout the supply chain. In 
accordance with the organizational control literature, we focus on MCS used for the ongoing 
management of the relationship that include the specification and monitoring of outcomes 
and behaviors, as well as socialization activities such as frequent meetings and 
communications (e.g., Das & Teng, 2001; Dekker, 2004; Harmancioglu, 2009; Kang et al., 
2012; Kirsch et al., 2002; Langfield-Smith, 2008). Operationally, we consider buyer-supplier-
supplier triads and investigate upstream MCS imitation in the supply chain. More 
specifically, MCS imitation is present when the use of MCS by the buyer with the first-tier 
supplier increases the likelihood of similar MCS being used by the first-tier supplier with the 
second-tier supplier. That is, suppliers are exposed to the MCS used by the buyer when 
dealing with them, and these may then serve as models for the MCS used with their own 
suppliers, giving rise to the phenomenon of MCS imitation. 
This study is designed in order to clarify the effectiveness of MCS imitation, based on the 
notion that effective cooperation depends upon the adoption of proper MCS. Because we 
expect firms to imitate MCS that have proven to be successful, we take an outcome-based 
approach to imitation. While it is commonly assumed that imitating successful practices from 
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other firms has a positive impact on the imitating firm (Haunschild & Miner, 1997), however, 
we argue that such imitation is not always valuable. In particular, one factor that appears 
crucial for successful imitation is context similarity (Csaszar & Siggelkow, 2010), reflecting 
the degree to which practices that work in one context are likely to work in another. 
Following this reasoning, we investigate the effectiveness of MCS imitation by considering 
context similarity of the relationships in which the MCS are being spread from one to 
another. After all, while firms may be inclined to copy successful MCS throughout the supply 
chain, the exchange conditions in the first-tier relationship do not necessarily mirror those in 
the second-tier relationship. This raises the question of what happens when firms, imitating 
MCS, are subject to different transaction contexts. As the literature provides broad support 
that control design is influenced by critical characteristics of the transaction context, several 
contextual factors that may affect the use of MCS are taken into account, such as the level of 
uncertainty surrounding the transaction, the degree of interdependence between the 
transaction partners, and the duration of the exchange relationship (e.g., Dekker, 2008; Ding 
et al., 2013; Fryxell et al., 2002; Langfield-Smith, 2008; Van der Meer-Kooistra & 
Vosselman, 2000; Yang et al., 2011). The ultimate test of whether a form of control is 
effective is the extent to which an association between the controls used and performance can 
be established. Because in our setting MCS are copied from the first-tier relationship to be 
used in the second-tier relationship, we specifically look at the impact on performance in the 
second-tier relationship, as reflected in a range of relationship outcomes. 
Accordingly, we posit that MCS imitation is likely to have favorable effects, specifically 
in the form of performance spillovers across relationships in the supply chain. However, to 
the extent that the relevant parties are subject to different conditions, this creates a mismatch 
between the used controls and the transaction context that weakens the effect of MCS 
imitation and hampers good performance. We test our model using survey data collected 
from firms involved in a supply chain triad. As predicted, we find that MCS imitation can 
positively impact performance, but that this impact crucially depends on the level of 
similarity in the transaction context. The results show a positive relationship between MCS 
imitation and performance in situations of high transaction context similarity, whereas the 
performance benefits substantially weaken when MCS are imitated across relationships with 
dissimilar transaction contexts. This highlights the importance of a good fit between the 
controls copied and the context in which the transactions take place. 
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This study extends prior accounting literature by arguing that, in addition to the dyadic 
focus on supply chain relationships, it is worthwhile to consider the larger network of 
relationships when studying MCS choices. More specifically, looking at imitative behaviors 
in a supply chain triad, we point out that MCS decisions can have consequences not only in 
the focal dyadic relationship, but also in adjacent relationships in the supply chain. 
Furthermore, this study contributes to the discussion of the value of imitation by providing a 
better understanding of the conditions where a stronger propensity to imitate would lead to 
performance improvements. Our study particularly emphasizes the critical role of transaction 
context similarity for MCS imitation to be successful. This has important implications for 
both theory and practice. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the theoretical 
background and hypotheses are described. This is followed by a presentation of the research 
methodology, after which we discuss our analysis and results. In the final section, 
conclusions are drawn, together with some limitations and suggestions for further research. 
2. Theory and hypotheses 
Extant research on the use of MCS in interfirm relationships has generally adopted 
transaction cost economics (TCE) as its theoretical framework. This stream of research 
maintains that minimizing transaction costs is the fundamental driver for firms to implement 
MCS (Williamson, 1985). As such, prior studies have referred to various transaction cost 
factors as important determinants of MCS choices (e.g., Anderson & Dekker, 2005; Dekker 
& Van den Abbeele, 2010; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; Van der Meer-Kooistra & 
Vosselman, 2000). Although TCE-based studies contribute to our understanding of interfirm 
management control, this understanding might be incomplete in the sense that it does not 
consider the larger network of relationships in which firms are embedded (Anderson & 
Dekker, 2014). 
TCE is focused on individual economic exchanges, and states that MCS are designed in 
response to critical characteristics of the specific transaction context. Inherent to this is the 
treatment of each transaction as a discrete event. It has been recognized, however, that 
practically any transaction is nested within a broader social context (Granovetter, 1985). 
From this perspective, control decisions may not only be affected by the characteristics of the 
transaction context, but also by this social context, and specifically the opinions and actions 
of others (Gulati, 1998). For these reasons, previous research has argued that transactions 
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should be seen as part of larger relational networks, and that connections with others can 
significantly influence control decisions (e.g., Chua & Mahama, 2007; Thrane & Hald, 2006). 
TCE furthermore posits that the design of MCS is the product of rational choice. It is 
assumed that several alternative MCS are consciously weighted, and that the decision-maker 
is able to choose the best one. While managers may strive to make rational choices, however, 
they often do not have the capacities to do so (March & Simon, 1958). In search for solutions, 
they may therefore look for directions in their own immediate environment and copy the 
decisions or actions of other organizations (Cyert & March, 1963). This allows saving costs 
and time, because they not compare alternatives, but rather make a choice after having 
observed the actions of other decision-makers, even if this may be suboptimal in terms of 
selecting among alternatives. Also for control issues, previous research indicated that 
rationality is more bounded than traditionally assumed, and that organizations often need to 
rely on learning mechanisms to inform their control decisions (e.g., Mayer & Argyres, 2004; 
Vanneste & Puranam, 2010). 
Taken together, these arguments suggest that social influences and information derived 
from others are likely to affect MCS choices. This is not to say that characteristics of the 
specific transaction context are not important, rather we contend that organizations are not 
atomistic players, and point to the value of incorporating the broader social context.
18
 In this 
regard, scholars have highlighted the importance of the network of relationships in which 
firms can be placed, as this influences their behavior and performance (Gulati et al., 2000). 
Such interfirm networks may specifically function as a mechanism for the diffusion of 
organizational practices and structures (Brass et al., 2004). The fact is that, through these 
networks, firms are able to observe possible options and strategies that they then might adopt 
themselves. This may be especially relevant when decision-making is a relative costly 
process (Ketokivi & Schroeder, 2004). Thus, with regard to MCS design, firms might get 
some inspiration about how to control their interfirm transactions by looking at how other 
firms controlled them. 
                                                 
18
 There are some previous studies that incorporated the social context, but these mainly viewed this as 
emerging over time, in that prior relationships between partners may influence the governance of future 
relationships between those partners (e.g., Gulati, 1995; Dekker, 2008). In contrast, we refer to the broader 
social context, and emphasize situations where the use of controls in one relationship affects the use of controls 
in another relationship, being between different partners in the network. 
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In this study, we particularly consider buyer-supplier-supplier triads, with each member 
being interconnected by a vertical relationship.
19
 We thus investigate a vertical supply chain 
that involves dyadic relationships at two levels. The first-level dyad involves the relationship 
between the buyer and the first-tier suppliers (S1s). The second-level dyad involves the 
relationship between these S1s and the second-tier suppliers (S2s). When these two dyads are 
considered in isolation, this provides one picture of two companies dealing with each other 
(Choi & Wu, 2009b). Bringing them together into a triad, enables us to see different 
relational dynamics, and specifically how the management of one relationship could have 
spillover effects in a different one. One process through which this may occur is MCS 
imitation, where MCS are copied from one dyadic relationship to another dyadic relationship 
in the supply chain.
20
 In particular, taking this perspective, the S1 sits between the buyer and 
the S2, and may be inclined to control its supplier relationships in a very similar way as the 
buyer firm controlled them. Specifically in our context, the buyer may use various types of 
control towards the S1 as part of their day-to-day management. These may then serve as 
models, examples to emulate or imitate, for the S1 when designing the controls to be used 
towards the S2. Thus, imitation represents an intended decision on behalf of the S1 in 
response to observing the MCS used by the buyer, resulting in similar MCS being used in 
interactions with the S2 (Nikolaeva, 2014). In this regard, it is important to emphasize that 
the buyer’s MCS may be used to inform, but not dictate the design of MCS further in the 
supply chain. Consistent with previous research, we acknowledge the existence of managerial 
choice in the design and implementation of MCS (Brignall & Modell, 2000). While it is 
reasonable to assume that the buyer may influence the S1’s choice of MCS in their 
relationships with the S2s, for example by suggesting and discussing the benefits to be gained 
through the use of MCS, these will not be strictly imposed by the buyer, and the choice to 
adopt ultimately lies with the S1. This condition highlights the critical importance of active 
agency on part of the S1 in the use of MCS. The decision of the S1 to follow the MCS used 
by the buyer, could therefore be described as voluntary mimicking behavior. 
                                                 
19
 This triad can be seen as one of many subsets of the wider network (Caglio & Ditillo, 2008). The fact is that 
any focal dyad is influenced by a range of third-party relationships. Our intention is not to obtain a complete 
model for all network effects. In studying imitative behavior, we confine our attention to one specific triad, 
consisting of a buyer-supplier and supplier-supplier relationship (Borgatti & Li, 2009). 
20
 Although communalities in the supply chain may also stem from coercive pressures, for example when the 
supplier is required to adopt favorable practices used by the buyer firm, we specifically focus on the mimetic 
adoption of practices, where the supplier chooses to engage in mimicry of the buyer firm (Braunscheidel et al., 
2011). This is important to distinguish imitation from the more general isomorphism phenomenon, where firms 
may behave similarly but not because one intentionally tries to copy the actions of the other (Ordanini et al., 
2008).  
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In general, imitation is then conceptualized here as resulting from observational learning, 
where firms view the actions of other firms as informative for their own decision-making 
(Gaba & Terlaak, 2013). That is, a firm observes the actions taken by others, evaluates them, 
and then decides whether to imitate or not. More specifically, organizational learning 
perspectives suggest that organizations will discriminate in their imitation decisions, selecting 
or avoiding specific actions or practices based on their perceived impact (Baum et al., 2000; 
Li et al., 2015). This builds on the premise that, by observing others, organizations can 
potentially learn about the myriad strategies, technologies, and managerial practices produced 
by the ongoing explorations of others in their environment and imitate those that are 
successful (Levinthal & March, 1993). According to this logic, organizations will look at the 
success of decisions or practices adopted by other organizations, and imitate if they believe 
that these decisions or practices have generated successful outcomes (Haunschild & Miner, 
1997). In this sense, mimetic behavior can be considered as rational, because firms imitate if 
they think the practice is beneficial, and this suggests it might also benefit them. 
Such an outcome-based approach to imitation has been used in previous studies, for 
instance on issues such as entry mode choices (Lu, 2002), organizational hiring patterns 
(Williamson & Cable, 2003), and electronic commerce applications (Huang et al., 2010). 
Applied to MCS usage in our setting, suppliers would be likely to assess the MCS used by the 
buyer against the overall performance of their relationship, and imitate the use of these MCS 
if this appears to have resulted in success. In terms of implications, organizational learning 
perspectives generally believe that outcome-based imitation is a useful way for firms to 
improve their performance. Supporting these arguments, previous research has shown how 
imitation of successful strategies effectively can lead to higher levels of performance 
(Brouthers et al., 2005). This suggests that imitation indeed can have a positive impact for the 
imitating firm. 
It is important to recognize, however, that imitation, even of successful practices, is not 
always valuable. This is because a practice that seems to be successful, prompting other 
organizations to start imitating it, might turn out to be not so successful under different 
conditions. Therefore, the extent to which firms benefit from imitation is contingent upon the 
conditions in which they operate. Specifically in this regard, it can be argued that for another 
organization’s actions to be valuable for the imitator, the organization and its context must be 
seen as sufficiently similar to that of the imitator (Greve, 1998; Baum et al., 2000). 
According to this, context similarity has been identified as an important factor for successful 
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imitation (Csaszar & Siggelkow, 2010). It reflects the degree to which practices that work in 
one context are likely to work in another. Prior literature cautions against imitation when 
there is a lack of context similarity. For instance, Kim and Miner (2007) noted that 
replicating exact strategies that have been successful for other firms without tailoring them to 
one’s own firm may be perceived as safe, but this simple imitation may not be effective 
because outcomes can depend on the context in which an organization operates. Also Sousa 
and Voss (2008) indicated that best practices do not work for all firms due to contextual 
mismatches, and that imitation can lead to suboptimal results. Along the same line, Argote 
and Ingram (2000) emphasized that, in order for imitation to be successful, the practices that 
are copied must fit or be compatible with the new context. 
The impact of context similarity is particularly relevant for the study of MCS, since an 
appropriate match between control and context is important. According to the discriminating 
alignment perspective, transactions which differ in their attributes need to be aligned with 
governance arrangements which differ in their competencies, in order to accomplish an 
optimal match (Williamson, 2008). Following this line of thought, misalignment between the 
transaction context and the control structure has been associated with subsequent transaction 
problems and poor performance (e.g., Anderson & Dekker, 2005; Hoetker & Mellewigt, 
2009; King & Clarkson, 2015). This points out that the control structure should be uniquely 
tailored to the control needs of the specific transaction, and that it cannot be simply replicated 
within other transactions (Speklé, 2001). In this sense, the appropriateness of particular 
controls used in interfirm transactional relationships, is considered to be contingent upon a 
number of contextual factors related to the transaction in question. 
Specifically in this regard, we examine three elements associated with the transaction 
context that have been identified by previous research as important factors that are relevant 
for choosing suitable MCS, namely the level of uncertainty surrounding the transaction, the 
degree of interdependence between the transaction partners, and duration of the exchange 
relationship. Important causes of uncertainty stem from the environment, such as market and 
technological fluctuations. The primary consequence of uncertainty is that it warrants a more 
elaborate use of MCS to anticipate and deal with unforeseeable situations (Dekker, 2008; 
Ding et al., 2013). Interdependence refers to the condition that outcomes and strategies of a 
firm are affected by the joint behaviors or activities of both parties. A higher level of 
interdependence increases firms’ reliance upon each other and, as a result, generates a higher 
need for appropriate MCS to manage these interdependencies (Dekker, 2008; Mahaptra et al., 
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2010). The length of cooperation is also an important concept in understanding the use and 
effectiveness of control in interfirm relationships. Long-term relationships are likely 
associated with more familiarity from prior experiences and trust between the partners, which 
may work as alternative MCS, hereby enabling partners to gradually use less hierarchical 
elements in organizing their relationships (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Dekker, 2008). As such, not 
only specific characteristics of the transaction, but also factors that relate to the relationship 
of exchange partners that might affect transactions between them are important to consider. 
These factors together determine the need for control. MCS choices should then be 
adequately aligned with these underlying context characteristics in order to be effective. In 
other words, the degree to which an identical set of controls implemented by different firms 
leads to similar results, would be dependent on the context in which the transactions take 
place. 
Based on this line of reasoning, it follows that the performance implications of MCS 
imitation depend upon the alignment between the imitated MCS and the specific transaction 
context in which they are to be installed. Because in our setting MCS are copied from the 
first-tier relationship to be used in the second-tier relationship, we specifically look at the 
impact on performance in the second-tier relationship. In accordance with the above 
arguments, we contend that alignment in this second-tier relationship is most likely to result 
if  MCS are imitated when the transaction context is similar in the first-tier relationship and 
second-tier relationship. Otherwise, when the transaction context is dissimilar, imitation 
would lead to the use of either less or more control than needed given the transaction risks 
faced, and is expected to hinder good performance (Anderson & Dekker, 2014). For example, 
for complex exchange relationships in the second-tier involving high levels of uncertainty or 
interdependencies, imitation would only be effective if the first-tier relationship is also 
characterized by high uncertainty or interdependencies. If not, a rather simple control 
structure lacking adequate safeguards would be adopted in the second-tier, exposing the firm 
to substantial residual risk due to the insufficient use of controls. By contrast, the  potential 
consequences of imitating an excessively complex control structure to a simpler relationship 
might include a loss in flexibility and decision-making speed due to the imposition of 
bureaucratic controls (Leiblein et al., 2002; Sampson, 2004), which when it is not strictly 
needed can also be seen as an obtrusive form of control that may offend the other party’s 
sense of autonomy and cause inappropriate actions (Deci & Ryan, 1987; Stump & Heide, 
1996). Similarly, when the second-tier relationship has been in place for a long-time and 
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entails high levels of trust and reduced goal conflicts, imitation would only be effective if the 
first-tier relationship has also been in place for a long-time. If not, an extensive control 
structure might be adopted in the second-tier, which might lead to excessive costs (Dyer & 
Singh, 1998; Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005) and, perhaps even more importantly, is likely to 
foster an atmosphere of distrust and may potentially damage the relationship (Das & Teng, 
1998; Fryxell et al., 2002). Conversely, adopting a relatively simple control structure in a 
relationship that only recently has been established would be inadequate, as these typically 
require higher levels of monitoring and safeguarding tactics. 
Thus, although we expect that MCS imitation in the supply chain is capable of improving 
performance, this effect will be contingent upon context similarity. In fact, when the 
transaction context is similar, copying MCS in the supply chain is considered to be valuable, 
because the MCS are likely to fit the specific context. In this case, effective control might be 
achieved among transaction partners, and better performance would result. By contrast, when 
firms are confronted with a different transaction context, imitation of MCS in the supply 
chain would not be appropriate, because the MCS copied would not fit the specific context. 
As a consequence, misalignment between control structure and transaction context would 
result, and the performance benefits of MCS imitation are not likely to achieved. 
Accordingly, we predict that the impact of imitation on second-tier relationship performance 
is weakened with transaction context dissimilarity between the first-tier relationship and 
second-tier relationship. In particular, we investigate MCS imitation and its performance 
implications by incorporating the three transaction context characteristics identified above. 
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: The impact of MCS imitation on second-tier relationship performance weakens  
with (a) uncertainty dissimilarity, (b) interdependence dissimilarity, and (c) duration 
dissimilarity. 
Altogether, we expect the relationship between MCS imitation and second-tier 
relationship performance to be moderated by transaction context similarity, such that MCS 
imitation has a positive impact on second-tier relationship performance to the degree that the 
transaction context is similar. From a technical standpoint, our predictions pertain to the slope 
of the relationship between MCS imitation and second-tier relationship performance as a 
function of transaction context similarity. 
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In this framework, we refer to imitation as similarities in use of MCS throughout the 
supply chain and, in line with previous research, we conceptualize MCS as combinations of 
outcome, behavior and social controls (Dekker, 2004; Langfield-Smith, 2008). Outcome 
control focuses on the measuring and monitoring of results to be achieved, regardless of the 
processes followed to obtain these results. Behavior control, in contrast, is to ensure that the 
processes are appropriate, rather than focusing on the results itself. Social controls do not 
specify outcome targets or desirable behaviors, but entail the alignment of goals through 
socialization activities. Although these various types of control are distinct in the actions or 
the approach required for their execution, controllers often use them in combination, creating 
a set of controls (Kirsch et al., 2002; Harmancioglu, 2009). This implies that MCS imitation 
comprises the replication of the overall set of controls. In fact, as we expect firms to use a 
variety of controls to make sure relationship objectives are met, the MCS imitation construct 
is designed to capture these different types of control by including the extent to which 
outcome, behavior as well as social controls are similar in the first-tier and second-tier 
relationship. Corresponding to the contingency approach to fit, the primary interest of this 
study is to examine the performance effects of the imitative use of such a combination of 
controls (Grabner & Moers, 2013). Specifically by considering transaction context 
similarities as outlined above, the purpose is to provide a better understanding of the 
conditions under which it is, or it is not beneficial to imitate MCS in the supply chain. 
3. Sample design and data collection 
The unit of analysis in this study is the vertical supply chain consisting of three members – 
i.e., buyer – first-tier supplier – second-tier supplier triads. In this setting, the buyer 
outsources production or service functions to the S1 and, in turn, the S1 outsources to the 
S2.
21
 
                                                 
21
 The data set includes transactions where the products or services exchanged between the buyer and S1 differ 
from those exchanged between the S1 and S2. As such, we investigated industry similarity over the supply chain 
triad, and looked at whether or not the S1 and the S2 shared the same SIC code at the two-digit level. A dummy 
variable was used for similar (same industry code) and non-similar industries (not same industry code). It 
appears that our sample is rather evenly distributed in terms of industry similarity, with 51 percent of the S1 and 
S2 firms operating in the same industry, and 49 percent operating in different industries. When including the 
industry similarity dummy into the regression models as a control variable, we did not find any significant effect 
and the results for the other variables remained unchanged. Also when industry similarity is added as a 
moderator of the relationship between imitation and performance, this did not turn out to be significant. Hence, 
the MCS do not appear to be industry specific, with the effectiveness of MCS imitation not being dependent on 
industry similarity.  
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Survey data are collected from the S1 involved in the supply chain triad. The population 
for our study was drawn from the database of a European association for supply chain 
professionals. For inclusion in our study, we chose supply chain directors, supply chain 
managers, and other top managers in charge of supply chain management and handling 
outsourcing engagements. In total, 2086 potential respondents were sent an email message 
with a link to the online survey. 
The survey questionnaire was split into two parts. First, we asked the respondents to 
complete a short questionnaire in order to assess whether their companies were suitable for 
the study, having a collaborative relationship with both a buyer firm (representing the first-
tier relationship) and a supplier firm (representing the second-tier relationship). If answered 
in the affirmative, the respondents were directed to the main questionnaire. They were 
instructed to complete the questionnaire with regard to a specific relationship with a buyer 
and supplier firm about whom they are knowledgeable. More specifically, to avoid selection 
bias but still capture exchange relationships that were salient to the respondents, they were 
asked to respond to the questions with respect to the most recent relationship with a buyer 
and supplier firm in which they were personally involved. Furthermore, since our data were 
collected from a single respondent, we tried to reduce common method bias by separating the 
measurement of predictor and criterion variables in the main questionnaire (Podsakoff et al., 
2003). In fact, by constructing the survey in such a way that the respondents had to report 
first on aspects of the first-tier relationship, subsequently on the second-tier relationship, and 
finally on the similarities between the two, we interspersed the dependent between the 
independent variables. Following Narayanan et al. (2011), this procedure should minimize 
common method bias by eliminating the saliency of any contextually provided retrieval clues 
and diminishing the respondent’s motivation to use prior responses to answer subsequent 
questions. 
To maximize response rates, the survey questionnaire was sent again approximately two 
and four weeks after the initial mailing. In addition, phone calls were made to respondents 
who started the first part of the questionnaire but failed to complete the second part. In the 
end, we received 184 completed questionnaires. Informant quality was evaluated using a 
series of questions that assessed the informant’s ability to respond to the questionnaire items, 
the level of involvement with the partner firms, and the knowledge of their firm’s dealings 
with the partner firms. We excluded 14 respondents with a low score on the informant quality 
questions. Further, given the level of detail required in answering the questions, several 
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responses included missing values or were not fully completed. We eliminated 51 responses 
because of missing data. The final sample thus consists of 119 usable responses.
22
 
Key sample characteristics are represented in Appendix 2.A. The average S1 firm in the 
sample has an age of 42 years. The sample covers small to large S1 firms, with number of 
employees varying from less than 100 to more than 1000. In terms of industry representation, 
the responses relate to multiple industry groups. In particular, the S1s were asked to indicate 
the main industry in which their firm as well as the S2s are operating. The industries were 
classified under two-digit SIC codes, belonging to five general industry groups, including 
manufacturing, transportation, wholesale and retail, finance and real estate, and services.
23
 
To test  for non-response bias, we compared early and late respondents on the study 
variables and some company demographics (Armstrong & Overton, 1977). Because of the 
insignificant differences (p > 0.05) between the responses of early and late waves of returned 
surveys, we can conclude that non-response bias does not appear to be a problem. 
Although we tried to reduce common method bias by separating the measurement of 
predictor and criterion variables, we still assessed its presence by performing the Harman’s 
single factor test using both the exploratory and confirmatory approach (Podsakoff et al., 
2003). The unrotated principal component factor analysis did not result in a single factor and 
the first factor did not account for most of the variance (five distinct factors account for 65 
percent of the variance; the first factor captured only 30 percent of the variance). Regarding 
the confirmatory factor analysis, the model with a single factor demonstrated a poor fit 
(χ²(170) = 750.70, SRMR = 0.13, CFI = 0.75, and IFI = 0.75). These results suggest that 
common method bias might not be a big concern. We also note that a large part of our 
findings are based on interactions. In that context, Siemsen et al. (2010) have indicated that 
common method bias can understate the significance of regression coefficients of interaction 
terms. Thus, the presence of significant interactions further suggests that our findings are 
robust to common method bias. 
                                                 
22
 Although our screening procedure results in a relatively low response rate (6 percent on total list of contacts), 
it does ensure a high reliability of the responses. That is, respondents included in the final sample are managers 
who (1) work for companies deemed appropriate for the study because they have collaborative relationships of 
the type referred to in the questionnaire; (2) are eligible for filling in the questionnaire as they are 
knowledgeable about the management of both their company’s first-tier and second-tier relationships.  
23
 About 16 percent of the S1s and 10 percent of the S2s could not be classified within the given categories and 
are referred to as “other.”  
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4. Measures and validation 
Scales used to measure the constructs were adopted from the available literature. For each 
multi-item construct, we calculated individual scores as mean scores for the combined scale 
items. All items were measured on a five-point scale, unless stated otherwise. An overview of 
the measures is provided in Appendix 2.B. 
4.1 Dependent variables  
Second-tier relationship performance is measured as the S1’s evaluation of its relationship 
with the S2. This relates to perceived, rather than actual, performance, in line with previous 
studies that measure interfirm relationship performance. In fact, there is some consensus on 
buyer’s assessments being a useful approach to evaluating the performance of their supplier 
relationships (e.g., Paulraj et al., 2008; Stouthuysen et al., 2012). While some scholars note 
that subjective performance evaluations may be overstated, it has also been argued that 
evaluations based on multiple indicators give a more reliable proxy for performance (e.g., 
Kale & Singh, 2007; Lunnan  & Haugland, 2008). The  measure in this study particularly 
refers to the extent to which the S2 is performing relative to the S1’s expectations on a 
variety of dimensions. Although performance involves many aspects (e.g., Ferguson et al., 
2005; Johnston et al., 2004), we focus on its operational dimensions because of its salience in 
a supply chain context (e.g., Cousins et al., 2008; Kumar et al., 2011). More specifically, we 
use an operational  measure of performance relating to key relationship outcomes, including 
quality, delivery, responsiveness, sales, and/or technical support, and cost. The measurement 
of this construct (five items) is based amongst others on Chen and Paulraj (2004), Mahama 
(2006), Prahinski and Benton (2004), and Wu et al. (2010). By taking the average response 
on those key dimensions, we obtain a measure reflecting overall relationship performance. 
Because the various dimensions do not per se have a common underlying meaning, this 
construct is treated as a formative scale. 
 
 
 
 - 58 -  
 
4.2 Independent variables 
To measure MCS imitation, the S1s were asked to indicate the extent to which they consider 
the controls they are using with their suppliers as similar to those the buyer used towards 
them.
24
 In particular, three types of control are included: outcome (two items), behavior (two 
items), and social (two items) controls. Outcome control imitation indicates whether the 
supplier employs similar outcome controls as those used by the buyer. Behavior control 
imitation refers to the supplier using similar behavior controls as the buyer did. Social control 
imitation relates to social controls being used by the supplier just like in the relationship with 
the buyer. Together, these measures capture the degree to which the supplier controls its 
supplier relationships in a similar way as the buyer did. As a consequence, we model overall 
MCS imitation as a second-order composite latent variable, composed of the three first-order 
imitation measures. The MCS imitation construct is also treated as a formative construct. We 
thus asses MCS imitation using an index of indicators, where each indicator reflects a single 
aspect of the higher-order construct. An average score across the three dimensions is used in 
the analysis. 
In a similar vein, we examine transaction context similarity by asking the S1s to indicate 
the extent to which they consider the transaction context of the relationship between their 
firm and the buyer to be similar to the transaction context of the relationship between their 
firm and the supplier. In this regard, three elements of the transaction context are considered: 
uncertainty, interdependence, and duration of the relationship (one item each). Uncertainty 
similarity refers to the extent to which the level of uncertainty in the market is similar in both 
relationships. Interdependence similarity is seen as the extent to which the degree of 
interdependence between the partner firms is similar in both relationships. Duration similarity 
indicates whether the number of years the partner firms have been working together is similar 
in both relationships. The model is tested by incorporating each of these three context 
similarity factors. 
                                                 
24
 We also used validation questions to gain assurance that the variable is behaving plausibly, and that the 
similarity in MCS indeed stems from imitation. In particular, we included an alternative measure of MCS 
imitation, which asked the S1s to indicate the extent to which their firm got the inspiration for the MCS they are 
using with their suppliers from the buyer firm. This measure reflects in a direct way whether MCS that the buyer 
uses with the S1 result in imitative MCS usage by the S1 with the S2. As our main measure is highly correlated 
with this alternative measure of MCS imitation (r = 0.73, p < 0.01), this raises confidence that it captures 
upstream MCS imitation in the supply chain. In addition, to gauge that this imitation relates to learning 
processes, we also asked the S1 to indicate whether they agree with the statement that their firm learned a lot 
from the buyer about the design of MCS. Again, we find a significant positive correlation with our main 
measure of MCS imitation (r = 0.56, p < 0.01), providing confidence that our construct is behaving as expected.  
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4.3 Control variables 
A number of control variables are included to account for alternative influences on interfirm 
relationship performance, in line with previous literature (e.g., Cannon et al., 2000; Carey et 
al., 2011; Palmatier et al., 2007; Kumar et al., 2011). Specifically, given our interest in 
second-tier relationship performance, we accounted for elements of the second-tier 
relationship that might affect its performance. First, we controlled for uncertainty, which 
relates to unpredictability of relevant aspects surrounding the transaction between the S1 and 
the S2 and is measured on a multi-item scale (four items), based on Wuyts and Geyskens 
(2005) and Zaheer et al. (1998). Uncertainty is an important attribute of the market in which 
products/services are transacted, and high levels potentially make the achievement of certain 
relationship outcomes more difficult. Second, we controlled for the degree of 
interdependence, reflecting the dependence of the S1 and S2 on each other and is measured 
on a multi-item scale (two items), based on Lusch and Brown (1996) and Li et al. (2010). 
Partners’ interdependence usually affects performance positively, because partners work to 
maintain their relationship and avoid destructive actions. Third, we controlled for the duration 
of the relationship, operationalized as the number of years that the S1 and S2 have been 
working together. The length of a relationship has been suggested to influence performance, 
with more enduring relationships reflecting higher performing participants. Finally, we 
accounted for firm-level characteristics, such as S1’s firm age and size. Firm age is measured 
in number of years since the foundation of the firm. Firm size is included as a dummy 
variable with number of employees less than or equal to 500 or number of employees larger 
than 500. 
4.4 Measurement validation 
With regard to measurement validation, multi-item measures were subjected to a systematic 
assessment of unidimensionality, reliability and validity. Given that the final MCS imitation 
construct and second-tier relationship performance construct were operationalized as 
formative, using an index of indicators, conventional techniques are not appropriate for 
assessing their reliability and validity (Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001). Instead, we 
assess the reliability and validity of the formative constructs, by following the guidelines of 
Diamantopoulos et al. (2008) and Petter et al. (2007). In particular, to ensure that 
multicollinearity is not present, we examine the variance inflation factors (VIF). We find that 
all VIFs have values below 3.3, indicating that the measurement indicators are not too highly 
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correlated and multicollinearity is not a concern. Further, validity can be assessed through the 
consideration of the significance of regression weights,  since they represent the contribution 
of the indicator to the construct. As we find the indicators all to be significant, this confirms 
that they are valid indicators of the formative constructs. 
For the other, reflective measures, the item sets were subjected to confirmatory factor 
analysis using LISREL 8.8 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996). Because of the large number of 
indicators and constructs, and the limitation on sample size, different confirmatory factor 
models were estimated according to Bentler and Chou (1987). That is, we divided the multi-
item constructs into theoretically plausible groups and ran separate models for these groups. 
Model 1 included the control imitation measures (outcome control imitation, behavior control 
imitation, social control imitation) and Model 2 included the remaining measures (uncertainty 
and interdependence). To evaluate model fit, we used multiple fit criteria as recommended by 
Hu and Bentler (1999). The results show a good fit for both Model 1 (χ²(6) = 21.05, SRMR = 
0.04, CFI = 0.97, and IFI = 0.97) and Model 2 (χ²(8) = 13.28, SRMR = 0.05, CFI = 0.98, and 
IFI = 0.98). This provides evidence for unidimensionality. 
We then assessed the scale reliabilities on the basis of Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 
1951), composite construct reliability and average variance extracted (Fornell & Larcker, 
1981). The results met the recommended criteria, and demonstrate internal consistency of the 
constructs. To test convergent validity, we inspected the parameter estimates and their 
corresponding t-values (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). The results show that all the indicators 
are significantly related to their underlying theoretical constructs and, hence, exhibit 
convergent validity. We used several methods to test discriminant validity. First, we 
compared for each construct the average variance extracted with the shared variance with any 
other construct (Fornell & Larcker, 1981), and found that the average variance extracted of 
the construct was always greater than the highest shared variance with other constructs. 
Second, we performed paired construct tests for every possible pairing in our study 
(Anderson & Gerbing, 1988), resulting in significant differences in chi-square values for the 
constrained and unconstrained solutions. Together, this supports discriminant validity 
between the constructs. Overall, the results demonstrate that our measurement scales are 
reliable and valid. 
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5. Results 
Table 2.1 reports correlations and summary statistics for all variables used in the model. To 
test our hypothesis, we used ordinary least square (OLS) regression modeling with second-
tier relationship performance as a function of MCS imitation, transaction context similarity, 
and their interaction. After only including the control variables (model 1), we subsequently 
entered the direct effects (model 2), and the interaction terms (model 3) (Aiken & West, 
1991). The variables were mean-centered in order to reduce potential problems of 
multicollinearity. Examination of the variance inflation factors associated with each 
regression coefficient shows values well below 5 and suggests that multicollinearity is not a 
problem (Hair et al., 1998).  
As shown in Table 2.2, the results indicate that MCS imitation has a significant direct 
effect on second-tier relationship performance (β = 0.25, p < 0.05). Our hypotheses, however, 
suggest that the performance effects of MCS imitation weaken with dissimilarities in the 
transaction context. Statistically, this is represented by a positive interaction term between 
MCS imitation and transaction context similarity. That is, we expect MCS imitation to 
positively influence performance when the transaction context is similar, with this effect 
becoming weaker when the transaction context is dissimilar. As Table 2.2 shows, we find a 
significant positive interaction coefficient for uncertainty similarity (β = 0.18, p < 0.10) and 
duration similarity (β = 0.19, p < 0.10). This finding is in line with H1a and H1c, and 
confirms that the impact of MCS imitation on second-tier relationship performance actually 
depends on the level of similarity in transaction context factors such as uncertainty and 
duration. For interdependence similarity, however, we do not find such effect. As such, H1b 
is not supported. 
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Table 2.1: Correlation matrix and summary statistics 
Construct 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. MCS imitation 
2. Outcome control imitation 
3. Behavior control imitation 
4. Social control imitation  
5. Uncertainty similarity 
6. Interdependence similarity 
7. Duration similarity 
8. Performance 
9. Uncertainty 
10. Interdependence 
11. Duration 
12. Age S1 
13. Size S1 
 
0.879
**
 
0.871
**
 
0.804
**
 
0.393
**
 
0.438
**
 
0.365
**
 
0.361
**
 
0.311
**
 
0.376
**
 
-0.012 
-0.097 
0.125 
 
 
0.711
**
 
0.540
**
 
0.345
**
 
0.377
**
 
0.417
**
 
0.320
**
 
0.221
*
 
0.318
**
 
0.025 
-0.134 
0.099 
 
 
 
0.511
**
 
0.366
**
 
0.374
**
 
0.308
**
 
0.301
**
 
0.258
**
 
0.240
**
 
-0.034 
-0.020 
0.078 
 
 
 
 
0.292
**
 
0.367
**
 
0.209
*
 
0.301
**
 
0.314
**
 
0.402
**
 
-0.022 
-0.095 
0.140 
 
 
 
 
 
0.315
**
 
0.279
**
 
0.218
*
 
0.473
**
 
0.205
*
 
-0.040 
-0.169 
-0.089 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.364
**
 
0.239
**
 
0.321
**
 
0.208
*
 
0.106 
-0.119 
-0.061 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.382
**
 
0.101 
0.138 
0.017 
-0.069 
-0.017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.051 
0.126 
-0.056 
-0.116 
-0.168 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.294
**
 
-0.013 
-0.040 
0.038 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.111 
-0.115 
-0.073 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.106 
0.071 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.497
**
 
 
M 3.31 3.35 3.32 3.27 3.29 3.43 3.45 3.86 2.87 3.68 10.41 42.25 0.40 
SD 0.80 0.93 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.93 0.96 0.63 0.82 0.83 8.61 39.86 0.49 
*
 p < 0.05;  
**
 p < 0.01 (two-tailed) 
M = mean; SD = standard deviation. 
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Table 2.2: Relation between MCS imitation and performance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Control variables 
Uncertainty 
Interdependence 
Duration 
Age S1 
Size S1 
Main effects  
MCS imitation 
Uncertainty similarity 
Interdependence similarity 
Duration similarity 
Interaction effects 
MCS imitation x   
Uncertainty similarity 
MCS imitation x 
 Interdependence similarity 
MCS imitation x  
Duration similarity  
 
0.055 
0.113 
-0.050 
-0.080 
-0.042 
 
(0.075) 
(0.076) 
(0.007) 
(0.002) 
(0.134) 
 
-0.077 
0.000 
-0.051 
-0.006 
-0.110 
 
0.252
*
 
0.094 
0.020 
0.258
**
 
 
(0.080) 
(0.074) 
(0.006) 
(0.002) 
(0.128) 
 
(0.088) 
(0.069) 
(0.071) 
(0.063) 
 
-0.166 
-0.007 
-0.078 
0.002 
-0.095 
 
0.250
*
 
0.131 
-0.001 
0.269
**
 
 
0.175
† 
 
-0.019 
 
0.185
†
 
 
(0.081) 
(0.072) 
(0.006) 
(0.002) 
(0.129) 
 
(0.088) 
(0.070) 
(0.080) 
(0.063) 
 
(0.086) 
 
(0.092) 
 
(0.069) 
Model Fit 
R²  
F-value 
∆ R²  
∆ F-value 
 
0.04 
0.81 
 
 
0.22 
  3.18
**
 
0.18 
    5.95
***
 
 
0.29 
   3.34
***
 
0.07 
 3.23
*
 
Standardized coefficients are reported; Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
† 
p < 0.10; 
*
 p < 0.05; 
**
 p < 0.01; 
***
 p < 0.001 (two-tailed) 
In order to better understand the precise effects for uncertainty similarity and duration 
similarity, we plotted the interactions. Plots were made for one standard deviation above and 
below the mean. The above-mean value was taken as high similarity, whereas the below-
mean value was taken as low similarity. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate a more positive 
relationship between MCS imitation and second-tier relationship performance in case of high 
uncertainty similarity compared to low uncertainty similarity, and in case of high duration 
similarity compared to low duration similarity. We also tested simple slopes of the regression 
lines. Specifically, the simple slope for MCS imitation for high uncertainty similarity is 
significantly different from zero (t = 2.77, p < 0.01), but is insignificant for low uncertainty 
similarity (t = 0.40, p = 0.69). Likewise, the simple slope for MCS imitation for high duration 
similarity is significantly different from zero (t = 2.83, p < 0.01), while for low duration 
similarity it is insignificant (t = 0.57, p = 0.57). Overall, these results confirm that the positive 
performance effect, which is observed when the transaction context is similar, weakens 
substantially when the transaction context is dissimilar, as evidenced by an insignificant slope 
in the latter case. 
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Figure 2.1: Plotted interaction of uncertainty similarity and MCS imitation 
 
Figure 2.2: Plotted interaction of duration similarity and MCS imitation 
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Since MCS imitation is composed of a portfolio of controls, we performed additional 
analyses to gain more detailed insights into the associations between second-tier relationship 
performance, transaction context similarity, and the different types of control that underlie the 
general MCS imitation construct. Specifically, we repeated the above analyses for outcome 
control imitation, behavior control imitation, and social control imitation.
25
 The results are 
presented in Table 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 respectively. As shown, the importance of uncertainty 
similarity and duration similarity for performance differs, depending on the different types of 
control under consideration. The moderating effect of interdependence similarity, again, was 
not found to be significant for any of the control types. 
Table 2.3: Relation between outcome control imitation and performance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Control variables 
Uncertainty 
Interdependence 
Duration 
Age S1 
Size S1 
Main effects  
Outcome control imitation 
Uncertainty similarity 
Interdependence similarity 
Duration similarity 
Interaction effects 
Outcome control imitation x 
Uncertainty similarity 
Outcome control imitation x 
Interdependence similarity 
Outcome control imitation x 
Duration similarity  
 
0.055 
0.113 
-0.050 
-0.080 
-0.042 
 
(0.075) 
(0.076) 
(0.007) 
(0.002) 
(0.134) 
 
-0.063 
0.036 
-0.064 
-0.007 
-0.083 
 
0.138 
0.118 
0.062 
0.265
*
 
 
(0.081) 
(0.074) 
(0.007) 
(0.002) 
(0.130) 
 
(0.075) 
(0.069) 
(0.071) 
(0.065) 
 
-0.121 
0.030 
-0.072 
-0.019 
-0.056 
 
0.171 
0.105 
0.083 
0.281
**
 
 
0.022 
 
0.072 
 
0.203
*
 
 
(0.084) 
(0.073) 
(0.006) 
(0.002) 
(0.130) 
 
(0.077) 
(0.070) 
(0.074) 
(0.064) 
 
(0.070) 
 
(0.072) 
 
(0.062) 
Model Fit 
R²  
F-value 
∆ R²  
∆ F-value 
 
0.04 
0.81 
 
 
 0.19 
    2.71
**
 
 0.16 
    4.94
**
 
 
0.25 
   2.70
**
 
0.05 
 2.36
†
 
Standardized coefficients are reported; Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
† 
p < 0.10; 
*
 p < 0.05; 
**
 p < 0.01; 
***
 p < 0.001 (two-tailed) 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 We also estimated a model in which outcome control imitation, behavior control imitation, and social control 
imitation are included together as predictor variables. In this model, in order to incorporate the way in which 
these three types of control are related to each other, we used multiple regression with factor score estimates as 
composite measures of the control types. This yields similar results and conclusions as those reported.    
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Table 2.4: Relation between behavior control imitation and performance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Control variables 
Uncertainty 
Interdependence 
Duration 
Age S1 
Size S1 
Main effects  
Behavior control imitation 
Uncertainty similarity 
Interdependence similarity 
Duration similarity 
Interaction effects 
Behavior control imitation x 
Uncertainty similarity 
Behavior control imitation x 
Interdependence similarity 
Behavior control imitation x 
Duration similarity  
 
0.055 
0.113 
-0.050 
-0.080 
-0.042 
 
(0.075) 
(0.076) 
(0.007) 
(0.002) 
(0.134) 
 
-0.066 
0.043 
-0.052 
-0.031 
-0.074 
 
0.173
†
 
0.104 
0.044 
0.275
**
 
 
(0.080) 
(0.072) 
(0.006) 
(0.002) 
(0.126) 
 
(0.067) 
(0.069) 
(0.071) 
(0.063) 
 
-0.141 
0.065 
-0.050 
-0.024 
-0.084 
 
0.193
†
 
0.167 
-0.039 
0.296
**
 
 
0.236
* 
 
-0.100 
 
0.155 
 
(0.079) 
(0.070) 
(0.006) 
(0.002) 
(0.125) 
 
(0.065) 
(0.069) 
(0.075) 
(0.064) 
 
(0.069) 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.055) 
Model Fit 
R²  
F-value 
∆ R²  
∆ F-value 
 
0.04 
0.81 
 
 
 0.20 
    2.88
**
 
 0.17 
    5.31
**
 
 
0.28 
   3.27
**
 
0.08 
 3.73
*
 
Standardized coefficients are reported; Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
† 
p < 0.10; 
*
 p < 0.05; 
**
 p < 0.01; 
***
 p < 0.001 (two-tailed) 
 
Table 2.5: Relation between social control imitation and performance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Control variables 
Uncertainty 
Interdependence 
Duration 
Age S1 
Size S1 
Main effects  
Social control imitation 
Uncertainty similarity 
Interdependence similarity 
Duration similarity 
Interaction effects 
Social control imitation x 
Uncertainty similarity 
Social control imitation x 
Interdependence similarity 
Social control imitation x 
Duration similarity  
 
0.055 
0.113 
-0.050 
-0.080 
-0.042 
 
(0.075) 
(0.076) 
(0.007) 
(0.002) 
(0.134) 
 
-0.086 
-0.014 
-0.048 
-0.007 
-0.102 
 
0.246
*
 
0.121 
0.021 
0.290
**
 
 
(0.080) 
(0.075) 
(0.006) 
(0.002) 
(0.127) 
 
(0.069) 
(0.067) 
(0.071) 
(0.062) 
 
-0.161 
-0.068 
-0.077 
-0.004 
-0.072 
 
0.205
†
 
0.134 
0.115 
0.259
**
 
 
0.143 
 
0.163 
 
0.046 
 
(0.081) 
(0.076) 
(0.006) 
(0.002) 
(0.126) 
 
(0.069) 
(0.070) 
(0.078) 
(0.064) 
 
(0.069) 
 
(0.071) 
 
(0.063) 
Model Fit 
R²  
F-value 
∆ R²  
∆ F-value 
 
0.04 
0.81 
 
 
 0.22 
    3.22
**
 
 0.18 
      6.05
***
 
 
0.28 
   3.17
**
 
0.06 
 2.56
†
 
Standardized coefficients are reported; Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
† 
p < 0.10; 
*
 p < 0.05; 
**
 p < 0.01; 
***
 p < 0.001 (two-tailed) 
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The results specifically reveal that uncertainty similarity has a significant positive 
moderating effect on performance for imitation of behavior controls (β = 0.24, p < 0.05), but 
that this effect is insignificant for imitation of outcome and social controls. This suggests that 
the impact of behavior control imitation, in particular, depends on similarities in the level of 
uncertainty. The interaction plot in Figure 2.3 accordingly displays a more positive 
relationship between behavior control imitation and second-tier relationship performance in 
case of high uncertainty similarity compared to low uncertainty similarity. In particular, the 
simple slope for behavior control imitation for high uncertainty similarity is significantly 
different from zero (t = 3.06, p < 0.01), while being insignificant for low uncertainty 
similarity (t = -0.40, p = 0.69). 
The results further show that the moderating effect of duration similarity on performance 
is positive and significant for imitation of outcome controls (β = 0.20, p < 0.05), but 
insignificant for imitation of behavior and social controls. This indicates that the impact of 
outcome control imitation is especially affected by duration similarity. The interaction plot in 
Figure 2.4 supports this by showing a more positive relationship between outcome control 
imitation and second-tier relationship performance in case of high duration similarity 
compared to low duration similarity. In particular, the simple slope for outcome control 
imitation for high duration similarity is significantly different from zero (t = 2.21, p < 0.05), 
but for low duration similarity it is insignificant (t = -0.09, p = 0.93).   
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Figure 2.3: Plotted interaction of uncertainty similarity and behavior control imitation 
 
Figure 2.4: Plotted interaction of duration similarity and outcome control imitation 
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Altogether, based on these results, we can conclude that MCS imitation can have a 
positive impact on performance, at least when it is in accordance with critical characteristics 
of the transaction context. While this is in line with our expectations, building on the premise 
that MCS imitation has the potential to improve performance in the second-tier relationship, 
it must be noted that this is under the assumption that successful MCS are being imitated. In 
order to test for this, we looked at performance in the first-tier relationship, as this may reflect 
the degree to which the used MCS turned out to be successful. In particular, we asked the S1s 
to evaluate their overall working relationship with the buyer firm, specifically by indicating 
whether the exchange activities were both effective and efficient.
26
 Following the outcome-
based approach to imitation, we then assessed the impact of this perceived performance in the 
first-tier on the propensity to imitate. We first examined the bivariate correlation between the 
two variables, showing a positive association between first-tier relationship performance and 
MCS imitation (r = 0.44; p < 0.01). We also compared the means of MCS imitation for the 
subsamples with high (n = 69) and low (n = 50) levels of first-tier relationship performance. 
The results demonstrate that those who perceive performance to be high engage in MCS 
imitation to a significantly greater extent than those who perceive performance to be low (t = 
3.72; p < 0.01). This provides support for the existence of outcome-based imitation, where 
S1s generally place high importance on outcome indicators when deciding to imitate. This 
also signals the relevance of willful imitation, as the S1s appear to concretely decide to 
imitate those practices that are deemed to be worthy or valuable to imitate. Indeed, such 
patterns would not be evident if the MCS choices are, for example, firm responses to coercive 
pressures from the buyer, forcing them to adopt specific practices in the supply chain. In that 
case, the S1 would have no other choice but to implement the MCS imposed by the buyer in 
their relationship with the S2. Our pattern of results is consist with imitation effects, where 
the S1 assesses the MCS used by the buyer against the overall performance of their 
relationship and imitate the use of these MCS if this appears to have resulted in success.  
 
 
                                                 
26
 A three-item, five-point Likert scale was used to measure the overall performance level between the buyer and 
the S1, as reported by the S1, based on the work of Boyle and Dwyer (1995) and Ren et al. (2010):  (1) There is 
an efficient working relationship between my firm and this buyer; (2) Coordination is easily accomplished with 
this buyer firm; (3) Any planning or exchange between my firm and this buyer is completed successfully (α = 
0.80).  
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Importantly, given that the S1s are imitating the buyer’s use of MCS towards the S2s 
when first-tier relationship performance is perceived to be high, this allows for performance 
gains in the second-tier relationship to result.
27
 The potential gains of MCS imitation in the 
supply chain, however, may not be achieved, to the degree that the relevant parties are subject 
to different exchange conditions, creating mismatches between control structure and 
transaction context. In other words, although MCS imitation is found to be rather selective in 
the sense that MCS are more likely to be imitated if they have proven to be useful tools in the 
first-tier relationship, this does not automatically imply that these MCS are also effective in 
the second-tier relationship, but is contingent upon similarity in the transaction context 
between the first-tier and second-tier relationship. 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
This study investigates MCS imitation and its performance implications in a supply chain 
triad. While our findings show that firms, when designing their MCS, often imitate MCS 
practices that are perceived to be successful in relationships with other network partners, 
firms also need to pay attention to whether the transaction context of the different 
relationships match. Specifically, we find that dissimilarities in the level of uncertainty and 
duration of the first-tier and second-tier relationships weaken the association between MCS 
imitation and performance. 
With regard to uncertainty, this observation reinforces the notion that MCS imitation 
under dissimilar environmental conditions is less effective. As shown in our additional 
analyses, this turns out to be particularly the case for imitation of behavior controls, 
suggesting that the proper extent of reliance on behavior controls depends on the level of 
uncertainty that needs to be managed. Take for example the situation where the environment 
in the second-tier is characterized by low uncertainty, whereas the environment in the first-
tier is characterized by high uncertainty. In this case, S1’s imitating behavior would result in 
misalignment as this may cause him to develop an elaborate control structure, such as 
explicitly prescribing rules and procedures and closely observing the supplier’s behaviors, to 
                                                 
27
 Since performance in the first-tier can be considered as another critical condition for MCS to be successfully 
imitated in the second-tier relationship, we also re-estimated the model including this as an additional 
interaction (i.e., three-way interaction between MCS imitation, transaction context similarity, and first-tier 
relationship performance). However, no significant three-way interaction was found, which could be explained 
by the fact that most S1s copy the actions of the buyer towards the S2 if performance in the first-tier is 
considered to be high. That is to say, because the link from perceived first-tier relationship performance to MCS 
imitation yields strong results, there might be insufficient variation in the sample to find significant interaction 
effects regarding the impact of MCS imitation. 
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manage environmental uncertainty, when a less complex control structure would suffice 
(Harmancioglu, 2009; Langfield-Smith, 2008). In other words, the firm is likely to implement 
rather costly behavior controls, involving high levels of supervision and complex methods for 
evaluating performance, while this may not be needed when the environment is not that 
uncertain. Furthermore, because behavior controls impose strict guidelines on which 
activities are to be performed and how they should be performed, when they are not really 
necessary, their use may be perceived as intrusive, such that it may produce retaliatory, 
opportunistic actions (Deci & Ryan, 1987; Heide et al., 2007). Another situation occurs when 
the second-tier is characterized by high uncertainty, whereas the first-tier is characterized by 
low uncertainty. When the S1, in this case, imitates misalignment would result from installing 
a relatively simple control structure, while actually a more complex control structure, with a 
high focus on monitoring behaviors, may be required to deal with unanticipated 
contingencies that might arise (Dekker, 2004; de Mortanges & Vossen, 1999). Thus, while in 
the first case the firm adopts a costly control structure when the threat of uncertainty is 
relatively low, the opposite occurs in the second case as inadequate control is developed 
given the presence of high uncertainty (Reuer & Ariño, 2002; Sampson, 2004). These 
different situations indicate that greater imitative use of MCS is not always associated with 
better performance, but that this relationship is contingent upon uncertainty similarity. 
A similar reasoning goes for duration of the relationship, as the suitability of MCS 
imitation also depends on the duration of the respective relationships. The additional analysis 
indicates that this mainly applies to imitation of outcomes controls, and underscores the 
importance of adapting the use of outcome controls to the length of cooperation. Our study 
suggests, for example, that when the second-tier relationship is characterized by low duration 
and the first-tier relationship is characterized by high duration, imitation would be less 
appropriate. One reason for this could be that long-term relationships are typically associated 
with more familiarity from prior experiences and trust between the partners, which may 
enable them to work closely together without the need for more costly formal controls 
(Dekker, 2004; Inkpen & Currall, 2004). If then the S1 tries to install a similar control 
structure with a partner that he barely knows in the second-tier, this may lead to misalignment 
as closely monitoring performance through the use of outcome controls may be required in 
early stages of the relationship (Choudhury & Sabherwal, 2003; Langfield-Smith, 2008). The 
opposite would hold when the second-tier relationship is characterized by high duration, but 
the first-tier relationship is characterized by low duration. In this case, imitation by the S1 
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may lead to misalignment with the longer duration, because if trust between partners is 
sufficiently strong to ensure cooperation, a high reliance on outcome controls that require the 
specification of clear goals and corresponding incentives would lead to unnecessary and thus 
costly levels of formality (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Li et al., 2010). Moreover, as the relationship 
duration increases, excessive control may undermine the mutual trust between partners and 
potentially damage the relationship (Das & Teng, 2001; Yang et al., 2011). This is because 
when outcomes need to be frequently checked against pre-set measures, this may signal 
distrust, enhancing the other party’s psychological reaction and thereby promoting undesired 
actions such as opportunistic behaviors. In addition, since outcomes are constantly and 
closely monitored, this may give partner firms little leeway in pursuing long-term objectives 
at the cost of certain short-term targets, which is likely to be inappropriate in relationships 
featured by a long run perspective. Therefore, when relationship duration is high, one should 
also be aware of potential dysfunctional effects of exercising control. Together, these 
arguments suggest that greater imitative use of MCS does not always result in better 
performance, but that this relationship is contingent upon duration similarity. 
Our findings did not provide support for the predicted positive effect of interdependence 
similarity on the performance impact of MCS imitation. The lack of such finding appears to 
be due to the fact that most S1s are responsive to interdependence similarities when imitating 
MCS. In an additional analysis on the relationship between interdependence similarity and 
the occurrence of imitation, we indeed found this to be the case. More specifically, in order to 
provide more insight into how firms differ in responses to similar conditions, we divided the 
sample into two groups. The first group included firms with low second-tier performance, 
whereas the second group included those with high second-tier performance. When we look 
at the association between interdependence similarity and the occurrence of imitation, the 
results indicate that this is positively significant for both groups. In general, this indicates that 
firms take similarities in the degree of interdependence into account, such that the control 
structure tends to be appropriately aligned with the transaction context and, hence, 
misalignment does not result from imitation. 
Altogether, this study enriches our understanding of how the cognition of context factors 
may exert influences on the use of MCS and thereby affect performance. Specifically 
regarding imitative behavior, we find that similarities in the level of uncertainty and duration 
of the relationship are important elements to consider. In particular, our findings show that 
outcome-based MCS imitation in the supply chain will only be effective under the same 
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environmental conditions, and when the length of cooperation is similar. These results 
complement previous studies suggesting that the tailoring needed to implement MCS under 
these contingencies is substantial. This makes a particular set of controls appropriate for 
managing relationships in one context, but not necessarily in another, given contextual 
mismatches. Therefore, designers of MCS should not be seeking gains from blind imitation, 
but should consider adapting the MCS to meet the specific relationship needs as prompted by 
factors such as uncertainty and duration. 
The evidence that firms, nevertheless, sometimes pursue mimetic actions despite the 
possibly resulting mismatch is consistent with some earlier theoretical developments. In 
general, MCS design is thought to be based on the process of matching. Organizations adopt 
particular MCS because they align with the transaction context, such that an optimal result 
can be achieved. However, while this notion of alignment is widely accepted, an 
organization’s control structure and transaction context may often be out of alignment 
(Geyskens et al., 2006). Our study demonstrates that this may be attributed to the managerial 
process of imitating. It appears that organizations sometimes imitate particular MCS, 
regardless of any connections to the specific transaction context. Roberts and Greenwood 
(1997) in this regard suggest that this does not imply that managers do not care about 
efficiency or performance goals. Rather, the adoption of organizational practices may be 
viewed as efficiency seeking, under certain cognitive constraints, instead of efficiency 
optimizing. That is, as boundedly rational decision-makers, they may be motivated to look 
around and imitate the decisions or actions of others. It is has been pointed out, though, that 
decision-makers conduct more-or-less limited searches and look for satisficing rather than 
optimizing solutions. These principles in itself, may then be understood to limit successful 
imitation (Posen et al., 2013). In fact, organizations may simply imitate practices they believe 
have been beneficial elsewhere, without reflecting on the context in which these practices are 
used. In our study, this provides an explanation for the fact that MCS are being imitated even 
when certain elements of the transaction context are not similar. Following this reasoning, it 
is then not surprising that MCS choices may not always be “in fit” with the transaction 
context. Thus, in line with arguments raised by Argyres and Liebeskind (1999), the control of 
a given transaction may, in many cases, not be based solely on the characteristics of the 
specific transaction context. Instead, because of the imitation processes outlined above, the 
transaction may be controlled in ways that are suboptimal if the transaction context alone 
would be considered.  
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Consequently, with regard to the performance implications of MCS imitation, we 
propose that how imitation takes place, plays a pivotal role in explaining the effectiveness of 
the copied MCS. That is, imitation of MCS may take place in a noncomparative or a 
comparative mode. Noncomparative imitation of MCS are imitations made in absence of a 
comparison point. Then, the S1 imitates the MCS the buyer uses with him without evaluating 
whether a match between the environmental and relationship characteristics of the first-tier 
and second-tier relationship exists. Comparative MCS imitation, in contrast, refers to 
imitations in the presence of a comparison point. In this case, the imitated MCS are evaluated 
by the S1 against a match between first-tier and second-tier environmental and relationship 
characteristics. It are these evaluation modes that influence the effectiveness of MCS 
imitation throughout the supply chain. Firms who better understand the different transaction 
contexts across the supply chain will likely benefit more from MCS imitation. 
This study contributes to previous literature in several ways. We contribute to the 
accounting literature by integrating insights from both economic and social perspectives. We 
believe that, since economic exchanges are always embedded in a broader social context, a 
theoretical perspective that accounts for social influences, rather than one that applies an 
economically rational perspective alone, is critical for a more complete understanding. 
Existing studies on MCS design in the supply chain mainly provide an explanation on how 
MCS are installed as a function of the specific transaction context. Such focus, however, does 
not include examining the broader social context in which firms are embedded. Our 
contention in this study is that the behavior and performance of firms can be more fully 
understood by examining the network of relationships in which they can be placed. 
Specifically, although a dyadic approach on MCS design has its contributions, our triadic 
approach helps us to capture the broader picture. By considering a triadic network 
configuration, we can investigate social influences on MCS usage, and especially how MCS 
become imitated in the supply chain. We further contribute to the literature on 
interorganizational imitation by investigating the effectiveness of such behavior. Although 
many studies have examined the processes through which imitation may unfold, there is little 
evidence on its performance implications. With this study, we add to the discussion of the 
value of imitation, by illuminating the conditions under which MCS imitation is a reasonable 
strategy in the sense that it would lead to performance improvements. 
This study also contributes to practice. Being part of a supply chain network, firms must 
capture the effects of their control decisions made in relation to their direct partners and be 
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able to extend this to determine how the decisions affect the connected business relationships 
with other firms. In particular, this study points out that the buyer’s control efforts in the first-
tier relationship, through imitation by the supplier, may lead to performance improvements in 
the second-tier relationship. Crucially, though, this study also shows that the impact of such 
imitation varies sharply with the level of similarity in the transaction context between the 
first-tier and second-tier relationship. While firms may be inclined to use similar MCS 
throughout the supply chain, the exchange conditions may not be similar for each 
relationship. We illustrate that imitation should not be a context-independent choice. It 
appears, however, that this may not always be well understood. Our results show that 
managers may engage in imitation when designing their MCS, possibly resulting in a 
mismatch between control structure and transaction context. Although imitating successful 
MCS can positively affect performance, the effect will depend on the capacity of the imitator 
to take into account the transaction context. In other words, this study points out that 
successful imitation requires decision-makers to recognize the importance of context 
similarity. Managers should be aware that every cooperation is different and that things may 
go wrong when imitating practices from other firms without questioning their applicability in 
the specific context. A better understanding of these imitation effects should help managers to 
use more effective MCS that have the potential to enhance performance in their interfirm 
exchanges. 
We recognize that our study is characterized by certain limitations, which suggest 
directions for further research. First, this study focused on supply chain relationships. The 
extent to which our findings are generalizable to other types of relationships remains to be 
studied. Second, although the unit of analysis is the vertical supply chain consisting of three 
members, we were able to collect data from the S1s only. In order to have a more complete 
view of the relationships, it would be better to collect data from all involved parties in the 
network. Third, the present study examined MCS imitation moving upstream in the supply 
chain. Future research is needed to explore possible downstream influences. Fourth, this 
study uses a rather general measure of MCS imitation. A more detailed picture of the extent 
to which the control types are actually used in both the first-tier relationship and second-tier 
relationship would provide additional insights. Future research could also benefit from a 
more elaborate measure of transaction context similarity. In this study, three elements of the 
transaction context are included. Also other factors, however, may constitute the transaction 
context and may influence MCS design. In addition, future research may examine other 
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contingencies besides transaction context similarity that may shape the benefits of MCS 
imitation. For example, scholars have indicated that differences in cultural context can have 
implications on a firm’s choice of MCS. Therefore, the degree to which an identical set of 
controls implemented by different firms leads to similar results may also be dependent on the 
cultural context in which the transactions take place. Regarding our measure of effectiveness, 
we looked at perceived performance based on multiple dimensions, like commonly done in 
the literature. Nevertheless, future research could expand the present model by also taking 
objective measures of performance into account, as to provide more insight into the costs of 
misaligned governance. Finally, it is important to recognize that imitation may occur for 
various reasons. Our results show that MCS imitation has the potential to generate economic 
benefits, at least to some extent. Our study, however, did not include social benefits in the 
model. Future research may wish to include both social and economic benefits in order to 
examine the overall influence of MCS imitation. 
In conclusion, we believe this study offers interesting insights. The results suggest that 
governance studies need not only to consider how interfirm relationships can be managed 
using MCS in particular, but also how these MCS are being developed, with imitation 
evidently playing an important role in the use of MCS in the supply chain. Even more 
importantly, we emphasize that a good understanding of the suitability of MCS imitation is 
important for the performance in the supply chain, and especially point to the role of 
transaction context similarity for MCS imitation to be successful. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 2.A: Sample characteristics 
 
Average value 
Age S1 (number of years)  42.25 
 
Frequency in sample Percentage of sample 
Size S1 (number of employees) 
< 100 
100 – 500 
501 – 1000 
> 1000 
Unknown  
 
38 
33 
13 
34 
1 
 
32 
28 
11 
29 
1 
Industry Sector S1 
Manufacturing 
Transportation 
Wholesale & Retail 
Finance & Real Estate 
Services 
Other 
 
51 
8 
13 
7 
21 
19 
 
43 
7 
11 
6 
18 
16 
Industry Sector  S2 
Manufacturing 
Transportation 
Wholesale & Retail 
Finance & Real Estate 
Services 
Other 
 
73 
3 
10 
5 
16 
12 
 
61 
3 
8 
4 
13 
10 
N = 119 
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Appendix 2.B: Survey measures 
 
 
Measurement Model Estimates 
Std. Coeff. t-value 
MCS imitation 
Outcome control imitation 
a 
(α = 0.82; CR = 0.82; AVE = 0.70; HSV = 0.51) 
We established specific performance goals for the 
supplier that are very similar to those the buyer 
used with us.  
We monitored the extent to which the supplier 
realized the performance goals in a very similar 
way to which the buyer monitored us.  
Behavior control imitation 
a 
(α = 0.82; CR = 0.82; AVE = 0.69; HSV = 0.51) 
We specified procedures to be followed by the 
supplier that are very similar to those the buyer 
used with us.  
We monitored the extent to which the supplier 
followed established procedures in a very similar 
way to which the buyer monitored us. 
Social control imitation 
a 
(α = 0.72; CR = 0.72; AVE = 0.57; HSV = 0.29) 
We organized joint meetings, social events and 
team-building activities with the supplier just as 
the buyer did with us.  
The exchange of information in the relationship 
with the supplier takes place frequently and 
happens face-to-face just as in the relationship 
with the buyer. 
 
 
 
 
0.857 
 
 
0.818 
 
 
 
 
 
0.783 
 
 
0.880 
 
 
 
 
 
0.816 
 
 
0.691 
 
 
 
 
10.790 
 
10.135 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9.530 
 
 
11.097 
 
 
 
 
 
8.516 
 
 
7.295 
Uncertainty similarity 
a
 
The level of uncertainty in the market is very 
similar in both relationships.  
Interdependence similarity 
a
 
The degree of interdependence between your firm 
and the partner firm is very similar in both 
relationships.  
Duration similarity 
a
 
The number of years in which your firm has been 
working together with the partner firm is very 
similar in both relationships.  
 
 
N.A. 
 
 
N.A. 
 
 
 
N.A. 
 
Second-tier relationship performance
 b 
How would you rate the supplier’s performance on 
fulfilling each of the following goals:  
Product/service quality.  
Delivery performance.  
Responsiveness to requests or changes.   
Sales, service and/or technical support.  
Overall cost performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
N.A. 
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Uncertainty 
a 
(α = 0.82; CR = 0.82; AVE = 0.54; HSV = 0.22) 
Availability of this product/service in the market is 
highly uncertain.  
It is difficult to monitor technological trends in the 
market.  
Supply of this product/service in the market is not 
stable.  
Volume forecasts of this product/service are quite 
inaccurate.  
 
 
 
0.770 
 
0.669 
 
0.827 
 
0.655 
 
 
 
9.112 
 
7.599 
 
10.009 
 
7.395 
Interdependence
  a 
(α = 0.67; CR = 0.71; AVE = 0.56; HSV = 0.16) 
We are dependent on this firm as a supplier of the 
product/service.  
The supplier firm is dependent on us as a customer 
of the product/service. 
 
 
 
0.895 
 
0.568 
 
 
 
5.843 
 
4.714 
 
Duration 
Length of relationship with supplier firm:  … years. 
 
N.A. 
a 
Items measured on a five-point Likert-type scale anchored by 1 = “strongly disagree” and 5 = “strongly agree.” 
b 
Items measured on a five-point Likert-type scale anchored by 1 = “very poor” and 5 = “very good.” 
Notes: N.A. is not applicable; all p-values < 0.01; α = Cronbach’s alpha; CR = composite reliability; AVE = 
average variance extracted; HSV = highest shared variance. 
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MANUSCRIPT III                                                                                                                                 
THE ROLE OF IMITATION IN TRUST FORMATION AND                                         
PARTNER SELECTION IN INTERFIRM RELATIONSHIPS 
 
Abstract 
The aim of this study is to investigate the role of imitation in trust formation and partner 
selection in interfirm relationships. We experimentally examine how information from other 
firms’ experiences may shape the trust that buyer managers have in a potential supplier firm, 
and how this trust affects the manager’s subsequent selection decisions. The results reveal 
different effects on two trust dimensions. The results specifically show that simply knowing 
other firms that trusted the supplier, without any information about the outcomes, is sufficient 
for the buyer manager’s level of competence trust, but not of goodwill trust, in the supplier to 
increase. In addition, we find that even buyer managers who have the opportunity to learn 
from their own firm’s experiences, are inclined to look at others when making trust 
judgments about the supplier. As expected, our results also indicate that higher levels of trust, 
in turn, increase the likelihood of the supplier being selected. Overall, our findings provide 
strong support for imitation effects, and suggest that managers may come to trust and select a 
certain partner, just because they see others do. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite the potential benefits of entering into collaborative relationships, many of these turn 
out to be not successful, and concerns have revolved around the fairly high failure rates, both 
in practice and in the literature. Recent studies in this area have particularly pointed out that 
trust between partners (e.g., Bsteiler, 2006; Das & Teng, 2001; Coletti et al., 2005; Nicolaou 
et al., 2011) as well as appropriate partner selection (e.g., Emden et al., 2006; Ireland et al., 
2002; Li et al., 2008; Shah & Swaminathan, 2008) are critical determinants of successful 
collaboration. Although it is widely recognized that a certain level of trust is indispensable 
for any interfirm relationship to be formed and to function, more research is required to 
explain how trust in potential partners is developed, and why certain partners are more likely 
to be selected. Especially given the increasing rapidity with which interfirm relationships are 
being initiated in some industries and markets, the phenomenon of early trust formation and 
the basis on which firms select partners are important to understand. 
This study builds on the premise that trust formation and partner selection do not occur in 
a vacuum. Much economic behavior is nested or embedded in a social context that shapes 
action (Granovetter, 1985, 1992). This social context emerges from the history of own 
relations, as well as from the connection to other actors. Following this reasoning, it is likely 
that trust perceptions and selection decisions are also affected by the social context in which 
they are made. In fact, a number of contributions have argued that embeddedness provides 
opportunities for learning, through own previous experiences but also through information on 
previous experiences of others (Buskens & Raub, 2002). However, while several studies 
suggest that managers can learn from their own firm’s experiences with a particular partner, 
our understanding remains incomplete as to how managers learn from the experiences of 
other firms. In particular, we contend that prior studies on trust and selection issues are 
limited because they fail to incorporate the role of imitation in the formation phase of the 
relationship (Barrera & Buskens, 2007). In this study, imitation relates to processes where 
firms, or particularly managers within these firms, draw inferences from the actions of other 
firms (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). Because firms often undertake actions that can be 
interpreted and imitated by others, other firms’ experiences with a particular partner can be 
an important source of information for managers that are about to engage in a new 
relationship and have to decide with whom to collaborate. More specifically, perceptions of a 
potential partner’s trustworthiness may be shaped by the actions of others, and these 
perceptions, in turn, might affect decisions regarding own partner selection. 
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The aim of this study is to demonstrate that managers indeed look at others to learn about 
the trustworthiness of potential partners and to inform subsequent selection decisions. The 
focus is on a buyer manager’s trust in a potential supplier firm during the initial stages of the 
relationship, when partners are being evaluated and eventually selected. 
We develop several hypotheses regarding how managers respond to information from 
other firms’ experiences. Overall, we propose that managers will adapt their trusting beliefs 
based on what others have done or are doing, but that this will vary depending on the amount 
of information obtained from others and on the particular type of trust. Many categorizations 
of trust exist, although competence trust and goodwill trust have emerged as particularly 
relevant to the formation of interfirm relationships (Das & Teng, 2001; Langfield-Smith, 
2008). Competence trust can be defined as the belief that the partner has the ability to 
perform as expected, whereas goodwill trust relates to the belief that the partner will act with 
integrity and benevolence. Since competence trust and goodwill trust present a clear 
distinction, we adopt these dimensions of trust in this study. In fact, simply knowing that 
other firms collaborated with the supplier may give the buyer manager a sense of confidence 
that the supplier is capable of accomplishing given tasks in the relationship, shaping 
competence trust, but not regarding its intentions to do so. The buyer manager’s goodwill 
trust in the supplier is expected to increase only when it is known that other firms had 
satisfactory past dealings with the supplier, which might be conceived as the supplier dealing 
fairly and caring about the firm’s welfare in the relationship, in addition to its ability to 
perform. Making this distinction enables us to investigate what type of trust managers place 
in potential suppliers and how these types of trust are derived from various levels of 
information that can be obtained from others. Moreover, we predict the effect of other firms’ 
experiences on the buyer manager’s trust in the supplier to be weaker when learning from 
own experiences with the supplier is also possible. The reasoning behind this is that, when 
buyers have already done business with the supplier, information from others becomes less 
relevant, as they can rely primarily on their own experience. Finally, we hypothesize that 
trusting beliefs will have an impact on subsequent decisions, such as actual partner selection. 
In particular, we posit that the supplier must be trusted for it to enter the buyer manager’s 
consideration set of potential partners. Stated differently, the level of the buyer manager’s 
competence trust and goodwill trust in the supplier is expected to be positively associated 
with the likelihood of the supplier being selected (Patzelt & Shepherd, 2008; Shah & 
Swaminathan, 2008). 
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We test our hypotheses by conducting a 2 x 3 between-subjects experiment, in which 
participants assume the role of a buyer manager in charge of handling collaborative 
relationships with supplier firms, with information from own-firm experience and from other-
firm experience being manipulated respectively, in order to assess whether this would 
influence the level of trust and, in turn, the intention to select. 
The results indicate, as predicted, that buyer managers may come to trust a particular 
supplier by looking at other firms that have engaged in similar collaborations. The results 
further reveal different effects on two trust dimensions. The results in fact show that simply 
knowing other firms that trusted the supplier, without any information about the outcomes, is 
sufficient for the buyer manager’s level of competence trust in the supplier to increase. This 
provides evidence for the presence of imitation even while excluding a reinforcement 
statement, namely, that it would lead to desirable outcomes. The buyer manager’s level of 
goodwill trust in the supplier, however, will only increase when it is known that other firms 
had good outcomes and the supplier indeed proved to be trustworthy. Moreover, we do not 
find that learning from own experiences would substitute for learning from others’ 
experiences. Rather, buyer managers tend to combine both when making trust judgments 
about the supplier. The results further prove that buyer managers who have higher levels of 
trust in the supplier’s competence and goodwill are more likely to select the supplier to 
collaborate with. 
This study contributes to the literature and practice by showing that imitation matters 
when forming new collaborative relationships. In this way, we provide new insights on the 
bases on which trust is built in the formation phase of collaborative relationships, as well as 
the implications for partner selection. 
One reason for the lack of evidence on these issues in previous literature may be due to 
the fact that much research on alliances has relied upon survey or archival data. The use of 
these methods, however, poses some constraints for testing the hypotheses outlined in this 
study. For instance, the impact of various factors influencing partner attractiveness cannot be 
gauged for relationships that are already in existence due to the possibility of retrospective 
bias (Shah & Swaminathan, 2008). Our experimental approach allows us to control the 
research setting and isolate the effects of other firms’ experiences from other potential 
confounding factors. Specifically by varying the information that can be obtained from 
others, this study provides more insights into how imitation works in the context of trust 
problems. 
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An additional advantage of our experimental approach is that it helps us to unravel the 
process by which information from third-parties affects partner selection. In fact, many of the 
arguments in prior research are based on the claim that network ties affect trust, which in turn 
affects partner selection. There are several studies, however, that take for granted that these 
effects operate through trust, but not explicitly measure trust as a mediator (Wuyts et al., 
2004). In this study, we show that selection decisions are influenced by other firms’ 
experiences, through shaping trust perceptions. 
These results are especially instructive since trust and particularly mimicking trust is not 
easily observable in real life, because it relies on mental processes that are intrinsically 
difficult to observe (Barrera & Buskens, 2007). By conducting an experiment, we are able to 
elicit individual’s trusting beliefs, and thereby offer a direct test of the role of imitation in 
trust formation and partner selection decisions. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We first discuss the theoretical background and 
develop the hypotheses. We next describe the experiment and report the results. The final 
section concludes. 
2. Theory and hypotheses 
This study takes an organizational learning perspective on trust formation and partner 
selection in interfirm relationships. The active search for cues by managers to learn about 
potential partners and to inform subsequent decisions is especially critical during the 
formation phase of the relationship, because of the high level of uncertainty and risk that is 
present (Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 2010; Inkpen & Currall, 2004). This may be due to 
information asymmetry, with one party having private information which the other lacks, and 
which can be used opportunistically. This makes it difficult, for example, for the buyer 
manager to assess whether desirable outcomes will result from collaborating with the supplier 
firm (Kollock, 1994). Thus, the collaboration is conceived as a trust problem in which the 
buyer manager is the trustor and the supplier firm is the trustee. Managers facing such 
problems would be inclined to look more actively for information to guide their choices 
(Nooteboom, 2002). In this sense, it has also been indicated that managers, entering new 
relationships, initially need cues to assure them that the potential partner is trustworthy 
(Gulatti & Gargiulo, 1999; Nicolaou & McKnight, 2006).  
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In this study, we specifically investigate the role of learning from other-firm experiences 
and own-firm experiences as a source of partner trust in the formation phase of the 
relationship, as well as the impact in terms of partner selection decisions. 
2.1 Trust formation and partner selection in interfirm relationships 
Following prior literature, we define trust as a psychological state comprising the intention to 
accept vulnerability based on positive expectations about the motivations or behaviors of 
another (Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998). Based on this notion, trust is often 
referred to as the perception formed by one party about another party’s trustworthiness 
(Coletti et al., 2005; McEvily et al., 2003). In other words, trust is formed when there is 
sufficient confidence that the other party will be trustworthy. More specifically,  the 
perceived likelihood that the other party will be trustworthy may be based on judgments 
about its competencies and/or goodwill (Nooteboom, 1996; Das & Teng, 2001). While 
perceptions of competence entail attributions regarding the ability of the other party, 
perceptions of goodwill entail attributions regarding the integrity and benevolence of the 
other party. Hence, our definition of trust encompasses not only concerns about a partner’s 
ability to perform according to agreements, but also its intentions to do so, as commonly done 
in the literature (Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011; Patzelt & Shepherd, 2008). Positive 
expectations of others along these dimensions provide the foundation for trust (Elliot et al., 
2012; Nicolaou et al., 2011). In the definition above, however, trust does not only refer to 
beliefs or expectations about trustworthiness, but also to the intention or willingness to be 
vulnerable to the partner. In this regard, trusting intention can be seen as the extent to which 
one is willing to depend on the other party in a given situation (McKnight et al., 1998; 
Stewart, 2003). The trusting intention of interest in our study is the intention to collaborate 
with the partner. Taken together, we posit that, as soon as the search for a partner begins, 
managers will be attuned to cues that influence the formation of its initial opinion about the 
potential partner’s trustworthiness, upon which the decision regarding partner selection will 
then be based.
28
 The purpose of this study is to explain where these cues may come from. 
                                                 
28
 It is important to note that trust between firms can exist at multiple levels. We adopt the view that trust is a 
psychological state and is inherently an individual-level phenomenon. This study specifically considers trust that 
an individual manager has in another firm. In particular, we focus on trust placed by a buyer manager, seeking 
to enter a new collaborative relationship, in a potential supplier firm. 
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In the next section, we summarize prior literature on organizational learning as a 
theoretical background of the study, after which we turn to the development of specific 
hypotheses regarding the impact on trust formation and subsequent partner selection. 
2.2 An organizational learning perspective  
Organizational learning is the systematic change in beliefs or behavior deriving from prior 
experience (Argote, 1999). There are two levels at which learning may work. Direct learning 
refers to learning from one’s own experience. Indirect learning refers to learning from others’ 
experience. In fact, actors adapt their choices depending on information they receive that is 
relevant for the decision they have to make. This information can come either from own 
experiences or from experiences of others who have to make similar decisions (Levitt & 
March, 1988; Huber, 1991). They look at their own past and repeat choices that proved to be 
successful, or they update their behavior after observing the choices made by others. 
Typically managers draw on some combination of these learning processes (Bingham & 
Davis, 2012). 
In our context, this means that buyer managers may acquire information about a potential 
supplier from two key learning sources: (1) learning from their own firm’s exchange 
experiences with the supplier and (2) learning from third-parties’ exchange experiences with 
the supplier, such as other buyer firms. 
Previous studies, however, have mainly focused on the effects of prior partner experience 
(e.g., Batenburg et al., 2003; Dekker, 2008; Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 2010). It has been 
shown that prior experience may positively influence the buyer’s trust in the supplier. The 
reasoning is that familiarity with a particular partner generates confidence that the partner 
will live up to his obligations. At the same time, however, it has been emphasized that trust is 
not only a result of occurrences within the dyad, but is often also influenced by third-parties. 
In this regard, learning effects have been discussed frequently in the sociological literature. 
The notion that trust in a dyadic relationship may be affected by the network structure 
surrounding it is at the heart of embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985, 1992). Various researchers 
have concluded that trust increases when a relationship is embedded in ties to third-parties 
(e.g., Burt & Knez, 1995; Wittek, 2001; Ferrin et al., 2006; Chua et al., 2008). Nevertheless, 
little research has directly modeled and assessed the effects of third-parties on trust in an 
interfirm setting. Moreover, while it has been acknowledged that embeddedness is important 
for trust, analysis of the mechanisms through which this works is often lacking. It is therefore 
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our intention to extend previous work by considering the potential effects of third-parties’ 
experiences, such as other buyer firms (e.g., Blumberg, 2001a,b; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; 
Rooks et al., 2006). In this study we specifically argue that interfirm partnering may be 
affected by a process of learning through imitation, in which managers alter their own beliefs 
and behavior in response to the actions of other firms. 
To summarize, although the idea that learning through previous experience promotes 
trust is well known, most empirical evidence is related to the level of the dyad, whereas clear 
evidence unambiguously supporting a causal relationship between information derived from 
others and trust is more difficult to find (Buskens & Raub, 2002). In addition, it has been 
argued that prior research does not account for all network mechanisms affecting decisions in 
trust problems (Barrera & Buskens, 2007). In particular, we believe that specific effects of 
imitation on trust in interfirm relationships are largely neglected, and brings out the 
motivation for this study. 
2.3 The role of imitation in forming trusting beliefs  
In a broad sense, imitation relates to processes where individuals, and by extension 
organizations, draw inferences from the behavior of others (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). In 
our context, imitation is considered as a mechanism to solve trust problems. By imitation we 
refer to situations where individuals facing a trust problem base their judgments upon 
observing behavior of other trustors in similar situations. If other trustors trust a certain 
trustee, their behavior can be perceived as a signal that trust can be placed safely. In other 
words, sometimes individuals come to trust somebody just because they see others do 
(Barrera & Buskens, 2007). Thus, concerning third-party effects, we posit that buyer 
managers may come to trust the supplier by looking at other firms that have done similar 
business with them. 
One might assert that trust between others is difficult to gauge and, hence, to imitate as it 
is a subjective psychological state. The exchange relationship in itself, however, might be 
easier to observe and can serve as cues for diagnosing the lines of trust. In fact, the act of 
collaborating with a certain partner can be seen as the behavioral manifestation of trust, 
which can be observed by others and can be used to draw inferences about the potential 
partner’s trustworthiness (McEvily et al., 2003). Therefore, in this study, imitation is defined 
to take place when knowing other firms that trusted the supplier, i.e., have done business with 
them, increases the level of trust placed by the buyer manager in the supplier. 
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While generally we expect such imitation effects to be present, the information gathered 
from the behavior of others may differ in the extent to which also the outcomes of their 
experiences are known. This relates to the issue as to how third-party trust is transferred to 
the buyer manager. One possibility is that buyer managers may learn about the third-party’s 
level of trust in the supplier, by using the third-party’s trust-related actions towards the 
supplier to infer that the third-party trusts the supplier, on which then their judgment about 
the supplier’s trustworthiness is based. If the third-party is willing to transmit trust-related 
information, by for example directly communicating information about the supplier’s 
trustworthiness, buyer managers may also be able to learn about the outcomes of the third-
party’s experiences with the supplier (Ferrin et al., 2006). Thus, in some situations buyers 
may only observe that other buyers have done business with the supplier, from which they 
could draw inferences about the supplier’s trustworthiness, while in other cases they may also 
know whether this resulted in good outcomes and thus whether the supplier indeed proved to 
be trustworthy. Making this distinction allows us to investigate which type of information 
matters most in forming trusting beliefs, and specifically what types of trust managers place 
in potential suppliers based on these different levels of information obtained from other firms. 
In particular, competence trust is based on the various resources and capabilities of the 
supplier, which are needed to perform adequately and fulfill relationship objectives (Das & 
Teng, 2001; Langfield-Smith, 2008). If it is known that other firms have engaged in similar 
collaborations with the supplier, this signals that these other firms must have believed that the 
supplier does possess enough resources and capabilities for accomplishing given tasks in the 
relationship, providing a basis for competence trust. Yet, the observation that other firms 
have done business with the supplier, without knowing their outcomes, does not inform about 
the supplier’s intentions to make the relationship work, and therefore would be less likely to 
affect goodwill trust (Das & Teng, 2001; Langfield-Smith, 2008). If, in addition, also 
outcomes obtained by others are known, and specifically that these others were satisfied with 
the relationship with the supplier, this can be interpreted as the supplier dealing fairly and 
caring about the other party’s welfare. Taken together, when the search for a potential partner 
begins, managers may be able to derive judgments about the partner’s competence through 
third-party sources and observation, with little outcome information. However, information 
about the outcomes of other firms’ experiences is needed to gain insights about the partner’s 
goodwill or, in other words, to make them feel assured that the partner will cooperate in good 
faith. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
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H1: The buyer manager’s level of competence trust in the supplier will be higher 
when the buyer manager knows other buyer firms that have done similar business 
with the supplier compared to when the buyer manager does not know other buyer 
firms that have done similar business with the supplier. 
H2: The buyer manager’s level of goodwill trust in the supplier will be higher when 
the buyer manager knows other buyer firms that have done similar business with the 
supplier and that this resulted in good outcomes compared to when the buyer manager 
does not know other buyer firms that have done similar business with the supplier. 
2.4 The moderating impact of prior experience  
The effects of learning from own exchange experiences are also important to consider. The 
reason for this is that, as managers can learn from their own experience, their informational 
needs are likely to change. The interrelationship between learning from own experiences and 
from experiences of others, however, remains unclear (Tuschke et al., 2014). On the one 
hand, it could be argued that a buyer who has had no direct experience with a given supplier 
may be motivated to look at third-parties to obtain clues about the supplier’s trustworthiness. 
But on the other hand, even buyers who do have direct experience with the supplier may be 
inclined to refer to third-parties to supplement their own information because of the 
difficulties of making trust judgments (Ferrin et al., 2006). In this study, we follow the first 
argument and posit that own prior experience may substitute for imitation of others. This is 
based on the idea that managers tend to copy the actions of others especially when other 
information is not available. That is, imitation appeals most to those with little prior 
information on which to base a judgment, more knowledgeable managers may rely on what 
they know internally (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). Therefore, when the buyer has already 
done business with the supplier, they hardly need to learn from the network or to imitate 
other buyers, as they can rely primarily on their own firm’s experience (Barrera & Buskens, 
2007). In other words, information from own past collaborations with the supplier is often 
seen as more informative than information obtained from others about the supplier. Hence, as 
a way to find out when imitation matters most, we look at the moderating effect of own prior 
experience. In particular, we expect the effects of learning from other firms’ experiences to 
be weaker if the buyer manager also has the opportunity to learn from its own firm’s 
experiences. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
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H3: The effect of other buyer firms’ experiences with the supplier on the buyer 
manager’s level of trust in the supplier will be weaker when the buyer has prior 
experiences with the supplier compared to when the buyer has no prior experiences 
with the supplier. 
2.5 The effect of trusting beliefs on selection decisions  
The perception about another’s trustworthiness is an important factor in the decision when 
people choose others with whom to interact. People are more willing to collaborate with 
those whom they trust. Based on the theory of reasoned action, it has been proposed that 
trusting intentions will be a function of trusting beliefs (McKnight et al., 1998; Stewart, 
2003). It seems logical that if one believes that the other party is trustworthy, one is likely to 
form a trusting intention towards that party. In our context, this means that a manager’s 
decision to engage in a collaboration with a partner will be based on an assessment of the 
partner’s trustworthiness (Inkpen & Currall, 2004; Nicolaou & McKnight, 2006). Managers 
make their partner selection decisions based on their predictions about satisfaction with their 
choice of collaboration partner, as informed by the partner’s perceived competence and 
goodwill. Seen in this way, trusting beliefs may act as an evaluative mechanism regarding the 
extent to which buyer managers foresee positive outcomes to result from collaborating with 
the supplier, and is expected to positively influence the buyer manager’s trusting intentions, 
in particular the likelihood of the supplier to be selected. More specifically, if the manager 
believes in the abilities and intentions of the supplier, he or she will be confident that the 
supplier will deliver in the future and thus will be more likely to select this supplier to 
collaborate with (Patzelt & Shepherd, 2008; Shah & Swaminathan, 2008). Therefore, we 
hypothesize that: 
H4: The higher the buyer manager’s level of competence trust in the supplier, the 
higher the likelihood of the supplier to be selected.  
H5: The higher the buyer manager’s level of goodwill trust in the supplier, the higher 
the likelihood of the supplier to be selected. 
In summary, we predict that competence trust is relatively easy to form when it is known 
that other firms have done similar business with the supplier, whereas goodwill trust requires 
more information about the outcomes obtained by these others. Moreover, we predict the 
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effect of other firms’ experiences on the buyer manager’s trust in the supplier to be weaker 
when learning from own firm’s experiences with the supplier is also possible. Further, higher 
levels of both competence and goodwill trust, in turn, are expected to influence the buyer 
manager’s decisions regarding partner selection. 
3. Method 
We use a 2 (no own-firm experience vs. own-firm experience) x 3 (no other-firm experience 
vs. other-firm experience without outcome information vs. other-firm experience with 
outcome information) between-subjects experimental design, in which participants were 
asked to indicate their perceived trust in a potential partner, and subsequently to decide on 
partner selection. 
3.1 Participants and procedures  
Participants are students recruited from a postgraduate programme in management. The 
students are supposed to have a certain familiarity with the type of problem described in the 
experiment. The experiment was administered during a scheduled classroom session. All 
participants were volunteers and, in turn for their participation, had the chance to win movie 
tickets. In total, 156 students completed the experiment. The participants assumed the role of 
an R&D manager in a technology firm, being responsible for finding an adequate supplier 
firm to collaborate with on a new product development project. This specific setting is used 
as it introduces interesting aspects of trust formation and subsequent partner selection. The 
situation represents a trust problem in which participants had to evaluate the trustworthiness 
of a potential supplier. It was especially emphasized that the success of the collaboration 
would depend on their supplier selection. 
The experimental procedure was as follows. After explaining the instructions, 
participants were asked to read the scenario (see Appendix 3.A). The basic scenario was 
described on the first page and all participants received the same information to this point. 
Besides their role description, participants were told that the new product development is of 
crucial strategic importance to the firm and involves a large amount of money. This is 
included as situational importance may induce individuals to more carefully evaluate the 
situation before making decisions. Furthermore, participants were informed that the outcomes 
of the project will only become clear after the project has been initiated, and especially will 
hinge upon the working relationship with the supplier. The reason for this is that actively 
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looking for information about the potential partner is more likely to take place in relatively 
uncertain and risky situations. After pointing this out, participants were instructed to the 
second page, presenting a more detailed description of a potential supplier with whom their 
firm can do business, including the experimental manipulations. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the six experimental conditions. In the next step, participants were asked to 
indicate their perceived trust in the supplier described to them, and subsequently the 
likelihood they would select this particular supplier to collaborate with. Finally, participants 
had to respond to two manipulation check questions, and were asked to fill in some 
demographic questions, as well as questions regarding their motivation to perform the 
experiment and their understanding of the experimental task. 
3.2 Manipulations 
The two independent variables manipulated in our experiment are own-firm experience and 
other-firm experience. First, information from own experience was manipulated by telling the 
participants either that their firm has never done business before with the supplier (no own-
firm experience condition) or that their firm has done business with the supplier before and 
had good outcomes (own-firm experience condition). We include these two levels as the 
focus is on the difference between no prior experience and positive prior experience with the 
partner (see e.g., Buskens & Weesie, 2000). Second, information from others’ experience is 
manipulated by either giving no information about other buyer firms’ previous experiences 
with the supplier which represents the control condition (no other-firm experience condition), 
by indicating that they know other buyer firms that have done business with the supplier but 
not the outcomes (other-firm experience without outcome information condition) or by 
indicating that they know other buyer firms that have done business with the supplier and had 
good outcomes (other-firm experience with outcome information condition). We use these 
three levels in order to study the difference between no information, neutral information, and 
positive information derived from others’ experiences with the partner. After all, imitation 
might occur without knowing the outcomes obtained by others, or could be based on 
information that includes the outcomes of a given collaboration (see e.g., Barrera & Buskens, 
2007). 
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3.3 Measures 
Next the dependent variables were measured. The participants were asked to answer a series 
of questions reflecting their trust in the supplier, derived from existing scales to measure trust 
(see e.g., McKnight et al., 2002; Nicolaou & McKnight, 2006). The first six items in the scale 
capture benevolence and integrity which reflect the individual’s belief in the supplier’s 
goodwill, whereas the last three items capture the individual’s belief in the supplier’s 
competence. Furthermore, participants were asked to make decisions on partner selection. 
Specifically, participants needed to indicate how likely it would be that they would select the 
supplier described in the experiment. This measure of supplier selection intends to reflect the 
individual’s trusting behavior (see e.g., McKnight et al., 2002; Nicolaou & McKnight, 2006). 
In addition to the dependent variables, we also measured participants’ disposition to trust, as 
this personal characteristic may influence trust in the supplier and subsequent decisions (see 
e.g., McKnight et al., 2002; Nicolaou & McKnight, 2006). Disposition to trust represents an 
individual’s general tendency to trust others, and was measured by using a three-item scale. 
This allows us to pick up how much trust one is likely to have in another, prior to data on that 
particular party being available. All questions were to be answered on a seven-point Likert-
type scale (see Appendix 3.B).  
4. Analysis and results 
We test our hypotheses by conducting the following analyses. First, analyses of covariance 
(ANCOVA) are used to test the main and interactive effects of other-firm experience and 
own-firm experience on partner trust (H1 to H3), controlling for the effects of trust 
disposition. Second, we use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression modelling to test the 
impact of partner trust on partner selection (H4 and H5). In addition, a structural equation 
modelling (SEM) analysis is conducted to offer an overall assessment of the entire model. 
Before testing the hypotheses, we performed some manipulation checks on the experimental 
conditions, and validated the measurement scales. 
4.1 Preliminary analyses 
Participants had to respond to two manipulation check questions. The first question asked 
participants whether their firm has done business before with the supplier: “yes” or “no”. The 
second question asked participants whether they knew any other firms that have done similar 
business with the supplier: “yes” or “no”. Of the 156 participants enrolled in the experimental 
 - 95 -  
 
sessions, 38 failed one or more of the manipulation check questions. These participants are 
excluded from our subsequent analyses, leaving us with 118 usable observations in total, and 
approximately 20 per cell.
29
 To further assess the effectiveness of our manipulations, 
participants were also asked to indicate how they would characterize their firm’s satisfaction 
about its prior dealings with the supplier, in case their firm had done business with the 
supplier before. This question was answered by the participants in the own-firm experience 
condition, and resulted in a mean score (M = 6.00; SD = 0.53) that is significantly higher than 
the midpoint of the scale. In a similar vein, in case they knew other firms that have done 
similar business with the supplier, participants were asked to indicate how they would 
characterize these other firms’ satisfaction about their dealings with the supplier. Most of the 
participants in the other-firm experience without outcome information condition correctly 
indicated “do not know”, as this was not explicitly mentioned. Of the participants in the 
other-firm experience with outcome information condition, none indicated “do not know”, 
yielding a mean score (M = 6.05; SD = 0.93) that is significantly higher than the midpoint of 
the scale.
30
 
Of the final sample of participants, 56 % were male, the average age was 24 years, and 
the majority had working experience of more than 12 months. The demographic data were 
tested for differences across experimental conditions to determine whether randomization 
was successful. As desired, no significant differences were found (all p > 0.10). The mean 
scores of motivation to perform the experiment (M = 4.40; SD = 1.05) and clarity of the 
experimental task (M = 4.40; SD = 1.26) were significantly larger than the midpoint of the 
scale, indicating that the participants were well motivated and understood the task. We did 
not find any significant differences across the experimental conditions on these variables 
either (all p > 0.10). 
                                                 
29
 As a robustness check, we reran the analyses using the full sample and found that the results remain 
qualitatively the same, although the statistical significance of the effects of other-firm experience on competence 
trust becomes slightly weaker.  
30
 Some of the respondents in the other-firm experience without outcome information indicated a satisfaction 
level ranging from 4 to 7, with the mean score (M = 5.36; SD = 0.56) significantly higher than the midpoint of 
the scale. Thus, an intriguing result of the experimental manipulation is that, if they are told that others have 
done business with the supplier, some participants infer that it must have been good, even when the outcomes 
are not explicitly mentioned. However, when the outcomes are mentioned, participants scored the satisfaction 
levels significantly higher than when the outcomes are not mentioned (t = 2.74; p < 0.01). Based on this we can 
conclude that the manipulations have worked.  
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4.2 Measurement validation  
Given that we adapted the measures of trust from prior studies, we performed an exploratory 
factor analysis (EFA) on the set of nine questions, to assess the validity of the construct. The 
results reveal two distinct factors (eigenvalues larger than 1; accounting for 57.34 % of the 
variance). The first six items load on one factor, representing goodwill trust. The last three 
items load on the second factor, representing competence trust. We further evaluated the trust 
construct by running a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). The model distinguishing 
between goodwill trust and competence trust demonstrates a good fit (χ2/df = 1.08; GFI = 
0.95; CFI = 0.99; RMSEA = 0.03). All items load significantly on their respective factors, 
indicating convergent validity of the measures. To assess discriminant validity, we computed 
the average variance extracted, and found that these are greater than the shared variance 
between the factors. Moreover, constrained analyses show a significant difference in chi-
square values between the constrained and unconstrained model, confirming discriminant 
validity. The Cronbach alpha of 0.79 for competence trust and 0.78 for goodwill trust reflects 
high construct reliability. In testing the hypotheses, we differentiate between competence 
trust and goodwill trust, and derive these two variables by calculating individual scores as 
means of the combined scale items.
31
 Table 3.1 reports the descriptive statistics for both 
competence trust and goodwill trust by experimental condition. 
A similar measurement analysis was performed for trust disposition, as this was also 
based on a multi-item scale. The results indicate that all items significantly load on one 
factor. The Cronbach alpha equals 0.73. From this we conclude that the measure is valid and 
reliable. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31
 We also calculated weighted average scores based on the EFA and CFA loadings on competence trust and 
goodwill trust. Repeating our analyses with these weighted dependent variables leads to very similar results. 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics 
Means and standard deviations for competence trust 
  
Other-firm experience 
 
   
 
Own-firm 
experience 
no other-firm 
experience 
other-firm experience 
without  
outcome information 
other-firm experience  
with  
outcome information 
 
Row total 
 
no own-firm 
experience 
 
4.76 
(0.61) 
n = 21 
5.09 
(0.67) 
n = 19 
5.11 
(0.75) 
n = 19 
4.98 
(0.68) 
n = 59 
 
own-firm 
experience 
 
5.33 
(0.75) 
n = 21 
5.53 
(0.70) 
n = 19 
5.68 
(0.86) 
n = 19 
5.50 
(0.77) 
n = 59 
 
Column total 
 
5.05 
(0.73) 
n = 42 
5.31 
(0.71) 
n = 38 
5.39 
(0.84) 
n = 38 
5.24 
(0.77) 
n = 118 
 
Means and standard deviations for goodwill trust 
  
Other-firm experience 
 
   
 
Own-firm 
experience 
no other-firm 
experience 
other-firm experience 
without  
outcome information 
other-firm experience  
with  
outcome information 
 
Row total 
 
no own-firm 
experience 
 
4.60 
(0.68) 
n = 21 
4.62 
(0.56) 
n = 19 
4.63 
(0.84) 
n = 19 
4.62 
(0.59) 
n = 59 
 
own-firm 
experience 
 
5.03 
(0.43) 
n = 21 
5.04 
(0.76) 
n = 19 
5.26 
(0.62) 
n = 19 
5.11 
(0.61) 
n = 59 
 
Column total 
 
4.81 
(0.61) 
n = 42 
4.83 
(0.69) 
n = 38 
4.95 
(0.79) 
n = 38 
4.86 
(0.70) 
n = 118 
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4.3 Hypotheses tests  
The first set of hypotheses relates to the effects of other-firm experience and own-firm 
experience on the buyer manager’s trust in a potential supplier firm. Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 
present the hypotheses tests. The analysis consists of two separate ANCOVA models, one for 
each dependent variable.
32
 As indicated above, we include trust disposition as covariate. We 
do this to control for the variation in participants’ inherent propensity to trust. Consistent with 
our expectations, trust disposition has a significant positive influence on trust, and this 
appears to be the case for both trust dimensions. In what follows, we look at the effects of the 
experimental treatments on competence trust and goodwill trust, controlling for trust 
disposition. 
Table 3.2: ANCOVA on competence trust 
PANEL A: Adjusted means and standard errors 
Own-firm experience  Other-firm experience 
 
no own-firm experience 
 
4.99 
(0.09) 
 
no other-firm experience 5.04 
(0.11) 
own-firm experience 
 
5.51 
(0.09) 
other-firm experience 
without 
outcome information 
5.30 
(0.12) 
 
 
 other-firm experience 
with 
outcome information 
5.41 
(0.12) 
 
PANEL B: Test of between-subjects effects   
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F p-value
a
 
      
trust disposition 
other-firm experience  
own-firm experience 
other-firm experience*own-firm experience  
error  
1.00 
2.92 
7.77 
0.18 
57.63 
1 
2 
1 
2 
111 
1.00 
1.46 
7.77 
0.09 
0.52 
1.92 
2.82 
14.97 
0.17 
0.08 
0.03 
< 0.01 
0.42 
 
PANEL C: Contrast results    
 Mean 
Difference 
p-value
a
 
 
no other-firm experience vs. other-firm experience without outcome information 
no other-firm experience vs. other-firm experience with outcome information 
other-firm experience without outcome information vs. with outcome information 
 
0.26 
0.35 
0.09 
 
0.06 
0.02 
0.30 
a 
The p-values are reported on a one-tailed basis, given the directional predictions of the effects. 
 
 
                                                 
32
 The hypotheses were also tested using multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA), allowing the two 
dependent variables to be analyzed simultaneously. The results are consistent with those of the univariate tests 
for both competence and goodwill trust.  
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Table 3.3: ANCOVA on goodwill trust 
PANEL A: Adjusted means and standard errors 
Own-firm experience  Other-firm experience 
 
no own-firm experience 
 
4.64 
(0.08) 
no other-firm experience 4.79 
(0.10) 
own-firm experience 
 
5.09 
(0.08) 
other-firm experience 
without 
outcome information 
4.80 
(0.10) 
 
 
 other-firm experience 
with 
outcome information 
5.00 
(0.10) 
 
PANEL B: Test of between-subjects effects   
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F p-value
a
 
      
trust disposition 
other-firm experience  
own-firm experience 
other-firm experience*own-firm experience  
error  
6.91 
1.03 
6.09 
0.21 
42.01 
1 
2 
1 
2 
111 
6.91 
0.52 
6.09 
0.11 
0.38 
18.26 
1.36 
16.08 
0.28 
< 0.01 
  0.13 
< 0.01 
  0.38 
 
PANEL C: Contrast results    
 Mean 
Difference 
p-value
a
 
 
no other-firm experience vs. other-firm experience without outcome information 
no other-firm experience vs. other-firm experience with outcome information 
other-firm experience without outcome information vs. with outcome information 
 
0.01 
0.21 
0.20 
 
0.48 
0.07 
0.08 
a 
The p-values are reported on a one-tailed basis, given the directional predictions of the effects. 
The means in Table 3.2 Panel A show that other-firm experience increases the level of 
competence trust (from 5.04 to 5.30 to 5.41). The results in Table 3.2 Panel B indicate that 
the increase is significant (F = 2.82, p = 0.03, one-tailed). The means reported in Table 3.3 
Panel A show that other-firm experience increases the level of goodwill trust (from 4.79 to 
4.80 to 5.00). The results in Table 3.3 Panel B, however, indicate that the increase is not 
significant (F = 1.36, p = 0.13, one-tailed). Hence, we find different effects on the two trust 
dimensions, with influences from other-firm experiences having a significant positive impact 
on the buyer manager’s competence trust, but not on goodwill trust in the supplier. 
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Because we manipulated other-firm experience at three levels, we conduct more in-depth 
tests to inspect the differences in trust formation between experimental treatments, as 
postulated in H1 and H2. Contrast results in Table 3.2 Panel C indicate that, compared to the 
no other-firm experience condition, competence trust is significantly higher in the other-firm 
experience without outcome information condition (mean difference = 0.26, p = 0.06), as 
well as in the other-firm experience with information condition (mean difference = 0.35, p = 
0.02). However, no significant difference is observed when we compare the two other-firm 
experience conditions (mean difference = 0.09, p = 0.30). This pattern of results is illustrated 
in the profile plot in Figure 3.1. As the other-firm experience condition without knowing the 
outcomes does result in higher competence trust than in the control condition, we can accept 
H1. Overall, these findings suggest that simply knowing other firms that have done business 
with the supplier, when nothing is mentioned about the outcomes and thus the information is 
not directly indicative of the supplier’s trustworthiness, is sufficient for the participants’ level 
of competence trust in the supplier to increase. Contrast results in Table 3.3 Panel C indicate 
that, goodwill trust does not significantly differ between the no other-firm experience 
condition and other-firm experience condition without outcome information condition (mean 
difference = 0.01, p = 0.48), but is significantly higher in the other-firm experience with 
outcome information condition than in the no-other firm experience condition (mean 
difference = 0.21, p = 0.07). Moreover, comparing the two other-firm experience conditions, 
it appears that goodwill trust is significantly higher in other-firm experience with outcome 
information condition than in the other-firm experience without outcome information 
condition (mean difference = 0.20, p = 0.08). This pattern of results is illustrated in the 
profile plot in Figure 3.2. Since the other-firm experience condition with knowing the 
outcomes leads to higher goodwill trust than in the control condition, this provides support 
for H2. We conclude that simply knowing other firms that have done business with the 
supplier is not enough to establish goodwill trust. The participants’ goodwill trust in the 
supplier will only increase when it is known that other firms had good outcomes and thus the 
supplier indeed proved to be trustworthy. 
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Figure 3.1: Profile plot for competence trust 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Profile plot for goodwill trust 
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H3 posits that the effect of other-firm experience is weaker if the buyer also has the 
opportunity to learn from own-firm experience. The ANCOVA results in Table 3.2 and Table 
3.3 show no significant interaction effect for either competence trust or goodwill trust. Thus, 
no evidence is found that own-firm experience would substitute for other-firm experience, 
and H3 is not supported. A potential explanation is that, although the participants may be 
aware of prior dealings with the supplier and may have been told that their firm and the other 
firm had a satisficing relationship, their willingness to trust may still be tentative, and looking 
at others may yield supplementary information to make trust judgments about the supplier. 
The final hypothesis relates to the impact trust has on subsequent decisions regarding 
partner selection. Specifically, H4 and H5 propose that the level of the buyer manager’s 
competence and goodwill trust in the supplier will be positively associated with the 
likelihood of the supplier being selected. We test this using OLS regression modeling, with 
partner selection as a function of competence trust and goodwill trust. The R-squared for the 
model is 0.26. The results are presented in Table 3.4. In line with our expectations, the 
relation between trust and the likelihood to select is positive and significant, and this appears 
to be the case for both competence trust (β = 0.26, p < 0.01, one-tailed) and goodwill trust (β 
= 0.33, p < 0.01, one-tailed), lending support for H4 as well as H5. This confirms that beliefs 
about the other party’s competence and goodwill are both critical in selecting a partner. 
Table 3.4: OLS regression on partner selection 
 β p-value
a
 
competence trust 
goodwill trust   
0.26 
0.33 
< 0.01 
< 0.01 
a 
The p-values are reported on a one-tailed basis, given the directional predictions of the effects. 
4.4 Structural model 
The previous section reports separate tests for our hypotheses, but does not provide an overall 
assessment of the entire model. Similar to Barton and Mercer (2005), we perform a SEM 
analysis to gain insights into how other-firm experience and own-firm experience affect trust, 
and subsequently partner selection decisions. The SEM analysis, using maximum likelihood 
estimation, simultaneously estimates the structural model and measurement model. The 
measurement model relates the measurement items to the respective constructs. The structural 
model contains the variables own-firm experience, other-firm experience, goodwill trust, 
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competence trust, and partner selection, and specifies linkages between them.
33
 As control 
variable we include trust disposition. The fit statistics indicate that the model fits the data 
well (χ2/df = 1.47; GFI = 0.89; CFI = 0.93; RMSEA = 0.06). Table 3.5 and Figure 3.3 
summarize the results. 
Consistent with the ANCOVA results discussed above, we observe that own-firm 
experience has a significant positive effect on both trust dimensions, while the path of other-
firm experience is significant for competence trust (β = 0.20, p = 0.02, one-tailed) but not for 
goodwill trust (β= 0.10, p = 0.13, one-tailed). For the second link in our model, we find that 
both competence trust (β = 0.33, p < 0.01, one-tailed) and goodwill trust (β = 0.23, p= 0.04, 
one-tailed) are significantly and positively related to partner selection, confirming the results 
from the OLS regression presented above. 
Table 3.5: Results of structural model 
 β p-value
a
 
trust disposition  goodwill trust 
trust disposition  competence trust 
own-firm experience  goodwill trust 
own-firm experience  competence trust   
other-firm experience  goodwill trust 
other-firm experience  competence trust   
goodwill trust  partner selection 
competence trust  partner selection 
0.40 
0.16 
0.33 
0.38 
0.10 
0.20 
0.23 
0.33 
< 0.01 
0.07 
< 0.01 
< 0.01 
0.13 
0.02 
0.04 
< 0.01 
a 
The p-values are reported on a one-tailed basis, given the directional predictions of the effects. 
The structural model further allows us to inspect whether partner trust mediates the effect 
of other-firm experience and own-firm experience on partner selection. We follow the steps 
recommended by Zhao et al. (2010) to test for mediation. To establish mediation, this test 
only requires the indirect effect to be significant. Bootstrap results indicate that the indirect 
path from own-firm experience (0.20, p < 0.01, one-tailed) as well as from other-firm 
experience (0.09, p = 0.03, one-tailed) to partner selection is positive and significant. This 
means that other-firm experience and own-firm experience indirectly influence partner 
selection. Given our earlier arguments, this can be interpreted in the sense that other-firm 
experience and own-firm experience influence partner selection via their effect on partner 
trust. 
                                                 
33
 The variable own-firm experience is coded 1 for no own-firm experience and 2 for own-firm experience. The 
variable other-firm experience is coded 1 for no other-firm experience, 2 for other-firm experience without 
outcome information and 3 for other-firm experience with outcome information.  
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Figure 3.3: Representation of structural model 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (one-tailed). 
5. Conclusion 
This study investigates the role of imitation in trust formation and partner selection in 
interfirm relationships. Specifically, we examine how other firms’ dealings may shape the 
trust that buyer managers have in a potential supplier firm, and how this trust affects the 
managers’ subsequent selection decisions. We find support for the effects of other-firm 
experiences, as participants place significantly higher levels of trust in a potential supplier 
when they know other firms that trusted the supplier. The effects, however, appear to be more 
pronounced for competence trust than for goodwill trust. In addition, we find that even 
participants who have the opportunity to learn from own-firm experiences are inclined to 
look at others when making trust judgments about the supplier. As expected, our results also 
indicate that higher levels of competence and goodwill trust increase the likelihood of the 
supplier being selected. Our structural model confirms these findings, and additionally shows 
that other firms’ experiences influence own partner selection decisions through shaping trust 
perceptions. 
The study contributes to the literature in several ways. We extend previous research 
investigating the ways in which trust is built in the formation phase of collaborative 
relationships, as well as the implications for partner selection. More specifically, we add to 
the literature by demonstrating that buyers go beyond the dyad when assessing the appeal of a 
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potential supplier, which corroborates the value of a broader network perspective. The 
alliance literature, generally concerned with the formation, governance, and performance 
implications of firms’ alliances, has often focused on dyadic exchanges, while a network 
perspective may provide a more complete understanding. Although there is an emerging body 
of research examining network effects, this is mainly focused on reputation effects and relies 
on a communication argument to explain the influence of network ties on alliance formation 
patterns. In addition to the influence that network ties will have on what information is 
communicated about potential partners, this study implies that observation of other firms’ 
patterns of ties may influence choices in forming alliances. Our findings complement prior 
research suggesting that a model of trust transfer or imitation may be useful in addressing the 
question of how firms choose alliance partners (e.g., Stewart, 2003; Wittek, 2001).  
By explicitly modeling and measuring these effects, our study further contributes to the 
understanding of how trust forms at the earliest stage of the relationship. Although trust plays 
a central role in interfirm partnering, its constituent elements have seldom been directly 
examined. Many studies have treated trust as a unidimensional construct, without making a 
clear distinction between competence trust and goodwill trust (e.g., Nicolaou & McKnight, 
2006; Nicolaou et al., 2011).  In this study, we do not only point to the existence of 
competence trust and goodwill trust as two distinct dimensions, but also indicate that the two 
types of trust are differently influenced by other-firm experiences. Particularly noteworthy is 
the finding that other firms dealing with a potential partner may increase one’s favorable 
perceptions about the partner’s competence but not immediately about its goodwill. This 
suggests that participants interpret the act of other firms dealing with a particular supplier 
mostly as a signal of the supplier’s ability to perform its tasks, but did not view such 
information as indicative of the supplier’s integrity and benevolence. Only when it is also 
known that other firms had satisfactory past dealings with the supplier, this is conceived as 
the supplier acting with integrity and benevolence, in addition to its ability to perform. This 
difference indicates that the two dimensions capture some unique elements of 
trustworthiness. Each dimension contributes a unique perceptual perspective from which 
managers consider a potential partner. The results also show that, regarding trusting 
intentions, competence trust and goodwill trust have a positive influence on partner selection. 
This provides further support for the reasoning that managers assess both the competence and 
goodwill of a potential partner, and together influence the intention to engage in a 
collaboration. Altogether, we add to the trust literature, by developing a model that integrates 
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different aspects of trust that have not been linked before. Some have called for more 
empirical work examining the differences in antecedents and consequences of different 
dimensions of trust (e.g., McEvily & Zaheer, 2006; McEvily & Tortoriello, 2011). We 
answer this call by explaining that the processes by which competence trust and goodwill 
trust are built are not necessarily the same, although their effects on selection decisions are. 
The results generally emphasize the importance of organizational learning as a basis for 
partner trust. Other than earlier research on organizational learning, we consider both the 
effects of direct and indirect learning. While previous studies have indicated that learning 
may be based on information from own prior experiences as well as from experiences of 
others, there is a limited understanding on how these two learning processes relate to each 
other (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006; Tuschke et al., 2014). By looking at the interaction 
between the two, this study provides evidence on whether managers emphasize one mode of 
learning over another, and makes an important contribution to the organizational learning 
literature in general. The results of our study in fact suggest that participants tend to combine 
both types of information. That is, in addition to consulting information from own 
experiences, they draw on third-parties to inform trust judgments. The role that own 
experience plays in combination with the experience of others stresses the prominence of 
learning in both a specific and broader social context (Bingham & Davis, 2012; Hagedoorn, 
2006). 
The study also provides important insights for practice. Our findings are particularly 
relevant given the potential detrimental effects of poor partner selection. We show that 
imitation plays an important role in forming trusting beliefs and selecting collaboration 
partners, which can be seen as particular type of learning by means of information accessible 
through the network (Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989; Huber, 1991). In this regard, it is 
important to recognize, however, that not all network ties provide equal opportunities for 
learning. When managers imitate others that are considered as holding superior information, 
imitation can be seen as a convenient way to arrive at a better decision, especially when the 
firm is lacking information from own prior experiences. This does not exclude the possibility, 
however, that imitation can be problematic (Barrera & Buskens, 2007; Lieberman & Asaba, 
2006). If managers base their decisions on the choices of others, without knowing the 
outcomes, there will be more room for opportunism compared to situations where outcomes 
can be observed as well. That is to say, managers may view the experiences of others as an 
indicator of a potential partner’s quality, inferring that if other buyer firms are doing business 
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with the supplier, it must be good. This may, however, not always be true. For instance, if 
managers engage in imitative behavior, regardless of any information about the outcomes, it 
could happen that they come to trust the ‘wrong’ partner, which may have large 
consequences (Carson et al., 2003; McEvily et al., 2003). In particular, competence trust is 
concerned only with the ability to do appropriate things, not the intention to do so. A very 
competent firm may well decide to be opportunistic and, therefore, threaten cooperation. In 
order to lower the level of such relational risk, also goodwill trust should be established (Das 
& Teng, 2001; Langfield-Smith, 2008). Building on this, we suggest that simply observing 
that other buyer firms collaborated with the supplier may be not enough, but that it would be 
worthwhile for managers to actively look for information about the outcomes of the other 
buyer firms’ experiences with the supplier before making selection decisions, as to gain more 
assurance that the partner will cooperate in good faith rather than behave opportunistically, 
and consequently to avoid mistakes in the decision-making process potentially resulting from 
pure imitation. 
The findings of this study should be interpreted in the light of its bounded scope and also 
suggest several avenues for further research. Particularly, as we considered only the effect of 
neutral or positive information from third-parties on trust perceptions, our study could be 
extended by examining the effects of negative experiences as well. Moreover, in the current 
setting, both information obtained from own firm’s and other firms’ experiences are based on 
positive experience, and hence are complementary and reinforce each other. However, it 
would be interesting to understand what happens in the situation where information signals 
are inconsistent, for example in the case of favorable own experiences but negative 
experiences by others. This represents an interesting topic for further research. 
In addition, the imitation of trust may also be dependent on relation strength or on how 
well one knows the third-parties. Managers may place considerably more value on trust-
related judgments obtained from trustworthy third-parties than from third-parties that are not 
deemed to be trustworthy themselves. Hence, which third-parties will be mainly relied upon 
for imitation remains an interesting question, and we leave investigating this for further 
research. 
Another important extension of this study would be to develop an experiment in which 
participants play repeated trust games. The experiment could be designed in such a way that 
in one condition trustors only know what happens in their own game with the trustee, 
whereas in another condition trustors may be able to look at the choices of other trustors with 
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the trustee. Such a design would allow researchers to better track the effects of different types 
of learning and, most importantly, to observe actual imitation at work. 
Furthermore, this study examines trust formation pertaining to the partner selection stage 
of the relationship, but we recognize that trust further develops as one’s positive expectations 
are confirmed by another’s behavior over time. Our results suggest that the role of imitation 
is strong when entering new collaborative relationships. Further research could investigate 
whether the importance of third-parties changes over the course of the relationship. 
Consistent with other studies addressing governance in interfirm settings, researchers 
may also wish to consider the influence on other decisions, besides actual partner selection. It 
would be interesting to find out, for instance, whether imitation of third-parties’ trustfulness 
towards a particular partner may also work to reduce the effort put into the contractual 
management of the relationship. 
As a conclusion, this study provides several new insights by examining the role of 
imitation in trust situations. Our findings suggest that, next to learning from own prior 
experiences, other firms’ choices may constitute an important source of trust in the formation 
phase of the relationship. In this way, this study highlights the social aspect of learning in 
which managers observe actions by other firms and change their own beliefs and behavior as 
a result. Further research in this area will be useful to deepen our understanding of the 
determinants as well as the implications of trust in interfirm relationships. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 3.A: Experimental scenario 
Basic scenario 
You are the R&D manager of a consumer technology firm. You often collaborate with manufacturing 
companies (“suppliers”) to develop and produce electronic devices.  
Advances in technology enhance the potential for consumer electronic devices to proliferate and be 
utilized well beyond what is in the market today. Your firm wants to keep up with the evolving 
technology and seeks to launch a new electronic device incorporating a new set of features.   
Since the development and production of this new product ask for significant technical expertise, your 
firm intends to enter into a collaborative relationship with a supplier firm to aid in these activities. As the 
R&D manager, you are responsible for finding an adequate supplier firm to collaborate with on the joint 
project.  
The project concerns the development of a new product that is of crucial strategic importance to your 
firm and requires a large amount of money to be invested. You realize, however, that by engaging in a 
relationship with a supplier to carry out the new product project, your firm is exposed to risk associated 
with the collaboration. In fact, the outcomes of the project will only become clear after the project has 
been initiated, and especially will hinge upon the working relationship with the supplier.  
Therefore, you place high importance on the success of the collaboration with the supplier. This will 
depend, in particular, on your supplier selection process. Specifically, choosing a good supplier to 
collaborate with will increase the likelihood of achieving the desired outcomes. 
Description of potential supplier 
Company HighTech is founded in 1998 and specialized in manufacturing electronic devices. The 
company asserts to be dedicated to providing innovative and high quality products with competitive 
prices to the global market. Below, a brief summary of the company profile is given.  
No own-firm experience condition: 
Your firm has never done business with this supplier before. 
Own-firm experience condition: 
Your firm has done business with this supplier before and was satisfied. 
 Company name: HighTech 
 Year established: 1998 
 Business type: Manufacturer 
 Products/Services: Electronic Devices  
 R&D staff: 11 - 20 People  
 Total number of employees: 250  
 Estimated annual sales: $5 Million - $10 Million   
The company is now considered as a potential supplier to undertake the new product project. 
Specifically, your firm aims to work closely with the supplier, to help in the development and production 
of the new electronic device. 
No other-firm experience condition:  
control condition; no information displayed 
Other-firm experience without outcome information condition:  
Next to the above information, you notice that you know some other firms that have done similar 
business with this supplier.   
Other-firm experience with outcome information condition:  
Next to the above information, you notice that you know some other firms that have done similar 
business with this supplier and were satisfied.   
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Appendix 3.B: Scale items 
Construct Measures 
Goodwill 
trust
a 
 
 
Competence 
trust
a 
 
 
1. I believe that this supplier would act in my best interest. 
2. I believe that if required, the supplier would do its best to help me. 
3. I believe the supplier is interested in my well-being, not just its own. 
4. I believe the supplier would be truthful in its dealings with me. 
5. I believe the supplier is honest.  
6. I believe the supplier would keep its commitments. 
1. I believe the supplier is competent and effective in undertaking this project.   
2. I believe the supplier would perform its role in the joint project very well. 
3. I believe the supplier is a capable and valuable member of this joint project. 
Partner 
Selection
b
 
1. If you had to choose a supplier to collaborate with, how likely would it be that you 
would select this supplier? 
Trust  
Disposition
a 
1. I usually trust people until they give me a reason not to trust them. 
2. I generally give people the benefit of the doubt when I first meet them. 
3. My typical approach is to trust new acquaintances until they prove I should not trust 
them. 
a
 seven-point scale: 1 = “strongly disagree”; 7 = “strongly disagree”. 
b
 seven-point scale: 1 = “very unlikely”; 7 = “very likely”. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
This PhD dissertation sought to improve our understanding of management control in 
interfirm relationships by investigating the role of imitation. As a general conclusion, we 
summarize the main contributions to the literature as well as the implications for business 
practice, and finally point to some limitations together with interesting opportunities for 
future research. 
1. Academic contributions 
This dissertation makes several contributions to the literature. Although imitation frequently 
occurs in reality, and is pervasive in the literature of other disciplines, the role of imitation 
has been largely neglected in the domain of interfirm management control. Several studies in 
various management fields have emphasized the processes through which individuals and 
organizations may be influenced by others (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006; Ordanini et al., 2008). 
None of these, however, have empirically examined the effects of imitation with regard to 
interfirm management control issues. In this dissertation, we start to fill this gap in the 
literature via three empirical studies on the role of imitation in explaining management 
control in interfirm relationships, and supply chains in particular. 
A notable implication of this research is the importance of placing dyadic encounters 
within a larger context. While previous research has often focused on dyadic exchanges, our 
contention is that a network perspective may provide a more complete understanding of 
interfirm management control (Caglio & Ditillo, 2008; Anderson & Dekker, 2014). After all, 
how economic actions of organizational and individual actors are influenced by their relations 
to others is one of most classic questions in the social sciences. The fact is that one’s actions 
are frequently and unavoidable shaped by the actions of others. In this respect, considering 
firms in their broader relationship context will take us toward the network view of supply 
chain relationships and help us better understand the influences that managers face. 
In the first and second manuscript, we particularly look at imitative behaviors in a 
vertical supply chain triad, and point out that MCS decisions can have consequences not only 
in the focal dyadic relationship, but also in adjacent relationships in the supply chain. This 
implies that organizations, or their managers, are not atomistic players, and points to the 
importance of incorporating the broader social context. More specifically, in the first 
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manuscript, we provide first evidence on the role of MCS imitation in supply chains, and 
demonstrate that suppliers often imitate the MCS used by the buyer in their interactions with 
their own suppliers. Given extensive prior empirical support for alternative antecedents of 
MCS usage, this finding is impressive and suggests that how suppliers control their own 
suppliers follows, to a certain degree, from imitating how the buyer controlled them. This 
study highlights the value of extending the traditional transaction cost logic with ideas 
derived from the imitation literature, as suggested by previous research (e.g., Roberts & 
Greenwood, 1997). In addition, in the second manuscript, we build upon this further and 
provide evidence on how performance may follow from the imitation of MCS throughout the 
supply chain but, at the same time, how mismatches between the imitated controls and the 
specific transaction context weaken these effects. In this way, we add to our understanding of 
the conditions under which it is, or it is not beneficial to imitate MCS in the supply chain, and 
specifically emphasize the critical role of transaction context similarity for MCS imitation to 
be successful. Contrary to what earlier studies have indicated (e.g., Haunschild & Miner, 
1997), we show that imitation, even of successful practices, is not always valuable, but that 
the extent to which firms benefit from imitation is contingent upon the conditions in which 
they operate. 
In the third manuscript, we expand existing theory by providing a broader view of how 
managers may draw on the social context to inform trust judgments, and subsequent selection 
decisions. Previous studies have mainly described trustors as decision-makers who use 
information from their history of interactions with a partner to draw inferences about the 
partner’s trustworthiness. The results of our study indicate that trustors also draw on third-
parties to inform their trust judgments. Our findings complement prior research suggesting 
that a model of trust transfer or imitation is useful in addressing the question of how 
managers choose collaboration partners (e.g., Stewart, 2003; Wittek, 2001). In particular, we 
point out that managers may come to trust and select a certain partner, just because they see 
others do. 
2. Managerial implications 
This dissertation has also important implications for management practice. As mentioned 
before, in today’s business environment, companies are increasingly working together in 
close supply chain relationships. However, for  practitioners to realize the existing potentials, 
effective management controls are needed to serve as the underlying basis. In this regard, it is 
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important to think not only about which MCS should be used during the relationship, but also 
about how to set up the relationship at the outset and, especially, with which partner. 
Specifically, despite the potential benefits of close cooperation between firms, high failure 
rates are still reported, which are often attributed to the lack of adequate MCS and poor 
partner selection (Ireland et al., 2002; Dekker et al., 2013). This dissertation aims to develop 
a better understanding of how MCS are designed and how collaboration partners are selected 
in interfirm relationships, by introducing the role of imitation. 
Especially given that imitation is a widespread phenomenon, it is important that 
managers understand when imitation occurs and when it may have beneficial or harmful 
implications (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006; Ordanini et al., 2008). By investigating the role of 
imitation in the context of interfirm management control, the outcome of this research offers 
useful insights to managers engaging in interfirm relationships. 
With regard to the first and second manuscript, we believe that managers that are aware 
of MCS imitation in different parts of the supply chain, should be better able to control their 
upstream interactions. A first important point to keep in mind is that each manager has a 
potential for serving as a model for other managers’ actions (Manz & Sims, 1981). In fact, 
whether or not managers desire their MCS to be imitated and passed on, this may occur 
nonetheless. By recognizing the conditions under which MCS imitation is likely, as indicated 
in the first manuscript, managers might be able to organize themselves to provide the best 
chance for imitation when it is desired and the least chance for imitation when it is not. 
Moreover, managers must realize that they themselves might be engaging in imitation, and 
should consider in advance whether it is in their best interest for the MCS to spread in this 
manner. In particular, in the second manuscript, we show that imitation should not be a 
context-independent choice. The suitability of MCS imitation needs a very careful and 
reflective assessment. Although imitating successful MCS can positively affect performance, 
results indicate that the effect crucially depends on similarity in the transaction context. 
Therefore, managers should recognize that not every cooperation is the same and that things 
may go wrong when imitating practices from other firms without questioning their 
applicability in the specific context (Lyles et al., 1996). A better understanding of these 
imitation effects should help managers to maximize the usefulness of their own imitation of 
other firms’ MCS practices within the supply chain. 
With regard to the third manuscript, the results should make managers aware of the 
different types of influences they are facing when selecting among potential partners. Our 
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findings indicate that observing other firms’ choices may increase a manager’s trust in a 
potential partner. Scholars have noted, however, that trust by itself does not guarantee 
trustworthy behavior (Carson et al., 2003; McEvily et al., 2003). Just because one party trusts 
another party, it does not follow that the other party is indeed going to meet the expectations 
of the first party. According to this, we argue that managers must beware of the dangers 
involved in blindly following other firms as, without any information about their outcomes, 
this may lead to instances of misplaced trust and poor partner selection. 
3. Limitations and suggestions for future research 
This dissertation provides new insights on the impact of imitation on the decision-making 
process to form interfirm relationships and the management thereof. As every study, we 
recognize that this dissertation is not without limitations, which at the same time bring out a 
number of promising avenues for future research. 
A first topic for future research directly follows from the specific setting we focused on. 
Although our ideas are centered around interfirm relationships in general, in all three 
manuscripts, our empirical results relate to buyer-supplier relationships. It must be noted that 
interfirm relationships can take many forms (e.g., Brass et al., 2004; Langfield-Smith, 2008), 
and the extent to which our findings are generalizable to other types of relationships remains 
to be studied. 
Further, given our interest in studying imitative behavior, it is important to keep in mind 
that no empirical test on imitation can be done without a correct measurement of the 
construct, and an important observation is that imitation is one of the concepts that lack a 
shared and clear operationalization (Ordanini et al., 2008). In both the first and second 
manuscript, using survey data, we propose a measure for imitation of MCS in supply chains, 
and use several validation questions. Examining the phenomena of MCS imitation with 
alternative operationalizations, however, could provide additional empirical support for our 
findings. 
Related to this, the first and second manuscript examined MCS imitation moving 
upstream in the supply chain. It would be interesting for future research to find out whether a 
similar process may also occur moving downstream. More generally, our results demonstrate 
the importance of looking outside the focal dyad when examining certain phenomena. 
Additional insight could also be gained by further expanding the unit of analysis in 
relationship research (Kumar et al.,  2011). For example, pointing to the wider network of 
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relationships, how far imitation carriers may also be important to consider. While we looked 
at the supply chain consisting of three members, it would be of interest to see whether 
imitation also occurs at other levels of the supply chain, and potentially whether there is a 
decrease or increase in imitation at each subsequent level, which in turn may reveal different 
control mismatch scenarios. 
Moreover, with regard to the first manuscript,  we note that the explanatory variables 
mainly related to the first-level dyad, while limited information was collected on the 
conditions of the second-level dyad. Recall that we have chosen the factors investigated in 
this study as predictors of MCS imitation, and first-tier relationship characteristics in 
particular were argued to play an important role. Nevertheless, incorporating second-tier 
relationship characteristics in our model, for instance as informed by the traditional 
transaction cost framework, could provide some further clarifications on the MCS choices 
(e.g., Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 2010). In fact, while we highlight that effects beyond the 
dyadic relationship are important to consider when explaining MCS, specific characteristics 
of the dyad remain worthy of study because they could still directly influence the use and 
effectiveness of MCS. In the second manuscript, we take this into account, and examine how 
the impact of MCS imitation is determined by transaction context similarity. Specifically, we 
tested for three elements of the transaction context, and encourage future research to include 
other contextual variables that may shape the benefits of MCS imitation, such as other 
transaction characteristics or firms’ cultural context (e.g., Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005). 
The results of the third manuscript likewise provide interesting opportunities for future 
research. For instance, our findings point to competence trust and goodwill trust as two 
distinct dimensions, which may be formed through different mechanisms, but play both an 
important role in partner selection decisions. Based on the evidence presented here, we 
believe it is imperative for researchers to recognize that trust is a multifaceted concept and to 
further differentiate the dimensions of trust (e.g., Gattiker et al., 2007). This would allow for 
a more nuanced view on trust formation and its consequences in collaborative relationships. 
In addition, as we considered only the effect of neutral or positive information from 
third-parties on trust perceptions, the third manuscript could be extended by examining the 
effects of negative experiences as well. For example, the buyer manager could be informed 
by other firms that they have done business with a particular supplier who did not meet his 
obligations, and hence were not satisfied. Such negative feedback could have a large impact 
on the buyer manager’s trust in the supplier. Indeed, social psychology research has shown 
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that negative information is given heavier weight and consideration than neutral or positive 
information because it represents potential threats or dangers (Rozin & Royzman, 2001). 
Specifically, previous studies found that both positive and negative information obtained 
from third-parties can influence trust but that the effect of negative information appears to be 
much stronger (Chua et al., 2008). Our results indicate, for example, that positive information 
from third-parties may not always greatly differ from neutral information in influencing the 
buyer manager’s trust in a potential supplier, but it is likely that negative information will. 
Building on this further, the third manuscript did not find a significant interaction effect 
between information obtained form own and other firms’ experiences. Instead, we found that 
buyers who have direct experience with the supplier are still inclined to refer to third-parties, 
perhaps as a way to confirm what they know from their own experience. In fact, in the 
current setting both types of information are based on positive experience, and hence are 
complementary and reinforce each other. However, it would be interesting to understand 
what happens in the situation where information signals are inconsistent, for example in the 
case of favorable own experiences but negative experiences by others. Research on social 
psychology suggest that past decisions affect the interpretation of new information. In 
particular, cognitive dissonance theory posits that individuals encounter increased cognitive 
dissonance when they receive information that is inconsistent with a prior choice, and in 
response may downplay the significance of this information (Patzelt & Shepherd, 2008). 
Consistent with this theory, a buyer manager whose firm had prior positive experiences with 
a supplier will likely experience cognitive dissonance when they know other firms that had 
negative experiences with this supplier, which may cause him to downplay the significance of 
this negative information from third-parties. This suggests an interaction effect where the 
decrease in trust that accompanies the negative information from third-parties is less for a 
buyer manager whose firm itself had positive past collaborations with the supplier. Related to 
this, previous research has shown that information from own experiences may substitute 
learning from others for some types of information but may complement learning from others 
for other types of information, depending on the nature of the information brought by third-
parties (Tuschke et al., 2014). By addressing this issue, future research could offer additional 
insights on the interplay between learning from own-firm and other-firm experiences. 
An additional remark is that, while the third manuscript documents imitation effects that 
are consistent with social network theory, there is much more to understand about the social 
dynamics related to this. The imitation of trust may, for example, be dependent on relation 
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strength or on how well one knows the third-parties. Although an actor may have access to 
several people who are potentially critical sources of information, the quality of the relations 
determines which of those resources that are within reach will be accessed, and to what extent 
(Moran, 2005). Along the same line, managers’ beliefs or behaviors may not only be 
influenced by the existence of information from third-parties, but also by the weighting that is 
assigned to such information based on the social relevance of the information source (Ferrin 
et al., 2006). In our context, the social relevance of an information source is likely to be 
reflected by the trustworthiness of that source. Managers may place considerably more value 
on trust-related judgments obtained from trustworthy third-parties than from third-parties that 
are not deemed to be trustworthy themselves. Hence, which third-parties will be mainly relied 
upon for imitation remains an interesting question, and we leave investigating this for future 
research. 
Another important extension of the third manuscript would be to develop an experiment 
in which participants play repeated trust games (e.g., Malhotra & Murnighan, 2002). The 
experiment could be designed in such a way that in one condition trustors only know what 
happens in their own game with the trustee, whereas in another condition trustors may be able 
to look at the choices of other trustors with the trustee. Then, information from own-firm 
experiences and other-firm experiences would be not so much predetermined, but would be 
created within the experiment. Such a design would allow researchers to better track the 
effects of different types of learning and, most importantly, to observe actual imitation at 
work (Barrera & Buskens, 2007). 
Furthermore, the third manuscript examines trust formation pertaining to the partner 
selection stage of the relationship, but we recognize that trust further develops as one’s 
positive expectations are confirmed by another’s behavior over time (Elliot et al., 2012). Our 
results suggest that the role of imitation is strong when entering new collaborative 
relationships. Further research could investigate whether the importance of third-parties 
changes over the course of the relationship. Consistent with other studies addressing 
governance in interfirm settings, researchers may also wish to consider the influence on other 
decisions, besides actual partner selection (e.g., Rooks et al., 2006). It would be interesting to 
find out, for instance, whether imitation of third-parties’ trustfulness towards a particular 
partner may also work to reduce the effort put into the contractual management of the 
relationship. 
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In summary, this dissertation represents a first step in understanding the role of imitation 
in interfirm management control. In addition to the questions this dissertation answers, the 
results suggest several new directions for future research. 
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